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There is a consensus in extant scholarship that austerity has had profound, harmful 
effects on vulnerable and marginalised populations. However, research on its impact 
on the governance and delivery of health structures intended to support individuals 
within prison settings remains sparse.  
This thesis draws upon the interdisciplinary contributions of critical social science 
theories to provide an in-depth, qualitative study exploring the impacts of 10 years of 
austerity (and counting) on prison health governance and the delivery of prison 
healthcare services in England. The research approach follows a constructivist 
grounded theory methodology and uses the perspectives of 87 prison health experts 
to illustrate how austerity unravels through a series of six political paradoxes—i) the 
need for austerity and cost-saving measures; ii) delivering prison health within a 
punishment structure; iii) the stability of a structured, top-down control of prison 
service; iv) the political rhetoric of ‘tough on crime’ and ‘we are all in this together’; v) 
neoliberal responses of the government towards prison instability; and vi) continued 
scrutiny of prisons and prison health, which has shaped and constrained prison 
health governance and the delivery of prison healthcare in England.  
This study, the first of its kind in England, confutes political claims that portray fiscal 
cuts and the increasing use of privatisation as requisite to prevent economic 
profligacy and reduce costs. It problematises how the prison health system in 
England operates within a regressive neoliberal structure that prioritises top-down 
hierarchies and punishment over collaboration and rehabilitation. Concurrent with the 
implementation of austerity since 2010, it explores the participants’ perceptions of 
how the transient political leadership of prison services, as well as the rampant 
growth of prison gangs and serious organised crime groups across English prisons, 
challenge both the governance and delivery of prison regime and health. 
This study also reveals that, although the United Kingdom is the fifth-largest 
economy globally, the poor continue to bear the burden of austerity—as study 
participants observed—via the withdrawal of welfare services from the community 
and a deindustrialisation process that has forced penal institutions to become first 
responders for some individuals. Building additional prisons, recruiting more prison 
officers, and blaming psychoactive substances for existing prison instability merely 
augments the UK government’s neoliberal vision. Finally, continual monitoring by 
prison oversight mechanisms fails to hold the government accountable for the 
deterioration in governance and delivery of healthcare across English prisons.  
Overall, this study underscores the important and yet unarticulated phenomenon that 
austerity has failed to reduce the burgeoning national debt, govern prison health, 
deliver prison healthcare services effectively and efficiently, and improve prisoner 




conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and policy contributions to interdisciplinary 
prison health studies, seven radical, upstream solutions are proposed to effect 
change and untangle a decade of political paradoxes that have shaped and 
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This is a picture of my family, which was taken 22 years 
ago, during the Eid celebration in Malaysia. In fact, it is the 
only complete picture with all of my family members in it. A 
few days before, I received my results for the compulsory 
national examination. Out of 29,000 lower secondary 
school candidates, I secured a top 1% position in the 
country. While I was showered with congratulatory wishes 
by relatives and friends, a relative, rather unexpectedly, 
asked, “What do you want to do after school?”, to which 
some other relatives suggested, “Just become a teacher, 
you only have to work between 9am and 2pm every day”, 
“You can join the local municipal office, punch your card day-in and day-out, have a 
beautiful family of five” and “Why don’t you start a small business? Work when you 
feel like you want it. It will be easier for family gatherings like this”. Among this 
chaos, my parents were silent. I knew they were unhappy with the suggestions, 
which seemed to have a lack of imagination and ambition. 
As I reflected on the conversations throughout the day, I looked at people in my 
circle and the small village in East Coast of Malaysia that I lived in. All of my father’s 
siblings worked for the government and repeatedly spoke about how much they 
could not wait to retire. From my mother’s side, none of them went to university. We 
lived in a small village where most people’s education was GCSEs. Rampant 
poverty, drug dealing, drug-using, anti-social behaviour, and violent crime were 
prevalent, which ironically related to the topic of my PhD. This reflection was a 
turning point for me. I felt I needed to achieve the highest education possible. I knew 
there was a world out there where I could reach my potential and attain social 
mobility. Using this as my motivation, I worked as hard as possible to become the 
first person in my family to ever obtain A-levels, an undergraduate degree, a 
Masters, and, hopefully, a PhD qualification. Along the way, I was fortunate that I 
was supported by various government scholarships as our family would not have 
been able to afford my education. 
A PhD thesis is often portrayed as a solitary journey; however, the long list below 
proves the opposite. First and foremost, I am deeply grateful for the continuous 
insight and support of my supervisors, Dr Nick de Viggiani and Professor Christina 
Pantazis. Nick, whose maddening attention to detail drove me to finally master the 
craft of academic prose, inspired me to embark on prison health research since my 
MSc Public Health between 2014 and 2017. And a special thanks to Christina for her 
selfless time and care—from endless free lunches and coffees and conversations 
about prison abolitionism to enabling me to secure a book contract with Routledge 
Criminology and a lectureship post at the School for Policy Studies, University of 




weekends has not gone unnoticed. Without their guidance and constant feedback, 
this PhD and my development as an early career academic would not have been 
achievable. 
I am indebted to the ESRC for their generous funding. A particular thank you must 
go to the South West Doctoral Training Partnership (SWDTP), and in particular to 
Rich, Sally, Sonja, Molly, Jo, Helen, Jackson and Connor for their trust in this study 
and their continuous support towards my journey. I have benefited so much from 
being part of this academic family—from funding opportunities to training 
workshops—and hopefully, I will return and give something back to this community. I 
am also grateful to colleagues in the Centre for Public Health and Wellbeing, UWE 
Criminology, Centre for Health, Law, and Society, and the School for Policy 
Studies—their generosity has never failed to overwhelm me. 
My deep appreciation goes to all 87 research participants of this study. Each of you 
generously spent your time with me talking about my research—either in the snowy 
city of Vienna or at the Victorian prison in the North East of England. Thank you for 
teaching me something new about the prison health field and for welcoming me as 
part of your community. The level of perseverance and resilience that you 
demonstrated—behind closed doors, away from the public spotlight, and in a system 
that continues to deteriorate—continued to amaze me. 
A very special thank you to my close friends: Della, Nunu, Keknis, Al, Adie, Emily, 
Lisa and Nicky for listening to my stories during my journey—the good, the bad, and 
the ugly ones—and for keeping me grounded. I am also grateful to Anne, Natasha, 
James, Michelle, John, Sheelagh and Judy for being great mentors, for their 
continual support of my academic development and for treating me as a colleague 
rather than subordinate, even though I am still on the apprenticeship training for my 
academic work. 
Last but not least, I thank my family in both Malaysia and the UK. They had to 
grudgingly learn to accept my three-year doctorate journey and still provide me with 
support, day after day. My gratitude for them can hardly be expressed in words.  
I dedicate this thesis to my parents and, in particular, my mother, who single-
handedly raised us after my father passed away. Thank you for the blessing for me 
to complete this doctorate and achieve the highest education level possible, despite 
not having the opportunity to go to university yourself. Even though you do not 
understand English—“I do not understand a word of your work”—you always 
cheerlead my work every time I sent you a copy of my publications or mention my 
achievement to others.  
I hope that one day, this story will be an inspiration to someone in the small village 
where I come from; there is a world out there to be explored, beyond the “9am to 
2pm job” and “a small business”, and that it is possible to work the way out of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
In 1848, Rudolf Carl Virchow, a pathologist who reported on the typhus epidemic in 
Silesia (in the region that is now part of Poland), observed how people oppressed by 
the aristocracy silently died of starvation (Virchow, 1848). While the epidemic 
ravaged the poor and vulnerable population, the aristocrats indulged in material 
luxuries and simultaneously increased the power of the courts and the army to 
protect their authority (ibid.). The civil servants merely acquiesced to the 
government’s directives (ibid.). Only when the press continually published the details 
of the hunger-typhus epidemic did government ministries order an in-depth review of 
the situation, with public condemnations that political and economic reforms were 
critical to tackling the burgeoning outbreak (ibid.). 
A somewhat parallel situation exists in the United Kingdom today. Following 
implementation of austerity for over ten years, inequalities are burgeoning: the rich 
get richer, and the poorer get poorer (Harvey, 2010; Milne, 2014; Office for National 
Statistics, 2021a; United Nations [UN] General Assembly, 2019). Austerity removes 
social protection—a key feature of the welfare state—and the poor become further 
marginalised and excluded, and some are eventually pushed into the criminal justice 
system (Wacquant, 2000). The cycle of punishment is perpetuated in prisons, where 
individuals continue to be treated poorly (HM Inspectorate of Prisons [HMIP], 2020). 
Additionally, in the community, both police powers and the number of prison places 
have increased following a growing trend of populism and a penal environment since 
the mid-1970s (Hall, 1978; Hall, 2011; Newburn, 2007; Nozick, 1974). Despite 
continual raillery against conditions in prisons and communities (House of Commons 
Justice Committee, 2019a), a paradigm shift in political power has yet to occur. 
Austerity is perceived as both a political ideology and a political outcome. Defined as 
a form of voluntary deflation via a reduction in government borrowing, austerity 
requires deep cuts in public expenditures to stimulate economic growth (Ortiz et al., 
2011). Beyond the falling budgets, its implementation is redolent of the chasm 
between the desire to uphold austerity—branded as “economic efficiency”—and an 
ideological programme aimed at dismantling social structures, a programme that has 
been built upon economic fallacies (Krugman, 2012; Wren-Lewis, 2016). Indeed, 
austerity reflects an embrace of neoliberalism: a policy of state that restructures 
processes organised by the logic of supposed economic efficiency, minimal state 
intervention, and a preference for individual rather than collective rights (Harvey, 
2010). As argued by Farnsworth and Irving (2018), operationalising ‘austerity’ over 
‘neoliberalism’ is strategic, as the former appears more definitive and more 
pragmatic than the latter, as well as free from any ideological response to the 
specific ‘problem’ of government debt. These working definitions of austerity and 
neoliberalism are further elaborated in the Literature Review chapters. 
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Austerity has had a profound impact on health outcomes. Circa 130,000 preventable 
deaths in the general population of the United Kingdom have been attributed to it 
(Institute for Public Policy Research, 2019). Early research on austerity examined 
how high-risk groups, such as migrants and the homeless, are particularly vulnerable 
to financial cuts in services and benefits in silos (Suhrcke et al., 2011). Substantial 
evidence suggests that spending cuts to public services have compounded the 
multidimensional nature of inequalities that cut across various minority groups, 
including women, Black and Minority Ethnic (BME), disabled, and lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender (LGBT) communities (Cross, 2013; De Henau and Reed, 
2016; Khan, 2015; Westwood, 2016). Research regarding the impacts of austerity on 
the governance and delivery structure of public sector services, however, remains 
sparse. The studies that do exist focus on organisations, such as UK local authorities 
and the NHS, and how these services underwent a structural reconfiguration, scaled 
back their operations, and contracted out their services (Heald and Steel, 2018; 
Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; McEldowney, 2016; Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011). 
There is consensus on the harmful effects of austerity on the population’s health and 
the governance and delivery structure that seek to improve it (Heald and Steel, 2018; 
McEldowney, 2016; Taylor-Gooby, 2012). However, the governance of prison health 
and the delivery of prison healthcare services in England have not been 
systematically researched. Without such efforts, there is a risk of failing to 
understand adequately how austerity has shaped the governance and delivery of 
health in prisons, inimically affected the service delivery of the prison healthcare 
services, and contextualised how demolishing the health system’s structure punishes 
prisoners beyond the loss of liberty.  
Over the last decade, media and official publications have highlighted the crisis 
facing the English prison system1 (European Prison Observatory, 2013; Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
[CPT], 2017; HMIP, 2020). To rectify the adverse situation, uncovering the role that 
the austerity programme has played in that crisis and, ultimately, describing the 
effects of austerity on prison health governance and the delivery of prison healthcare 
services within a broader construct of politically-determined health- and location-
based inequalities is critical. Politics and places matter for health, but health also 
matters for politics and places, particularly when there is a mutually reinforcing and 
reciprocal relationship between place and structure (Dorling, 2013).    
This thesis critically examines how the 10-year-long austerity policy has impeded 
governance and delivery systems of healthcare in English prisons. It does so using 
neoliberalism as a political construct that valorises policies of ‘rolling back’ and 
‘rolling out’, hegemonic programmes (dominance of class power by the elites), and 
governmentality (Ward and England, 2007). In other words, it demonstrates how 
 
1 The United Kingdom is made up of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The focus of this 
thesis will be on the prison health governance and delivery of prison healthcare services in England. 
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austerity has been implemented as a political ideology rather than a policy based on 
evidence. Its execution has not only led to ballooning debt in the decade after its 
implementation but also a deteriorated prison health system. In addition, the policy 
has perpetuated a cycle of punishment that has led to sicker prisoners and high 
rates of reoffending and violated prisoners’ human rights (CPT, 2020a; Ministry of 
Justice, 2020e; Ministry of Justice, 2020f; Wacquant, 2010).  
This thesis is a large, qualitative study of prison health drawing on data from 87 
prison and prison health experts, including policymakers, prison governors and 
officers, and healthcare service providers at the international, national, and local 
levels of governance. Grounded in the domains of public health and criminology, this 
study offers sophisticated and complex investigations through a variety of 
disciplinary lenses—sociology, law, social policy, politics, and economics—to 
generate coherent debates and deliver improved outcomes to resolve today’s 
multifaceted research problems. 
This introductory chapter establishes the aims of the research and the research 
questions. It also explains the rationale for conducting the study and outlines the 
structure and content of the remainder of the thesis. 
1.1 Research aims and questions 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the impacts of austerity on prison health 
governance and delivery of healthcare across prisons in England from the 
perspectives of 87 research participants from key organisations relevant to prison 
work at the international level (e.g., the UN, the World Health Organization [WHO], 
and the Council of Europe), the national level (e.g., HM Prison & Probation Service 
[HMPPS], NHS England, and Public Health England [PHE]), prison establishments 
(i.e., high, medium, open, resettlement, and private prisons), and voluntary sector 
representatives at the national and regional levels. It is operationalised via seven 
main strands.  
First, by operationalising the construct of neoliberalism, austerity is revealed to be a 
vehicle justifying scaling down public sector services (including prisons) as part of 
the deficit reduction programme and privatisation of prisons and healthcare services. 
Second, this thesis seeks to articulate the deterioration to the governance and 
delivery of healthcare services across English prisons, as well as the supportive 
prison regime. Third, it examines how austerity and the broader neoliberalism 
framework underscore prison rehabilitation from the prism of punishment. Fourth, the 
thesis demonstrates how adoption of a tough-on-crime stance and, simultaneously, 
the withdrawal of community services for vulnerable individuals, impacts prison 
operations and provisions for prison healthcare services. Fifth, it investigates political 
responses to the system’s instability, especially when they merely hew to the politics 
of neoliberalism. Sixth, the thesis assesses the effectiveness of scrutiny mechanisms 
in reducing the effects of austerity on the governance and delivery of health across 
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prisons in England. Finally, it explores potential solutions that can serve as an 
antidote to the austerity programme implemented over the last decade.  
The main research question underpinning this study is the following: How does 
austerity impact prison health governance and healthcare delivery in England? The 
following subsidiary research questions used with the research participants are as 
follows:  
1. In what ways have austerity been mobilised as a vehicle to strengthen 
neoliberal constructs that impact prison health governance and the delivery of 
prison healthcare services in England? 
2. How is austerity manifested upon prison healthcare governance and 
healthcare delivery, as well as the supportive prison regime?  
3. How has the top-down control of the prison service affected prison health 
governance and the delivery of healthcare across English prisons? 
4. To what extent did longstanding issues of English prisons impact prison 
health governance and delivery of healthcare, as well as the broader prison 
regime, once austerity was put into place in 2010? 
5. What has been the government’s response to the ongoing instability since 
2010? 
6. In what ways do the scrutiny mechanisms of prisons mediate the impact of 
austerity on the prison health governance and the delivery of healthcare in 
English prisons? 
7. What are the policy solutions to address the impact of austerity on prison 
health and the delivery of prison healthcare in England?  
This thesis focuses on the impact of the austerity measures on the prison health 
system, institutions, policies, financing, service delivery, and monitoring, rather than 
the health outcomes of prisoners per se. The term ‘prison’ refers to institutions that 
hold people aged 18 years and older who have been sentenced to a period of 
imprisonment by the courts for offences against the criminal law.2 This research 
explicitly focuses on prisons in England, as prisons situated in the devolved 
administrations of Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland are subject to different 
 
2 The analysis excludes other locations that deprive people of their liberty, including police cells, youth 
offender institutions, military detention centres, immigration removal centres, and mental health 
institutions. Likewise, the study does not address prisoners who have been released and monitored 




policy responses and enforcement and utilise a different health system (HMPPS, 
2017a).  
1.2 Thesis structure  
The structure of the thesis is divided into chapters. Chapter 2 reviews critical social 
sciences literature that demonstrates how the UK’s Conservative politicians have 
conceptualised the notion of austerity since 2010. It appraises the extant literature 
that illustrates how politicians have created this crisis—in which its history is 
traceable as far back as 1980s during the Thatcherism era—and how they have 
resorted to neoliberal adjustments as solutions (Gamble, 2014). This analysis is 
underscored by the latest Gross Domestic Products (GDP) and the debt-to-GDP 
ratio data.  
Chapter 3 introduces the drivers of prison health governance and delivery in 
England. It initially outlines several definitions and theories of governance before 
analysing the structure, process, and prison and prison healthcare actors. Building 
on the critical realist theory of governance that theorises how the central government 
maintains a firm grip on hierarchical coordination (Marsh, 2011), it then highlights the 
peculiarity of prison healthcare and prison service in England—specifically in cases 
where the state dictates the minutiae of service delivery. This chapter explores how 
the health system is shaped by the government’s structured, top-down, and 
command-and-control approach. 
Additionally, drawing upon the principle of less eligibility (Sim, 2009) within a regime 
of efficiency, value for money, and performance monitoring (Loader and Sparks, 
2002), this chapter locates the role of health within a structure that prioritises 
punishment. The chapter also reflects on the vulnerability of a prison health 
governance system that has been continually subjected to myriad political 
interference and increasing privatisation, thus vitiating the potential for sustainable 
health gains in this setting. It then examines literature that illustrates the 
effectiveness of the monitoring structure of both prison and prison healthcare 
services in addressing the systemic instability. 
Chapter 4 completes the literature review section of the thesis. It draws upon the 
work of Wacquant (2009) concerning a ‘centaur state’, Goffman’s (1961) theory of 
importation, and Sykes’ (1958) theory of deprivation to articulate how prisons do not 
account for the needs of these populations. The chapter argues that prisoners’ poor 
health is the by-product of their experiences prior to entering incarceration and that 
inattention to their health needs during incarceration further perpetuates the cycle of 
exclusion and marginalisation. It promulgates how the prevailing neoliberalism limits 
political possibilities for reducing health inequalities among prisoners and the wider 
population, as well as causing human rights violations. 
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Academic research is often narrated in a uniform, linear process, whereas history 
rarely unfolds so neatly. In ensuring the transparency of this research’s research 
methodology, Chapter 5 details how grounded theory methodology was 
operationalised over the 13-month period of fieldwork. It justifies the methodological 
position undertaken and the use of constructivist grounded theory to answer the 
research questions. It provides a detailed description of the recruitment of 87 
participants. Challenges related to recruitment, as well as to the analysis of 1,474 
pages and 689,664 narrative texts conducted via NVivo, the process of establishing 
credibility of the thesis findings (i.e., via data triangulation, member checks, and peer 
debriefing), and maintenance of ethical conduct are described. Finally, the chapter 
ends with a reflexive conclusion.  
The findings of this study are presented in five chapters. Chapter 6 begins by 
outlining how the research participants made sense of austerity across various levels 
of governance. Based on the Benchmarking programme of the Ministry of Justice in 
2012 that executed the government’s reductions on prison spending (House of 
Commons Justice Committee, 2012), it reports participants’ perspectives on the 
government’s justification for the imposition of austerity on prison health.  
Chapter 7 discusses participants’ accounts of deterioration in the governance and 
delivery of prison health—such as longer waits, insufficient consultation time, and 
frequent cancellation or postponement of appointments—that stems from austerity. 
In some cases, prisoner complaints were so severe that participants’ narratives 
averred that a lack of access to healthcare has increased prisoners’ disability and 
mortality. Additionally, participants descanted on the progressively harmful living 
conditions where prisoners spent more than 14 hours daily in unhygienic and 
overcrowded cells, thus triggering boredom and restlessness and contributing to 
unprecedented spikes (albeit underreported) in self-harm, assault, and self-inflicted 
death (Ministry of Justice, 2019b). As such, this chapter describes how imprisonment 
became a double punishment and double deprivation for prisoners. Rather than 
presenting a uniform trend, however, this chapter illustrates participants’ varying 
views of how different prison establishments suffered financial cuts 
disproportionately to others.  
Additionally, this chapter illustrates the difficulties staff face in stemming the flow of 
psychoactive substances, which have been linked to increases in organised crime 
and prison gangs operating both within and beyond prison walls. This chapter 
examines how these criminal groups not only impair prisoner health (by, say, 
intimidating vulnerable prisoners into buying drugs from them) but also create and 
administer their own forms of prison governance. This phenomenon is linked to 
Habermas’s (1973) theory of the legitimation crisis of prisons. This chapter also 
details participants’ observations on the challenges in commissioning and delivering 
healthcare services across English prisons, as well as the increasing privatisation of 
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whole prisons and their services—including healthcare—as part of the ongoing 
neoliberal programme. 
Chapter 8 underscores background issues that have intensified governance and 
delivery of prison healthcare across English prisons. This chapter articulates how the 
diminishing social and welfare services in the deprived areas across England, as 
well as links between austerity and the shift of deindustrialisation, operate as a form 
of disadvantage. Participants mentioned that this situation has ensured—despite 
their not being equipped to do so—that prisons have become first responders when 
community provisions are no longer available to numerous vulnerable individuals 
from these communities. These phenomena are against the backdrop of such 
longstanding issues as a poor prison environment, harsher sentencing practices, and 
volatile political prison leadership. 
Chapter 9 examines participants’ reactions to the government’s policy responses to 
prison instability, particularly as they pertain to the nationwide recruitment campaign 
for new prison officers since 2016. This chapter also highlights participants’ views on 
inherent failures in prison oversight mechanisms and how those failures helped 
create the space and conditions for the deep-seated crisis that austerity continually 
inflicts on prison structure. It will also explore participants’ responses to third sector 
organisations that often fill advocacy gaps. As discussed in this chapter, these 
organisations have absorbed neoliberal logic and failed to challenge austerity 
measures so as to maintain their government funding. This chapter concludes with 
reasons why nearly all participants were sceptical about the Treasury’s 
announcements in 2019 that austerity was ending—especially given the backdrop of 
Brexit (at the time of interviews), which has been predicted to perpetuate the decline 
in the UK’s economic growth. 
Aiming at theorising political and social impacts and proposing requisite specific 
policymaking efforts, Chapter 10 considers several distinct measures to undo the 
effects of austerity on prison health. Following participants’ remarks, these 
recommendations include improving the public’s political literacy to expose a fiscal 
crisis that does not exist in the first place, as well as nudging the political direction 
towards increased resources for prisons and the community via tax increases for 
profitable corporations and wealthy individuals. In parallel, reducing the prison 
population, attaching augmented accountability for programmes to the relevant 
ministers, and encouraging prisoners to initiate civil and criminal litigations against 
the government are suggested to accelerate reversing the impacts of austerity on 
prisoners and the prison health system. 
Chapter 11 juxtaposes the findings with extant theories and literature on austerity 
and neoliberalism, prison health and healthcare, and prison governance structures. 
Based on participants’ viewpoints, it articulates the central argument of this thesis: 
austerity unravels a series of six political paradoxes that have shaped and 
constrained prison health governance and delivery of quality prison healthcare in 
 
25 
England. These paradoxes include the following: i) austerity’s putative 
imperativeness; ii) conceptualisation of prison health from the prism of punishment; 
iii) stability of command-and-control governance of English prisons; iv) political 
rhetoric of tough on crime and ‘we are all in this together’; v) government responses 
to instil prison stability; and vi) scrutiny organisations’ continual monitoring. It 
concludes by discussing the applied implications for prison health governance and 
healthcare delivery and the supportive prison regime and structure. 
Chapter 12 concludes the thesis. Empirically, it reinforces the arguments that both 
austerity and imprisonment have failed to deliver their stated objectives in reducing 
the burgeoning national debt and improving prisoner rehabilitation, respectively. Yet, 
after over a decade of failures, the combination of austerity and imprisonment 
remains the government’s seeming juggernaut—continuing to produce the same 
result—with marked political reluctance to dispense with these policies. These 
adverse dynamics are occurring against a potential backdrop of a creeping recession 
following Brexit and the global COVID-19 pandemic. Theoretically, the thesis brings 
together the major themes that reiterate the paradoxes of austerity, imprisonment, 
and the structure of governance of prisons and prison health. Methodologically, it 
illustrates the mechanics of conducting a large-scale, interdisciplinary qualitative 
study, which fulfils the sparsity of ‘studying up’ research in the prison health field and 
improves rigour in analysing enormous amounts of qualitative data. Finally, for policy 
contribution, this thesis argues for implementing tracking mechanisms to ensure that 
the recommendations from the prison oversight bodies, as well as justice ministers’ 
political promises, are properly executed. The chapter (and thesis) concludes with an 





Although the first prison was established in the UK in the late 19th century, scholars 
did not focus much attention on prison and prison health until a century later. 
Because the aim of this thesis is to understand the impact of austerity on the prison 
health governance and delivery in England, an in-depth analysis of the current prison 
healthcare governance and delivery is thus contextualised within the backdrop of 
existing understanding of the political economy of neoliberalism.  
Considering how austerity has been operationalised as a vehicle to strengthen 
neoliberalism, this literature review illustrates the framing of austerity as a political, 
rather than an economic, choice. Beyond the projection of cost reductions on public 
sector services, including prisons, the review demonstrates a longer-term welfare 
state restructuring in the context of preference for punishment over rehabilitation. 
These analyses are critical to providing the context for how prison healthcare 
delivery is mobilised within a prevailing neoliberal framework that limits political 
possibilities for reducing health inequalities among prisoners and the wider 
population, as well as creates human rights violations. 
Prior to describing how the 87 study participants perceive austerity’s impact on 
prison governance and delivery of prison healthcare in England, reviewing germane 
literature on the foregoing topics is important. Doing so will afford construction of the 
theoretical and conceptual undergirding of the thesis. Although the literature review 
chiefly focuses on the context in England, where appropriate, it draws on theoretical 
and empirical work from other geographical areas.  
The literature review initially investigates the development of austerity since 2010, 
centring on the welfare state and prisons (Chapter 2). It demonstrates how austerity 
became an organising concept within wider English society. Although extant work 
illuminates how political and social actors have mobilised austerity as a political and 
social agenda in the UK, the literature insufficiently contextualises austerity’s impact 
on prison health governance and delivery in England—a gap that will form the 
theoretical rationale of the present study. 
The review elucidates the historical and current arrangements for prisons and prison 
health governance and delivery in England (Chapter 3). It considers the present 
challenges that a neoliberal ideology presents—for instance, the prioritisation of 
punishment over rehabilitation and a preference for service privatisation that may 
derail health.  
Finally, this review appraises the current state of health across English prisons 
(Chapter 4). Coalescing epidemiological and sociological underpinnings of ill-health 
across these institutions are theorised. It concludes by examining the decline in 
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health conditions in prisons during the austerity time post-2010 and government 
responses to the declension that cohere with prevailing neoliberal values.
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Chapter 2: The spell of neoliberalism and austerity 
Introduction 
Despite well-publicised evidence on the effects of austerity on the general 
population’s health, research has not systematically contextualised the impact of 
austerity on prisoner health and well-being in England. This chapter initially provides 
a historical account of neoliberalism, which has provided a template for introducing 
and sustaining austerity as UK government policy since 2010. It subsequently 
reviews how austerity has been framed as a political choice rather than as an 
evidence-based one. Then an assessment of the consequences of austerity on 
prisons and prison healthcare services is offered. Beyond the immediate financial 
reduction in these services, the review infers a longer-term welfare state 
restructuring in the context of an increasing level of punitiveness and a tougher 
stance on crime.  
2.1 A history of neoliberalism 
According to Harvey (2005), neoliberals support the restoration of elite power based 
on class privilege, which they argue was undermined by the redistribution of wealth 
and income following World War II. Doing so exacerbates the inequality gap as 
wealth and income concentrate on the selective few (Piketty and Sanchez, 2014). 
Ward and England (2007) have identified four taxonomies of neoliberalism: (1) 
neoliberalism as a hegemonic ideological project; (2) neoliberalism as a policy and 
programme; (3) neoliberalism as a state form: the ‘rolling back’ and ‘rolling out’ of 
state formations in the name of reform; and (4) neoliberalism as a governmentality: 
the ways in which the relations among and between peoples and things are 
reimagined, reinterpreted, and reassembled to effect governing at a distance. This 
chapter will critically explore these dynamics. As Dardot and Laval (2013) and Peck 
(2015) note, neoliberal manifestations are best considered not as unconnected 
phenomena but as elements of a complicated but coherent political project. 
The provenance of today’s neoliberal economics in the UK can be traced to Adam 
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1976). The tome discoursed on the rights of free 
individuals to accumulate wealth and safeguard their own property interests. Smith 
(1976) proposed that government should play a minimal role in economic matters to 
allow trade to flourish. In the 19th century, industrialisation and the rise of 
manufacturing ensued, with the advent of waged labour, a factory system, free trade, 
and urbanisation dovetailing the revolution as the UK became ‘the workshop of the 
world’ (Hall, 2011, p.709).  
For almost 200 years, the UK government internalised the mindset of liberal 
economics through the rise of mass production, a large consumer market, and mass 
media (Hall, 2011). However, post-World War II, societal movements based on 
collectivism, solidarity, and trust became fashionable (Taylor-Gooby and Leruth, 
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2018). Britain embraced Keynesian economics, resulting in more than a third of the 
country’s GDP being redistributed to ensure acceptable standards in public services, 
promote greater social equality, provide benefits to those outside the labour market, 
and develop community infrastructure (Sen, 1977). This was the period in which the 
consensus of the welfare state took place—dubbed ‘the golden age’—although 
neoliberal ideas were running in the background through the Walter Lippmann 
Colloquium, which began in 1938, and the Mont Pelerin Society, which began in 
1947 (Barkan, 2000; Dardot and Laval, 2013). Keynes (1936) argued that the market 
had been left to its own devices for too long and that it did not show any signs of 
correcting its negative externalities: protracted unemployment, poverty, and health 
disparities. He called for counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies to address 
these externalities (Keynes, 1936). 
Nationwide inflation in the mid-1970s terminated the Keynesian reformation. 
Austerity emerged as a crucial means of sustaining neoliberalism during this period. 
The New York financial crisis in the 1970s and the bankruptcy threat from Mexico in 
the 1980s led the IMF to bail out Mexico in a deal that would impose austerity on its 
citizens (Harvey, 2005). With the arrival of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and 
Helmut Kohl in 1979, 1981, and 1982, respectively, a reconstruction of the socio-
economic landscape in the UK, United States, and Germany emerged. These efforts 
accorded with Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman’s work, which opposed 
Keynesian principles by espousing the self-regulating capacity of markets and 
scepticism of the state and collectivism (de Vogli, 2011; Martinez and Garcia, 1997).  
Thatcher insinuated that neo-Keynesianism had created disastrous economic effects 
(Schmidt, 2002: 215; 2008). She averred that ‘there is no alternative’ policy (better 
known by its acronym, TINA) to monetarism, thus creating a narrative about the 
benefits of thrift and hard work and neoliberal policies to support them (ibid.). Her 
approach gained acclaim from right-wing commentators; they reasoned that going 
beyond a basic minimum in instituting collective responsibility would constitute 
interference with free markets (Amable, 2011). Murray (1984, p.9) argued that 
Keynesian economics had attempted “to provide for the poor and produced [poorer 
people] instead” and thus the UK had “tried to remove the barriers to escape from 
poverty and inadvertently built a trap”.  
Although different political parties have embraced alternative styles of political 
economics in the last three decades, neoliberalism remains in the background, which 
has transformed into different governing forms. Also, toughness on crime has been 
steadfast until it was superseded by events such as the global financial crisis and 
immigration (Hall, 2011). Unlike Thatcher’s normative differentiation of ‘the worthy 
poor’ versus ‘the feckless and the idle’, Tony Blair’s social-democratic legitimation 
underscored the need to create equal opportunities (Schmidt, 2002, p. 269). 
However, he emphasised that welfare would ‘not [be] a hammock but a trampoline’, 
and not a ‘hand out but a hand up’ (ibid.). The strong stance against crime continues 
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unabated and reinforces the political position that the poor require policing 
(Wacquant, 2012).  
Simultaneous to the foregoing phenomena, law and order discourse had become 
increasingly dominant in the political process. Wacquant (2012, p. 242) argued that 
“welfare and criminal justice are two modalities of public policy towards the poor”, 
with enhanced coherence of these two systems. To garner public support, politicians 
have used an emotional and punitive orientation to create a perpetual sense of crisis 
(Garland, 2001). In 1993, a bipartisan consensus emerged that was termed ‘second 
order’, with both major political parties embracing an augmented position on crime 
(Reiner, 2011). One consequence was increased public attention to criminal justice 
operations. Moreover, criminal justice gained considerable exposure in popular 
media and political discourse, which were fuelled by images of dangerous offenders 
and vulnerable victims, displaced elite, and professional expertise (Garland, 2001). 
That topic will be further analysed in Chapter 3 when describing the prison and 
prison healthcare governance. Parallel with Nozick’s (1974) Anarchy, State and 
Utopia, the role of the state became to ensure that law and order was maintained; 
yet, other state interventions were viewed as either a restriction on individual liberty 
or interference in market operations. 
The privatisation of public services, expansion of deregulation, reduction in taxes, 
and enhancement of labour market flexibility were common governmental efforts 
(Hall, 2011; Harvey, 2010). Neoliberalism has also provided a template for 
competitive globalisation, imposing sweeping programmes of state restructuring and 
rescaling across a wide range of national and local contexts (Peck and Tickell, 
2012). Fine and Saad-Filho (2017) argued—albeit in sharply dissimilar and logically 
incompatible ways—that differently endowed, property-owning individuals 
exchanging goods, services, and information in minimally regulated markets 
constitute the most desirable form of allocating resources and should prevail over an 
interventionist role of the state and democratic processes. Borrowing Hayek’s 
(quoted in Peck, 2010, p.18) reference to neoliberalism as the “flexible credo”, it is a 
project that has been realised through a somewhat improvised, often experimental, 
and shape-shifting repertoire of pro-market programmes, projects, and power plays.  
Prioritising short-term economic efficiency limits political possibilities for reducing 
health inequalities, as well as causes human rights violations. Polanyi (1944) warned 
that allowing the market mechanism to be the sole arbiter of the fate of human 
beings would lead to society’s downfall, as governments would become insensitive 
to the day-to-day predicament of society’s members. The extreme austerity 
measures that the IMF and World Bank impose on countries receiving funds in a 
financial bailout leads debtors to deregulate capital markets, privatise economic 
activity, relax foreign investment, and reduce social spending (Hart-Landsberg, 
2006). These two financial organisations in fact depict human rights concerns as 
beyond the scope of the implementation of the fiscal regime. Specifically, they 
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conceive that such issues are subject to cost-benefit analysis and the potential cost 
of trying to reconcile seemingly incommensurable values (Kennedy, 2005; Sarfaty, 
2012). Discussions about marginalised and vulnerable populations, prisoners 
included, are thus excluded from economic consideration. 
2.2 The 2007-2008 global economic crisis and austerity in the UK 
The insolvency of the Northern Rock Bank in 2007 was part of a cascade of events 
that led to a global financial crisis (Basu, 2017). The collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
dovetailing with the financial deceit in the US mortgage market, grew into a global 
economic recession (Bermeo and Pontusson, 2012; Gamble, 2009). The UK bank 
bailouts of 2008 followed, and the UK officially entered a recession (Basu, 2017), 
engendering an annual financial gap in the state finance of £35bn per year for the 
UK government (Farnsworth, 2018). 
The Coalition Government embraced austerity shortly after it entered office in May 
2010. Although the UK was not a member of the Eurozone, the then-Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, George Osborne, imposed severe fiscal reductions, similar to what 
the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF (‘the Troika’) 
inflicted on Greece, Ireland, and Portugal as part of their bailout conditions (Gamble, 
2014; Schrecker, 2016). These cuts’ immediate objective was to reduce costs; 
hence, the budgetary deficit (HM Treasury, 2010).  
The government justified reductions in public sector spending as a means to secure 
deficit reduction in the short term and maintain confidence in the country’s financial 
market in the long term (Dorling, 2016; Gamble, 2014). The chancellor set a goal of 
achieving a ratio of public spending to GDP of 41% by 2015 (Gamble, 2014). 
Spending cuts imposed by the government were part of its strategy to restore the 
economy to an equilibrium (Blyth, 2013). The Coalition Government exacted large 
spending cuts for public programmes, claiming that they would create an acceptable 
equilibrium (Gamble, 2014). In this “rolling back [of] the state” (Taylor-Gooby and 
Stoker, 2011, p.14), the government sought to appease financial markets by 
decreasing public sector spending without raising taxes to meet the burgeoning 
deficits created by the bailout of the banking sector; such efforts were designed to 
allow the government to continue borrowing at reasonable interest rates (Gamble, 
2014; Midgley, 2014). 
The definitions of ‘austerity’ have evolved, with some early definitions developed 
around the concept of financial cuts. Defined as extreme retrenchment in public 
expenditure (Ortiz et al., 2011), austerity reflects a form of voluntary deflation via a 
reduction in government borrowing that requires deep cuts in public expenditures. It 
tends to be implemented with the claim that such efforts will have the positive effects 
of rebalancing the economy and regaining economic dynamism and competitiveness 
(Anderson and Minneman, 2014; Bramall, 2013; Fontana and Sawyer, 2011; Schui, 
2015). This definition is built on the theory of expansionary fiscal contraction, which 
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argues that a decrease in state spending will stimulate economic growth (Dellepiane-
Avellaneda, 2015)—reasoning which the UK government adopted.  
Beyond financial cuts, economists and political scientists have gone a step further by 
arguing that austerity is ideological, as its implementation will likely have a far-
reaching impact on the population. Wren-Lewis (2016) argued that austerity 
measures have gone beyond balancing the books; instead, they have become an 
ideological project built upon deceit. For Clough (2018), austerity is a disingenuous 
word for promoting government rhetoric to the effect that there is no alternative—
similar to Thatcher’s slogan in the 1970s. Blyth (2013) argued that such measures 
induced a reduction in wages, prices, and public spending, and that austerity 
measures actually increased government debt and deficits (Blyth, 2013). Krugman 
(2012, p. A27) has asserted, ‘the austerity drive is not really about debt and deficits 
at all; it is about using deficit panic as an excuse to dismantle social programs […] 
[E]conomic recovery was never the point; the drive for austerity [is] about using the 
crisis, not solving it’. This thesis adopts these critical definitions of austerity and 
considers how austerity has been depicted as a political choice rather than an 
economic imperative. 
Additionally, scholars have distinguished the existing implementation of austerity 
post-2008 financial crisis—termed as ‘neo-austerity’—from the forms of austerity in 
the previous decades (Farnsworth and Irving, 2018). While all phases of austerity 
characterise debt as a problem and claim state expenditure cuts are the solution, the 
‘socialised austerity’ of 1945–1951 (Hill, 2015, p.50) was mainly focused on 
consumer restraint to support civic investment, and the ‘permanent austerity’ of the 
1980s and 1990s—despite its legacy for welfare relations—did not prompt the 
political immobilisation required to reverse welfare expansion (Pierson, 1998).  
Nevertheless, neo-austerity after the 2008 crisis exploited political opportunities in 
three ways: i) its proponents used the post-crisis public debt narrative as a definitive 
and pragmatic economic truth to question the welfare state’s affordability; ii) neo-
austerity reconditioned social welfare expectations to the minimum, diminishing the 
solidarity that characterised post-war welfare state-building; and iii) it supported the 
contradiction that despite restricting public spending to prevent accumulation of 
national deficits, austerity enables social policy measures to support and promote 
private sector interests (Davies, 2016; Farnsworth and Irving, 2018; McBride and 
Mitrea, 2017). These dynamics will be critically explored in this thesis. 
2.3 Austerity as a political choice 
Scholars have questioned the durability of the macroeconomic policy of austerity 
from its inception (Blyth, 2013; Gamble, 2009; Gamble, 2014). Nonetheless, the 
errors and ultimately disproven claims of some economists—misinterpretation of 
public debt and claims without evidence that the global recession overwhelmed the 
government—actuated the policy to some extent at its advent. Ultimately, these 
errors seemingly facilitated its retention. Given this, austerity was clearly a political 
choice: within 10 years of its launch, it had no credible economic support. 
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2.3.1 Misinterpretation of the impact of public debt 
The United Kingdom was among very few major industrialised countries that 
increased public expenditures in the decade before the economic crisis (Shaoul, 
2011; Streeck and Mertens, 2013). Conservative politicians in 2010 described the 
UK’s 90% debt-to-GDP ratio as alarming, although other countries—such as 
Japan—had ratios as high as 240% (Konzelmann and Fovargue-Davies, 2019).  
Three events fostered misinterpretations of public debt and facilitated the turn 
towards austerity. First, economists exposited that high levels of debt could trigger 
economic sluggishness and unsustainable debt repayments (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2010). However, Blyth (2013) debunked this myth by showing that the forecast that 
had driven this belief was based on coding errors, selective exclusion of available 
data, and unconventional weighting of summary statistics. Second, European 
politicians began describing private household debt and public debt as analogous 
(Blyth, 2013). For example, Angela Merkel famously proclaimed that ‘the sustainable 
level of public debt was equivalent to that of private households’ (Blyth, 2013). Blyth 
(2013) and later on, Stiglitz (2014) and Weeks (2019) discredited such false 
comparisons, which posited that if the government desisted from excessive 
borrowing and concomitant spending, the economy would shrink from a lack of 
demand for goods and services. Instead, a liquidity-trap recession—when interest 
rates approach zero, and the economy remains in a recession—could occur (Blyth, 
2013; Stiglitz, 2014).  
This, then, exposed the discrepancies that right-wing economists proposed. They 
propounded that a fiscal contraction would improve business confidence and 
consumer expectations (Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). Opting to address shortfalls by 
imposing a tax increase would be deeply recessionary in the short- and medium-
terms, such economists claimed and would be ineffective in addressing burgeoning 
debts (Alesina et al., 2014). 
Because the UK fiscal cuts have progressed since 2010, the negative effects have 
become increasingly clear. Indeed, examples from Romania, Estonia, Bulgaria, 
Latvia, and Lithuania showed that austerity measures coincided with increasing debt 
(Blyth, 2013). By 2020, austerity clearly had increased debt in the UK. The debt-to-
GDP ratio rose from 74.7% in 2010—before the economy was feeling the impact of 
austerity—to 84.6% in 2020 (Office for National Statistics, 2021b). Nevertheless, as 
Hickel (2017, p. 156) argued, debt has been “a powerful mechanism for pushing 
neoliberalism around the world”. The assertion is based on the claim that austerity 
would reduce national debt, thus justifying a fundamental shift in the size of many 
states with accompanying transfer of the burden to the public sector and its 
workforce (Blyth, 2013; Grimshaw, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2012). Reflecting the same 
disregard of the evidence, the coalition and subsequent Conservative governments 
have continued to blame the preceding Labour government for negligence with the 
public purse; they have positioned themselves as being serious about addressing 
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the fiscal deficit while ignoring germane support about how to accomplish it (Buller 
and James, 2012; Gamble, 2014; Hayton, 2014; Jabko, 2013).  
2.3.2 The claim that the global recession overwhelmed the government  
In 2007, Klein (2007) predicted that neoliberal politicians opposed to ‘big 
government’ would use the coming event—a global recession—as an opportunity to 
pursue their political objectives in a way that would otherwise not be possible. In so 
doing, they could make the case that there was no alternative. Asserting that the 
global recession overwhelmed the state’s power to stabilise the national economy, 
with the Coalition Government began to mobilise such a claim as soon as it took 
office (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013), bore out Klein’s prediction.  
Far earlier, Weiss (1987) had observed that governing institutions often overstate 
and overgeneralise the degree of state powerlessness and underplay their capacity 
for adaptability. Extant work (Nolan, 2015; Ortiz et al., 2011; Taylor-Gooby and 
Stoker, 2011) has suggested that claims made to justify austerity entailed such 
overstatements, thus further demonstrating that austerity was a political choice, not 
an economic necessity. 
In imposing cuts, the government ignored valuable commentary from the IMF and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The former 
warned that “a budget cut equal to 1 percent of GDP typically reduces domestic 
demand by about 1 percent and raises the unemployment rate by 0.3 percentage 
points” (IMF, 2010). The latter said of the UK’s rapid financial consolidation, that by 
constraining monetary policy, it was at risk “of adversely affecting the recovery” 
(OECD, 2011, p.227). Countries abandoning austerity and opting for fiscal 
stimulus—such as the United States and Iceland—witnessed a strong economic 
recovery, repaid their debts early, and improved their populations’ health (Stuckler 
and Basu, 2013).  
The UK government applied pre-emptive deflation as part of a domestic political 
manoeuvre, constructing a misleading political narrative (Gamble, 2014). It also 
underplayed the political aspect of neoliberalism and containing it within financial 
responses (Gamble, 2014). Yet, the economy has never returned to the low 
recession point of 2009 (OECD, 2018). This denouement signified how politicians 
created their own crisis and resorted to neoliberal adjustments as solutions. The 
discourse on the economic recovery evolved from managing the risks of financial 
institutions to curbing the expansive welfare state (Clarke and Newman, 2012).  
Despite Osborne’s promise of a turnaround by the end of Parliament 2015, six 
months prior to the dissolution of Parliament, the Conservative-led coalition released 
details of its plans to cut public expenditure to around 35% of GDP by 2018 
(Farnsworth and Irving, 2015; Vina et al., 2013). Upon narrowly winning the general 
election in 2017, the Conservative government extended terminating the austerity 
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programme until 2022, contingent upon the date of the next general election (The 
Conservative and Unionist Party, 2017). Chancellor of Exchequer Philip Hammond 
announced in October 2018 that the era of austerity was ending; his successor, Sajid 
Javaid, repeated the claim eleven months later (HM Treasury, 2019b; HM Treasury, 
2019c). These announcements demonstrated that austerity was a political choice 
rather than an economic requirement. The immediate impacts of austerity on the 
public sector, including on prisons and prison healthcare services, will be unpacked 
in the next section.  
2.4 Impacts of austerity on the UK public sector services  
Assessing the distributional impact of spending cuts on public services prior to their 
imposition would have been done with incertitude. The Treasury used this argument 
as a license to provide limited social impact analysis of the reduction in expenditures 
(HM Treasury, 2018; O’Dea and Preston, 2010). A decade on, as shown in Figures 
2.1 and 2.2, spending on social protection by the UK is lower than the European 
average, and it spends slightly more than the European average on prisons 
(Eurostat, 2020). This trend typifies the punitiveness of neoliberal condition where 
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Austerity has had immediate social and health consequences. It has increased 
material deprivation through spending cuts to social protection and other social 
services, including health systems. The Poverty and Social Exclusion (PSE) UK 
study revealed that austerity has increased poverty and inequality: one third of the 
UK population is estimated to suffer significant problems, and about a one-quarter 
have an unacceptably low standard of living (Gordon et al., 2013). Unprecedented 
reductions in income support for pensioners have led to an increase in the mortality 
rate among those aged 85 years and over (Loopstra et al., 2016). A decreasing 
safety net has led to an increase in suicides and in rates of depression (measured by 
prescription rates; Barr et al., 2015); these fraught outcomes are because austerity 
measures have impeded mental health provisions severely since 2010 (O’Hara, 
2014). More recently, the UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human 
rights, Philip Alston, documented in November 2018 that, despite being the fifth 
largest economy in the world, the UK has 14 million people in poverty attendant with 
record levels of hunger, homelessness, and dependencies on food banks (UN 
General Assembly, 2019). These studies demonstrate the clash between efficiency, 
effectiveness, and equity, showing that people do not share the burden of austerity 
adjustment evenly. 
Measures on income inequality—such as Gini Coefficient,3 Palma Ratio,4 Top 1% 
share,5 S80/S20 ratio6 and P90/P107 ratio—have pointed to an increase in income 
inequality between 2010 and 2020 (Office for National Statistics, 2021a) (Figure 2.3 
below). Despite then-Prime Minister David Cameron’s claim that ‘we are all in this 
together’ (Cameron, 2010a), selective austerity has protected high earners and 
major transnational corporations via tax reduction and systematic tax avoidance, but 
markedly disadvantaged those at the bottom of the income ladder (House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2012).  
 
3 The Gini coefficient ranges between 0% and 100%. 0% indicates that income is shared equally 
among all households, and 100% indicates the extreme situation where one household accounts for 
all income. Therefore, the lower the value of the Gini coefficient, the more equally household income 
is distributed. 
4 The Palma ratio is the ratio of the income share of the richest 10% of individuals to that of the 
poorest 40% of individuals. 
5 Top 1% have incomes substantially higher than the rest of those in the top 10%. For the entire world, 
the top 1% earn 20% of the total income.  
6 The S80/S20 ratio refers to the ratio of the total income received by the richest 80% to the poorest 
20% of people. 
7 The P90/P10 ratio is calculated as the ratio of incomes of the person at the 90th percentile to the 
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2.5 Impacts of austerity cuts on prisons and prison healthcare services 
Day-to-day spending on prisons totalled £3.48 billion in 2009/2010; by 2015/16, it 
was 19% lower in real terms, at £2.3 billion (Institute for Government, 2019). This 
translated to a 30% decline in prison staff between 2009 and 2017 (CPT, 2017; 
National Audit Office [NAO], 2017). Despite some investments to reverse the 
spending fall in subsequent years, prison spending was still 14% lower in 2017/2018 
compared to eight years earlier (Institute for Government, 2019).  
A target was set for the HMPPS to deliver £900 million in savings by the end of 2015 
without reducing the prison population (National Offender Management Service 
[NOMS], 2015). Pay structures for management and operational staff were 
scrutinised and consolidated, along with early retirement offers, redundancy, fixed-
term contracts for the existing workforce, and introduction of new pay levels in line 
with market rates—which were often lower than existing staff salaries (House of 
Commons Justice Committee, 2015). Coterminously, structural measures were 
undertaken, consisting of a decrease in the number of headquarters and the closing 
of small and less cost-efficient prisons (ibid.). 
Shown in Figure 2.4 is a consistent downward trajectory for the total number of core 
prison operational staff in England and Wales between 2012 and 2016. This 
declension created a severe staffing deficiency, with 3.8 prisoners for every staff 
member—fewer than one-half of the average number found in other European 






Number of core prison staff and prison population in England and Wales, 2010/2011 
to 2019/2020 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice (2020a, 2020g). 
A recruitment campaign to increase the number of prison officers was part of the 
government’s attempt to mitigate the increasing prison instability across England 
(Ministry of Justice, 2016). The campaign, which initially took place in 2017 and 
continued in 2018 and 2019, has not been enough to compensate for the 
contraction. The slight rise in staffing numbers reflects augmented reliance on 
inexperienced officers. A total of 2,640 frontline prison officers left the HMPPS in 
2019, a 26% (n=552) increment in departures compared to 2018, thus reflecting an 
ongoing trajectory (CPT, 2017; HMPPS, 2019b). Short terms of service are also 
growing, as evidenced by a 38% departure of officers having served less than one 
year—compared to a 31% rate the previous year (HMPPS, 2019b). This 
phenomenon exacerbates the problem of inexperienced officers in the prison 
system.  
Additionally, overcrowding and instability have persisted (CPT, 2017). Although 
remaining high, the rate of imprisonment has stabilised over the last decade. This is 
partly because the backlog of court cases (currently standing at 45,500 cases) has 
prevented a surge (Crest Advisory, 2020). However, given the political 
announcement of additional police resourcing, the extension of stop and search, and 
the review of sentencing for serious offenders, prisoner-to-prison officer ratio is likely 




Under the coalition and the subsequent Conservative governments, expenditures on 
the NHS have been relatively protected (HM Treasury, 2010). However, growth has 
not kept pace with the growth of the UK population. In 1979, NHS expanded by 
3.8%, and in 2010, it grew only 1.1% (Marmot, 2017), a rate that has remained 
steady between 2009/10 and 2014/15 owing to funding constraints (New Economics 
Foundation, 2018). As the New Economics Foundation (2018) noted, this represents 
the slowest growth since the 1950s. Thus, NHS funding has decreased in real terms 
over this period (The Health Foundation, 2019).  
The total spending for prison health by the NHS England was £400 million in 
2016/2017, of which an estimated £150 million was spent on mental health services 
and substance misuse services (NAO, 2017). This plateaued funding was 
maintained throughout the austerity period (NAO, 2017), despite an increased 
burden of disease in the prison population (as is further explored in Chapter 4), and 
has placed a strain on the governance and delivery of prison healthcare in England. 
Although scholars have yet to theorise the extent to which these strains affect prison 
service operations, it is clear that spending cuts are not evenly distributed for prisons 
and prison healthcare. As Streeck and Mertens (2013) argue, austerity measures 
target mandatory spending, which is often derived from statutory obligations. NHS 
England spending appears to follow this terrain. In contrast, prison spending appears 
to have fallen under discretionary funding, which is the most common target of 
austerity cuts in the consolidation state (Streeck and Mertens, 2013; Streeck, 2014). 
The impact of austerity measures on prisons is linked to existing prison instability, a 
topic which is further explored in Chapter 4. 
2.6 Punitiveness and tough-on-crime  
Some right-wing scholars have argued that austerity resembles a typical economic 
downturn pattern (Bennhold, 2009; Konings, 2009; Thompson, 2013). Additionally, 
they have justified austerity measures on the grounds that the state should suffer the 
consequences of its financial mismanagement in preceding decades (Panitch and 
Konings, 2009). Nevertheless, the irony of austerity is enshrined in the fact that 
those who engineered or profited from asset bubbles do not bear the brunt of the 
resulting austerity; workers and the poor do (Callinicos, 2012). As Slobodian (2020, 
p.6) underscored, “if we place too much emphasis on the category of market 
fundamentalism, we will fail to notice that the real focus of neoliberal proposals is not 
on the market per se but on redesigning states, laws, and other institutions to protect 
the market”.  
Beyond the economic argument, continual levels of punitiveness have re-emerged 
as a guiding social order. Neoliberalism and inequality tend to neutralise social 
solidarity and lead to disproportionate levels of punitiveness (Cavadino and Dignan, 
2006; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). The high incidence of punishment-use 
corresponds with neoliberalism’s punitive nature (Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1939). 




its dominant penal ideology has a pronounced tendency towards social exclusion, 
exclusionary modes of punishment, and strengthening of the coercive arm of the 
state (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006). Given the increasing level of economic 
inequality, higher levels of punishment should not be surprising (ibid.). 
This may well spark the return of the less-eligible doctrine; it suggests that prisoners 
should receive lower-quality healthcare treatment than the poorest members of 
society (Sim, 1990). This allows the state to relinquish its moral obligations (Judt, 
2010; Pantazis, 2016), but more crucially, we face the issue that when the welfare 
state’s main function withers, the penal state flourishes in its place (Wacquant, 
2000). In this context, the prison system becomes a major provider of state welfare, 
healthcare, and educational services. This leads to structural injustice because state 
structures become corrupted and diverted from serving the public good (Arendt, 
1958). 
Moreover, politicians have engaged in an ‘arms race’ to convince voters that they are 
tough on crime (Lacey, 2008). Although a more populist and punitive penal 
environment can be traced to the mid-1970s, the decisive shift occurred in the early 
1990s, when the main political parties vowed to be ‘tough on crime’ (Newburn, 
2007). They used an emotional language of fear and anger to portray individual 
deficits requiring imprisonment (Sparks, 2007). Additionally, the state organises how 
politicians communicate and politicise risks (Malloch, 2000; Sparks, 2000; Thirlaway 
and Heggs, 2005). Hall (1978) argued that the exaggerated outburst of public 
concern over the morality and behaviour of society represented politicians’ attempts 
to persuade the working class that they are serious about tackling crime and the 
causes of crime. A comprehensive survey of media coverage revealed that networks 
spotlighted the lenient treatment of prisoners by prison officers while ignoring 
unacceptable living conditions and human rights violations in prisons (European 
Prison Observatory, 2013). A 2019 Ipsos MORI poll revealed that only 17% of 
respondents considered crime and order to be important issues in the UK today, 
compared with the 25% who thought so in 2010—although there was a higher pre-
2010 value (Ipsos Mori, 2015; Ipsos Mori, 2019).  
Falling rates of recorded crime are claimed to be linked to the success of increased 
rates of imprisonment. This assertion accords with the erstwhile Conservative Home 
Secretary Michael Howard’s classic argument that ‘prison works’ (Parliament UK, 
1993). Civitas, a UK right-wing think tank, also claims that crime is falling because of 
the incapacitating effects of prisons (Green et al., 2003). The latest figures show that 
the overall crime rate fell by 4% between July 2019 and June 2020 (Office for 
National Statistics, 2020), although there has been an increase in the trajectory of 
violent and property crime that corresponds with the implementation of austerity 
since 2010 (Giulietti and McConnell, 2021; Kirchmaier, 2019; Walby et al., 2016). 
However, only 32% of respondents to the nationwide Crime Survey for England and 




Justice, 2015). Indeed, such beliefs accord with the high reoffending rate of 45% for 
all those released from custody and 61% of those serving a sentence of less than 12 
months (Ministry of Justice, 2020d). As Wacquant (2010) argued, the government is 
more interested in preserving the social hierarchy than in addressing the root cause 
of criminality. Resorting to the prison apparatus in advanced societies is thus 
seemingly a result of political choices. 
Summary 
This chapter has reviewed germane extant work that broadly establishes 
connections between the fiscal consolidation arising from the government’s austerity 
measures and the adverse impact on the population’s health and well-being in the 
UK. The historical account of neoliberalism has provided a template for austerity to 
be operationalised by the government. The stance of being tough on crime and 
privatising of services over the past few decades have illustrated that the guiding 
norms of neoliberalism direct the current social order.  
Although the implementation of austerity was initially claimed to reduce government 
deficits, evidence of misinterpretations of public debts and fallacies about the global 
recession reveals that austerity’s implementation was ideological, not requisite. 
Beyond spending reductions on public sector services—including prison spending—
the broader notion of neoliberalism decimated the welfare state’s role and increased 
the level of punitiveness. Cumulatively, these undercurrents have deepened 
inequality, insecurity, and disparity in society. The impacts on prison healthcare 
governance and delivery, however, remain to be theorised. 
The next chapter will discuss the governance and delivery structure of prisons and 
prison healthcare in England. The latter is highly dependent on the former. It will 
analyse the roles of networks and organisations involved in these governance 
structures, and then critique their effectiveness in governing, delivering and 




Chapter 3: The governance and delivery of prisons and prison 
healthcare services in England 
Introduction 
Existing literature tends to examine the governance of prisons and prison healthcare 
discretely. Yet, these governance structures are critical systems that dictate how 
prison healthcare delivery is mobilised within a neoliberal framework that predicates 
the entire operation of prisons in England.  
This chapter establishes the historical and current arrangements for prisons and 
prison healthcare governance and delivery in England. It initially outlines the 
definitions and modes of governance before analysing the structure, process, and 
prison and prison healthcare actors by the HMPPS and NHS England, respectively. 
The chapter details a series of issues regarding impending political ideologies that 
closely resemble neoliberalism—such as punishment over rehabilitation and 
increased privatisation of both prisons and prison healthcare services. It does so by 
analysing the monitoring structure of both prison and prison healthcare services—
both at the European and the UK level—as well as by governmental and 
intergovernmental bodies. To understand how austerity impacts prison health 
governance and healthcare delivery across English prisons, assessing how these 
structures function within a prevailing neoliberal structure is imperative. 
3.1 Definition and modes of governance 
Existing literature on ‘governance’ suggests that the concept is complex and 
multidimensional. Kooiman (2003) defined governance as a set of arrangements in 
which public and private actors aim to solve societal problems and phrase principles 
according to which these activities are undertaken. To various public administration 
scholars, governance consists of both structure and process (Davies, 2005; 
Marinetto, 2003). Often, structure relates to institutions and actor constellations that 
are highly subject to the actors’ power (Benz et al., 2007; Davies, 2005; Gamble, 
2000; Marinetto, 2003; Mayntz, 2009). 
Academic literature on governance has evolved chiefly around top-down and 
dispersed modes of governance. For top-down governance, Marsh (2011) used the 
critical realist theory of governance to hypothesise that the government maintains a 
firm grip on hierarchical coordination. This is inherited from the Westminster model of 
British government, involving a unitary state, parliamentary sovereignty, strong 
cabinet government, ministerial accountability, majority party control of the executive, 
and institutionalised opposition (ibid.). According to Hill and Hupe (2015), the top-
down nature of governance is built upon three assumptions: 1) a chronological action 
in which policy intentions precede action; 2) a linear view of policy underpinned by a 
causal link between policy intentions, policy actions, and results; and 3) a hierarchy 




Scharpf (1997) proposed that hierarchical coordination is a relatively rare 
phenomenon, the control of the criminal justice system, and in particular prisons, 
falls under this exception, in line with unilateral and closed decision-making 
processes (Futrell, 2003; Williams and Matheny, 1995).  
In contrast, a dispersed model of governance has grown markedly. From a public 
policy perspective, Rhodes (1996) and Bevir and Rhodes (2003) postulated that 
‘governance without government’ denotes the hollowing out of a state, favouring self-
organisation, inter-organisational cooperation, and resource exchange that cannot 
be externally imposed by the actors involved. Rather, it is a result of the interaction 
of these actors (Kooiman and van Vliet, 1993) and the significant autonomy from the 
state: processes relating to an effort to organise and exercise political power in 
response to challenges and opportunities (Fidler 2007; cf. Lee, 2010).  
A governance structure such as the foregoing is underpinned by multilateral 
cooperation among actors involved in the agenda-setting process, which is designed 
to hold each actor accountable and encourage transparency in their dealings 
(Benford, 2011; Bexell et al., 2010; McGann and Sabatini, 2011; Porter and Ronit, 
2010; Scholte, 2011). The application of structure-actors-processes has led 
Gordenker and Weiss (1995), Dodgson et al. (2002), and Payne (2008) to establish 
a concept of health governance that resonates with the nature of prison health 
governance: the actions and mechanisms that actors adopt to organise the 
promotion, organisation, and protection of the population’s health. Kickbusch (2006) 
described the unique characteristics of health governance that differentiate it from 
other fields: the fluidity around intra-sector knowledge transfer in addressing 
normative health issues to combat communicable and non-communicable diseases 
and the relevance of initiatives in other sectors that can affect population health. 
However, a power imbalance is often cited as a common problem in dispersed, 
collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash, 2007; Tett et al., 2003). The health 
system is often complex, and thus its focus is not always aligned and needs to be 
negotiated across different agencies (Marks et al., 2010). The dynamics of power 
and alignment between prison and prison healthcare will be explored further in this 
chapter. 
3.2 The HM Prison & Probation Service (HMPPS) 
The delivery of prison healthcare services in England relies upon the HMPPS 
(known as the NOMS until 2017). The HMPPS is the Ministry of Justice’s executive 
agency, responsible for commissioning and providing offender services in the 
community and custody. England and Wales currently have 100 public-sector 
prisons and 14 private prisons contracted to private organisations, such as Serco, 
Sodexo, and G4S (HMPPS, 2017a). The security categories range from Category A 
(high-security) to Category D (resettlement prisons), with the majority falling under 




There are no coherent aims of imprisonment that can be traced from legislation or 
policy documents. Legally, Rule 3 of the Prison Rules 1999 provides the Prison 
Service mission statement: to encourage and assist prisoners in leading a good and 
useful life. However, Livingstone et al. (2008, p.7) criticised this provision as too 
general, with “a series of enabling and deeming provisions designed to give the 
Secretary of State maximum discretion in the organisation of the prison system”. 
Alternatively, HMPPS (2021a) states that the purposes of imprisonment are to carry 
out court sentences, prevent further victimisation, and reduce reoffending via 
rehabilitation programmes, such as education and employment. There is no explicit 
recognition of the role of health under this definition, although its implicit in its 
emphasis on a rehabilitation programme. Although Syrett (2011) argued that the law 
functions as a control mechanism and sets parameters for actions and decisions that 
institutions can take, lack of clarity on the aims of imprisonment is problematic. It is 
highly dependent on the discretion of the minister and bureaucrats to interpret the 
government mandate for prisons.  
In funding prisons, the state has adopted a managerialism tenet that has subjected 
prison institutions to a regime of efficiency, value for money, and performance 
monitoring (Loader and Sparks, 2002). A study by Liebling and Crewe (2012) among 
senior managers of prisons revealed how these officials discussed a “Tesco prison 
model,” (p.295) referring to the government’s desire to standardise cheaper, larger 
scale, and austere punishment provisions to legitimise their management of prisons 
in the eyes of the taxpayers. However, as Feeley and Simon (1992) averred, this 
management style facilitates the dehumanisation of prisoners. In addition to the cost-
saving and efficiency measures, prison management is characterised by a series of 
indicators and risk assessments—such as Prison Service Instructions and Prison 
Service Orders (PSOs)—addressing issues that range from the use of force to health 
promotion in prison and with which prison governors must comply (Ministry of 
Justice, 2020c). It resembles a top-down framework that seeks to enforce 
compliance. Weber (1930) compared such bureaucracies to an iron cage that 
removes the freedom and autonomy of staff, especially in shaping the operation of 
their establishments. As Sparks and Bottoms (1996) noted aright, people legitimately 
view officials’ behaviour as a reflection of the system as a whole, even if it might be 
different from their leadership ethos owing to their inability to exercise discretion.  
3.2.1 Prison Governors 
Despite policy scholars’ debate around prison governance, they have paid little 
attention to prison governors—those dictating the provisions across English prisons, 
including healthcare. Fox (1952, p.9) argued that prison governors are “the keystone 
of the arch. Within his own prison, he [sic] is supreme”. Their responsibility is to 
ensure that prisons function in an orderly manner by using their leadership to create 
an environment that is structured, stable, predictable, and acceptable (Liebling and 




Section 11 of the Prison Act 1952 stated that the governors are responsible for all 
activities taking place in the establishments they manage. They have the power to 
steer and motivate their workforces, which increasingly include the involvement of 
voluntary, community, and private sector organisations in delivering prison services 
(Ministry of Justice, 2010). Bryans (2007, 2012) theorised four typologies of prison 
governors: general managers operating their establishments according to 
performance indicators, chief officers essaying to adopt a people-centred approach, 
liberal idealists subscribing to the idea of prisoner reformation, and conforming 
mavericks repeatedly challenging the status quo. Although a single governor may 
shift between these categories, the ‘conforming maverick’ (Bryans, 2007) seems to 
be disappearing today, given increasing regulations, instructions, and rules that 
curtail governors’ ability to shape prison regimes (ibid.).  
3.2.2 Prison Officers 
 
There is a longstanding recognition among criminologists that relationships between 
prison officers and prisoners are at the prison system’s core. Characterised as low 
visibility and yet highly skilled (Liebling and Price, 2001), prison officers have often 
been depicted as engaging in complex and varied work (Arnold, 2008), not least 
because maintaining penal order relies on significant use of personal authority and 
discretionary practices (Cheliotis, 2008; Crawley, 2013; Scott, 2006).  
Prison officers are expected to act as mentors, counsellors, and social workers for 
prisoners (HMPPS, 2021b), despite not being trained to fulfil these roles as in some 
other European countries (Eide and Westrheim, 2020). However, there is also a 
micromanagement culture and the tendency to focus on punishment and control 
rather than care and empathy (Arnold, 2016). Thus, these two factors undermine the 
legitimate expectation that prison officers should fulfil roles that more resemble social 
work. 
Today, more than 30,000 prison officers in England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern 
Ireland are members of the Prison Officers’ Association (POA, 2021). Historically 
labelled as being resistant to change and militant (Liebling and Price, 2001; Morris et 
al., 1963; Thomas, 1972), the POA has embraced cooperation over resistance more 
recently. In 2004, it was a signatory to the Joint Industrial Relations Procedural 
Agreement in which the POA agreed not to induce its members to strike, thus 
promoting enhanced constructive collaboration between managers and unions— 
such as being informed by threats of commercial competition from outside and 
adopting target-driven performance management from the inside (Bennett and 
Wahidin, 2008). This change is reflected in the level of disinterest in national issues 
e.g. political leadership on prisons and greater concern for the prison in which the 




3.2.3 Political interference 
Gash et al. (2010) identified three reasons public bodies are created to support the 
governance structure and delivery of public services: to depoliticise decision making 
and improve perceived independence of decisions from political influence, to 
increase managerial freedoms, and to allow the government to access external skills 
and expertise. However, research has found that political interference affects public 
bodies. Terry (1995) and Boin (2001) explained the contextual definition of the 
autonomy of civil servants, which is highly dependent on the prevailing political 
values of the government in power. Garland (1997) and Hood (2000) observed that 
this mode of governance seeks to align civil servants with their rulers’ objectives. 
This belief is in line with Gramsci’s (1971) theory of ideological incorporation of 
hegemony through state apparatuses—which includes prisons—while protecting 
ministers from blame in the event of crises. 
 
The extent to which civil servants can exercise their agency in the daily operation of 
public services is unclear. Using agency and structure theory (Giddens 1984, 1991) 
to explain how structures can be both enabling and constraining and how actors can 
create and adapt to those structures, Pusey (1991) noted that ministers can frame 
constraints as economic rationality and abounding of choice via technical efficiency. 
In this context, such critical realists as Hay (2002), Marsh (2003), and McAnulla 
(2005) proposed that the British political system is significantly influenced by 
structured inequality—specifically referring to the continued concentration of power 
in the hands of central government.  
For the criminal justice system, particularly prisons, government direction remains an 
ongoing practice, even though such efforts have lost traction in other public sector 
systems, given the preference for a dispersed governance structure. The Learmont 
Report in 1995 recognised that prison is a politically sensitive area, and, thus, 
ministerial involvement will typically be relatively high (Hansard, 1995). Reaffirming 
the active role of top-down management in the criminal justice system, Chapman 
(1984) argued that prison leadership should be reserved for ministers, as civil 
servants are merely expected to execute ministerial visions. This idea accords with 
Weber’s (1978) conceptualisation of bureaucracy as a form of rational-legal authority 
whereby politicians direct public officials who do not dominate the government. A 
recent quote by the current Justice Secretary, Robert Buckland, signified this 
position: “I am not here to run every prison operationally, but I am here, I hope, to set 
a clear steer to the civil servants about what I expect to be done” (House of 
Commons Justice Committee, 2019a). 
Although prevailing political ideologies have a substantial impact on the penal 
system, extant research has revealed that individual actors, especially prison 
governors, can shape the service despite constraints. Indeed, they must exercise 




p.213) argued, many rules, instructions, and orders remain “open textured”, 
providing considerable latitude for interpretation of the governor. Sparks (1996), 
Carlen (2002), and Cheliotis (2006) agreed that the notion of governors’ power 
undergoes a process of continual negotiation in which the players must tread 
carefully between conformity and resistance towards the political power. Gramsci’s 
(1971) theories of ‘pessimism of the will’ and ‘optimism of the intellect’, therefore, 
depend on the individual. As such, Cheliotis (2006) proposed that the assumption 
that governors are docile bodies and trapped in an iron cage of bureaucracy (Weber, 
1930) distorts the reality of power that governors hold.  
One potential implication of this principal-agent relationship is that civil servants 
cannot be held accountable in the case of a system failure. However, this situation is 
doctrinaire. In fact, civil servants must manage conflicting expectations—that of care 
and that of punishment—and potential misalignment of their statutory obligations 
with the ministers’ political preferences. As Cäker and Nyland (2017) have argued, 
these conflicts can undermine prison health governance and delivery in favour of 
appeasing the vertical ministerial power. This is juxtaposed with the fact that 
ministers are typically transient, regularly moved for strategic political reasons, thus 
making coordination challenging (Flinders, 2002). This difficulty is captured in a 
series of reforms that dovetailed with turnover of seven justice ministers since 2010 
(Appendix 3).  
3.3 From Prison Medical Service to NHS England 
Historically, in the UK, the Prison Medical Service had been responsible for the 
physical and mental health of prisoners (Home Office, 1968). The Prison Service’s 
statement of purpose indicates that its remit “is to look after [prisoners] with humanity 
and help them lead law-abiding and useful lives in custody and after release” (Home 
Office, 1991, p.3). The biomedical paradigm, adopted by the Prison Service, has 
supported prison health care work since the 19th century (Sim, 1990; Smart, 1985). 
However, a single-minded prioritisation of security and discipline undercuts the 
perception of prisoners as patients (HMIP, 1996). Prison Services provided 
healthcare, as well as responsibility for the correctional mission, obligating staff to 
fulfil the dual missions that might sometimes conflict (ibid.). Though healthcare could 
be compatible with rehabilitation, staff focused on security, punishment, discipline, 
and deterrence, thus resulting in a serious compromise of prisoners’ health and well-
being (Foucault, 1977; Hudson, 1993; Hughes, 2000; Malloch, 2000; Patton, 1979; 
Smart, 1985). The presumption that “if [prisoners] are not [known to be] ill, de facto 
they are healthy” became expedient as staff sought to resolve their multiple roles 
(Morris et al., 1963, p.193). 
Policy changes in the last three decades suggest a growing understanding of prison 
healthcare problems, if not necessarily comprehension of how to address them. In 
1990, the Strangeways Prison Riot prompted The Woolf Report which, among other 




standards of treatment and the ensuing prevalence of prisoner anxiety and unrest 
(Sim, 2002). The 1992 replacement of the Prison Medical Service with the Health 
Care Service for Prisons was an introduction towards the integration between the 
Prison Service and the National Health Service (ibid.). In 2000, the government 
published ‘The Future Organisation of Prison Health Care’, a policy document that 
outlined a partnership between the Prison Service and the NHS to improve 
prisoners’ health services over five years (ibid.). The Prison Service ceased 
controlling the prison healthcare service in 2006, and it became part of NHS’s 
commissioning and delivery, maintaining the NHS role as a conduit between the 
community and prison health systems (Hayton and Boyington, 2006).  
There is a general consensus that England leads the world generally and Europe 
specifically in standards for prison healthcare (Leaman et al., 2017; Gatherer et al., 
2005; Gatherer and Fraser, 2009). This can be attributed 1) to England’s prison 
health framework’s acknowledgement of the relationship between prisons and the 
wider community and 2) to the ability of England’s multisector partnership to provide 
resources and ideas, reduce duplication of effort, and share operational risks to 
promote efficiency without compromising health (Leaman et al., 2017).  
3.3.1 Prison healthcare workforce 
Historically, Sim (1990, p.5) has questioned the dual loyalty of healthcare 
professionals in prisons because they could be forced into “controlling the behaviour 
of the ill-disciplined and recalcitrant”. The extent and form of treatment and quality of 
care were influenced by the degree to which treatment agencies and healthcare staff 
were bound to prison authorities and their priorities of security and control (de 
Viggiani, 2007; Mills and Kendall, 2018). However, Leaman et al. (2017) found that 
the professionalisation of the health care workforce serving prisoners, transparency, 
and use of evidence-based guidance and responsiveness of services have 
increased the quality of care, since NHS assumed prison healthcare in 2006, 
although expanded resources and guided focus on prevention would provide 
improvements. 
Although studies often cite the positive aspects of healthcare work among prison 
healthcare staff, such as pride, enjoyment, multidisciplinary teamwork, and 
enjoyment (Jordan, 2017; Møller et al., 2009), issues regarding recruitment and 
retention, workload, and working environment have increasingly gained policy 
traction. Even as prison staff have decreased, staff retention in the health sector has 
been poor (The Health Foundation, 2019). In 2019, England faced a shortfall of 
39,520 nurses and 9,000 doctors (NHS Improvement, 2019). Although official 
statistics did not disaggregate these rates among prison providers, nearly one-half of 
prison nurses (45%) have indicated that staff shortages compromised the care they 
could provide (House of Commons Select Committee, 2018). Furthermore, the most 
recent CPT inspections of English prisons documented numerous unfilled GP and 




inadequacies in prison healthcare staffing—a trend that is likely to worsen, given the 
lack of a coherent government approach to recruitment and migration policies and 
uncertainties of Brexit (The Health Foundation, 2019). 
Extant studies have increasingly portrayed how increasing workloads have led prison 
healthcare staff to feel unsupported, to experience low morale, and terminate 
employment (Forrester et al., 2013; Ginn, 2012). Tension from reorganisation, 
operational efficiency imperatives, and management of local needs have reinforced 
the sense of helplessness among this workforce (Exworthy, 2010), attendant with 
augmented levels of violence (Plugge et al., 2017; Watson et al., 2004). The ways 
employees deal with these pressures remain unclear, with scholars calling for 
research to fill this knowledge gap (Plugge et al., 2017). 
 
3.4 Punishment  
Prisons represent “the darkest region in the apparatus of justice” (Foucault, 1979, 
p.256) and continue to occupy a central position in the criminal justice system in 
England. As he noted, despite their failure as a tool of punishment, prisons still exist 
and produce the same results, despite political reluctance to dispense with them 
(ibid.). Punishment is one way, albeit not the best, of getting people to understand 
that they have caused harm; however, this position is diametrically opposed to the 
broader rehabilitation stance regarding prisoners. 
Since the latter part of 20th century, the rehabilitation ideal has been politically 
attacked for being soft on crime and ineffective in reducing reoffending (Cullen and 
Gendreau, 2001; Hollin and Bilby, 2007). Such a discourse effectuates practices that 
stress incarceration and deterrence—both punitive in nature (Garland, 2001; Pratt, 
2007) and have implications on health. As such, Sieh (1989) and Sim (2009) have 
proposed that prisoners suffer from “less eligibility,” where they are deemed 
undeserving of anything more than what the lowest social class in a free society 
experiences. Underlying the structure of prison health governance and delivery is the 
state’s choice whether to exercise its power over health governance and the extent 
to which the state sees it fit to align prison health governance and delivery with the 
prevailing political ideology (Holden, 2011; Peck and Tickell, 1994; Vayrynen, 1999). 
Rutherford (1996) has suggested that criminal justice management is an arena 
characterised by competing ideologies.  
As observed in section 3.2.1 on prison governors, the central government imposes 
vague and conflicting regulations and instructions on prison governors, and cost-
cutting often takes precedence (Bryans, 2012). As such, governors are required to 
interpret these mandates between structures and agencies (Bennett, 2016). 
Therefore, prisons have become a by-product of Weberian bureaucracy. As such, 
prison governors are ill-equipped to translate vague and often conflicting goals, such 
as punishment and rehabilitation, into integrated action (Boin, 1998). Marks (2014) 




to complex systems like healthcare, where flexibility, innovation, and local problem 
solving are needed. Her thesis, however, failed to provide a lens in which healthcare 
systems, especially prisons, could thrive within a top-down system (ibid.). Such 
perspective is requisite given that the prevailing political determinants fall outside of 
the NHS England remit. 
Apart from punishment, the traits of neoliberalism are demonstrated via deregulation 
through commissioning and the privatisation of services, as well as the impotence of 
the monitoring structure of prison healthcare and overall prison operations. These 
issues will be explored in the subsequent sections. 
3.5 Deregulation via prison and prison healthcare commissioning 
Two contemporary characteristics in prison and prison health governance define 
neoliberalism: deregulation—which is enmeshed with the contradiction of 
centralisation—and preference for economic efficiency over collective rights. The 
move towards privatising prisons, including their healthcare, education, and welfare 
services, supports this observation. Deregulation involves dismantling laws so that 
the government relinquishes its oversight power to the private sector (McGregor, 
2001). The coalition government in 2010 instituted such deregulation through 
‘Localism’ and the ‘Big Society’ (Cameron, 2010b). These efforts sought to give local 
actors autonomous roles in shaping local economies while engendering a smaller 
state (ibid.). Advocates argued that decentralisation of state power would lead to 
faster and more thorough responses to citizens’ needs, with greater sensitivity to 
their contexts and conditions (Brodie, 2000). Critics have been quick to aver, though, 
that such results have not occurred (Grimshaw et al., 2017; Halsall et al., 2015). 
Centralisation of criminal justice policy and practice complements the trend toward 
localisation (Newburn, 2007). The policy has thus become more punitive, more 
politicised, and more populist (ibid.), which highlights the rhetoric of neoliberalism. 
From the 1980s, cost reduction and efficiency were central to the argument in favour 
of contracting and competitive tendering for public services (Walsh, 1991). Thus, 
commissioning became understood as a process where the needs are assessed and 
resources are planned and prioritised, which are then followed by purchasing and 
monitoring of the delivery to attain the best outcomes (Allen et al., 2020). Successive 
British governments since the 1980s have used procurement in various ways to 
support the evolution and development of private business and the procurement 
sector in particular (Crouch, 2011; Whitfield, 2001).  
Based on the understanding that the government should be “steering and not 
rowing” prison healthcare (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p.25), an understanding that 
prison services can be delivered in a shared arrangement between public, voluntary, 
and private-sector organisations has been increasingly prevalent among UK 
politicians. This arrangement allows the state to uphold the legal principle of 




and enforced at the lowest level possible, rather than being dictated at the central 
government level (Morgan, 2011). Devolved risk—based on leaving governance 
responsibilities with regional and local actors who have a better capacity to 
respond—appeals to the government in that it is perceived to have improved 
capacity to tailor services to the needs of a particular community (ibid.). Commitment 
towards a shared public-market ownership of health from both Conservative and 
New Labour governments demonstrated acceptance of neoliberal ideas to govern 
public services at a distance (Newman, 2012). 
Regulation 9(4) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 provided support towards 
commissioning. In particular, the supply of products or the provision of services with 
a value generally of at least €134,000 (or ~£117,552) requires public-sector 
organisations to use a prescribed procurement procedure to provide ‘equal access to 
economic operators’ and that must not have ‘the effect of creating unjustified 
obstacles to the opening up of public procurement to competition’. Such ukases 
open opportunities for profit and not-for-profit sectors to be involved in running prison 
services. With the primary aim of improving quality, flexibility, and efficiency of prison 
operations, the Health and Social Care Act 2012 increased the competition for health 
services by welcoming ‘any qualified provider’ to issue a proposal to manage public 
services (Krachler and Greer, 2015). As such, non-profit social enterprises (e.g., 
community interest companies) and private-sector players (e.g., Care UK and Virgin 
Care) deliver prison health care alongside NHS Trusts. This phenomenon has 
intensified over the last 10 years (HMPPS, 2019a; Ministry of Justice, 2009). 
3.5.1 Intensifying privatisation of prisons 
A state is neoliberal when the market governs distribution of social goods and 
services according to the principles of market efficiency and effectiveness (Foucault, 
1979). England’s prison privatisation mirrors that context and also affords the state to 
govern public services from a distance. The move toward further privatisation began 
with the introduction of the Prison Unit Cost Programme—also known as the 
Benchmarking Programme—in 2012 (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2012). 
It required that public prisons reduce their operating costs at the same level as the 
private sector (ibid.). The introduction of the programme was also meant to provide 
an alternative to wholesale competition from private companies for prison space as a 
means of delivering cost savings across prisons (House of Commons Justice 
Committee, 2015; Mulholland, 2014). Such efforts further embedded the neoliberal 
principles of market forces and competition. 
England has the most privatised prison system in Europe (Prison Reform Trust, 
2019). Competition to run prison services is the crux of the programme. This is 
proposed as a “means to secure new services to improve existing service delivery, 
encourage innovation and drive value for money” (Ministry of Justice, 2011, p.4). The 
policy rests on a perception that creation of a competitive and mixed market, where 




and the public sector are paid to reduce recidivism, thereby increasing efficiency of 
penal institutions (ibid.). Custodial contracts represented 16% of HMPPS’s overall 
expenditures in 2018/2019, for a total of £6.8 billion (HMPPS, 2019a)—a dramatic 
increase from £0.2 billion in 2009 (Ministry of Justice, 2009). Seemingly, austerity 
has played a role in this explosion of private contractor involvement in the penal 
system. 
Privatisation heightens a sense of doubt, fear, and insecurity regarding the quality of 
public services (O’Hara, 2014). In turn, these feelings provide a rationale for further 
privatisation based on the belief that “government is inept, the market works, and 
that anything and everything that can be done to deliver the services of the state 
through the mechanisms of the market is of benefit” (Murphy, 2011, p.29). This belief 
results in what Murphy (2011, p.5) called the cowardly state, saying it “sees 
responsibility and runs away from it”. Chomsky (1999) contended that the 
retrenchment of government from various areas of economic and political life, 
including devolution to the privatisation of prisons, creates a democratic deficit. 
Krugman (2012) argued that the government hoped that a “confidence fairy” (p.3) 
would magically rescue the economy after fiscal reductions through privatisation. He 
argued that savings have been enormously unattainable (ibid.).  
Privatisation also defies the logic of neoliberalism and in particular deregulation. 
Private contractors still need to be managed and policed considering that markets 
are not self-correcting, and prisoners cannot provide appropriate quality control 
(Fitzgibbon and Lea, 2018). Inevitably, the privatisation move in England and Wales 
is placing additional strains on an already inadequate regulatory system. 
Furthermore, Harvey (2010) has promulgated that neoliberalism in the current 
economic condition has led to a consolidation and centralisation of class power into 
the hands of a few institutions that escape public control. 
Scholars have developed an understanding regarding misconceptions around the 
efficiency and quality of the services provided under prison privatisation. Admittedly, 
Sachdev (2004) found that prison contractors in Britain projected efficiency by 
reducing labour costs, and Hermann and Flecker (2012) discerned that privatisation, 
liberalisation, and marketisation of public services led to lower costs and superior 
quality. Nonetheless, there remains a false promise that private contractors provide 
efficient and responsive services without compromising the quality or quantity of 
these services (Hacker, 2004). A report by the Institute for Government criticised the 
political fallacy that outsourcing delivers between 20% and 30% savings, which has 
no supporting evidence (Sasse et al., 2019). Additionally, the government did not 
always establish a sufficient understanding about the services that were outsourced, 
and its fixation on the lowest price usually accompanies unreasonable expectations 
on service efficiency and effectiveness (ibid.).  
The efficacy of private prisons for rehabilitation remains underexplored (Andrew and 




that a lack of accountability, the absence of oversight framework, and little to no 
quality control of private security operators undermine the image of the penal sector. 
If these experiences are generalised to English prisons, relations between prisoners 
and those governing them may well be based on the legitimacy of penal 
commercialisation, which could limit opportunities to pursue the prison rehabilitation 
agenda. Furthermore, removing healthcare services from some of the private prison 
contracts is difficult (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2019b). Therefore, for 
those prisons commissioned directly by HMPPS, some governors have raised 
concerns about worsening standards of healthcare in these prisons, as they were not 
subjected to the NHS England delivery framework (ibid.). Clearly, commercial 
interests may subordinate the role of rehabilitation in prisons; if so, the pursuit of 
profit jettisons the notion of social justice in prisons. 
Recent data have highlighted the poor performance of private contractors in 
delivering their promises. HMP Birmingham’s transfer from G4S to the Ministry of 
Justice following continual high levels of violence and poor standards in 2019 
provided evidence that private sector organisations ran state facilities ineptly 
(Ministry of Justice, 2019a). Moreover, the bankruptcy of Carillion—a facilities 
management company with a footprint across prisons in the South of England—cost 
taxpayers an estimated £72 million (Sasse et al., 2019). Not only did it fail to deliver 
on its mandates, but it also required the state to subsidise its failure. Defined as 
either direct or indirect government subsidy, support, or rescue packages to 
business (Dawkins, 2002; Glasberg and Skidmore, 1997), corporate welfare is 
riddled with the neoliberal principle that private businesses depend extensively on 
public services and state benefits. This reality thus disputes the claim that private 
sector organisations are independent (Farnsworth, 2012; 2013). Uniquely, the 
political right and left oppose its existence. For the right, public expenditure distorts 
markets to the detriment of all (Farnsworth, 2012; Moore and Stansel, 1996). For the 
left, corporate welfare operates as a tool of political corruption designed to reward 
elite interests at the expense of those in genuine need (Dawkins, 2002; Farnsworth, 
2012; Nader, 2000). Yet, despite its poor track record across the English criminal 
justice system, corporate welfare persists. Indeed, the Ministry of Justice continues 
to use private providers to manage newly built prisons and even announced in 2018 
a competition to operate two new prisons (House of Commons Library, 2018b; 
Ministry of Justice, 2019f). 
3.6 Monitoring structure of English prisons 
Considering the closed nature of prisons, the need for checks and balances on 
power within the prison and prison healthcare governance structure is paramount. 
This is especially critical, given that issues of power abuse have been well-
documented (Carrabine, 2004; Liebling and Crewe, 2012; Simon, 2018). This section 




governmental to non-governmental—and its effectiveness in addressing the 
governance structures’ potential democratic deficits across English prisons to date. 
3.6.1 European region monitoring  
Legal scholars have observed that the protection of prisoners’ rights is a strong 
feature in the European approach to punishment (Snacken and Dumortier, 2012; van 
Zyl Smit et al., 2014). Elements of this structure include the European CPT and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) enforcement of the European Convention 
on Human Rights—key to protection in England. 
The CPT consists of independent experts elected for a four-year term by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and is responsible for scheduled 
and unscheduled inspections of individual prisons and thematic reports on particular 
issues—such as healthcare—which cut across the system as a whole. The CPT has 
repeatedly criticised prison conditions detrimental to health, such as overcrowding, 
poor ventilation, lighting and heating, and poor hygiene and sanitary conditions, 
which are increasingly widespread in English prisons (CPT, 2017; 2020a). These 
criticisms will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
The legally binding provisions of the ECHR across all member states often 
strengthen the findings of the CPT. In its landmark judgement of Kudla v Poland 
[2000] ECHR 512, the state must ensure that imprisonment does not subject 
prisoners to distress or hardship exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering 
inherent in imprisonment. Imprisonment was not of high moment on the ECHR 
agenda until 1975. That year it handed down its first major decision on prisoners’ 
rights involving the UK Government in the case of Golder v United Kingdom [1975] 1 
EHRR 524, which led to an improvement in health care standards in European 
prisons. ECHR jurisprudence on prisons has evolved, focusing on prisoners’ 
entitlement to the right to health, social and welfare issues, and their participation in 
democracy.  
ECHR often refers to the recommendations and standards the CPT sets that 
strengthen the standards via international case law. That law subsequently has led 
to improved conditions in prison systems across Europe. These judgements have a 
real-time application that continually benefits prisoners beyond the reactivity of 
prisoners taking legal actions against individual governments, including the UK 
(Karamalidou, 2017; van Zyl Smit and Snacken, 2009). Research has demonstrated 
that a human rights approach is the most effective and safest way of managing 
prisons (Coyle, 2009). 
Critics, however, have noted that the ECHR contains no explicit benchmark for the 
right to health, that some provisions aim too low, and that the convention occupies 
soft law status (Betteridge, 2004). Yet, it remains the most successful form of 




created minimum legal requirements for both the right to health and the ban on 
inhumane treatment—especially on deficient material conditions and unacceptable 
prison practices—that signatory states must meet, although with varying levels of 
implementation successes (Lines, 2008). This jurisprudence has clarified the 
obligations in Articles 2 and 3 and most likely made them irreversible—particularly 
given their ubiquity across Europe (Krisch, 2007; van Kempen, 2008; van Zyl Smit 
and Snacken, 2009). Outside of the legal jurisprudence, the political weight of the 
treaty itself is their strongest asset.  
3.6.2 Cross-government departmental monitoring  
The governance and delivery of prison healthcare in England involve multisector 
cooperation across governmental departments. Formed in 2012, the National 
Partnership Agreement for Prison Healthcare in England 2018-2021 (Ministry of 
Justice, 2018b) governs the commissioning, delivery, and monitoring of prison 
healthcare. HMPPS, the Ministry of Justice, the Department of Health and Social 
Care, NHS England, and PHE formally oversee the delivery of this agreement. It is 
aimed at promoting collaboration on improving prisoner health outcomes, reducing 
health inequalities among prisoners, addressing health-related drivers of prisoners’ 
offending behaviour, and improving continuity of care across criminal justice 
pathways (ibid.).  
Reports, though, have criticised the deficiency of the partnership. In a NAO review 
on mental health in prisons (NAO, 2017), government agencies collected insufficient 
data about services, treatment, and outcomes in prison. For instance, 31,328 
prisoners reported mental health issues in the HMIP surveys, but NHS England 
recorded mental health treatment for only 7,917 prisoners, thus suggesting that at 
least 75% were untreated (NAO, 2017). The House of Commons Health and Social 
Care Committee (2018) provides a possible explanation for this failure. It criticised 
prison health contracts for failing to reflect population health needs, with gaps in key 
services including dentistry, mental health services, and speech and language 
therapy. Regardless, without robust data, assessing the prevalence of ill-health in 
prisons and directing resources appropriately to address deficiencies is nigh 
impossible. As previously mentioned, theorising how prison healthcare can flourish 
within the prevailing structure of neoliberalism is difficult. Parallel to Crawford’s 
(1998) observation of partnership working across governmental organisation, the 
five-member partnership prioritises its own individual needs at the expense of 
collaborative and inter-organisational commitments when seeking to address the 
issues of government departments. 
Over the last 40 years, the House of Commons Select Committees have been 
responsible for scrutinising each Whitehall department executive decision. The 
committees are generally well-regarded, and their establishment in 1979 is routinely 
cited as a key event in British parliamentary history (Kelso, 2009; Ryle, 2005). They 




recommendation processes (Helboe et al., 2015). For prisons and their prison 
healthcare, the House of Commons Justice Committee is the main committee 
examining their policies, although joint committees—such as the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights and the Public Account Committee—often examine issues that 
involve prison and prison healthcare from human rights and finance management 
perspectives, respectively. 
These parliamentary committees are viewed as critical to monitoring and influencing 
government policy. Benton and Russell (2013) found that the government accepted 
and implemented approximately four in ten recommendations from these 
committees. Public embarrassment and media attention towards their review 
activities have acted as a double-edged sword in influencing policy reforms (ibid.). 
However, issues, such as government compliance, persist (Brazier and Fox, 2011; 
Defty et al., 2014; Rogers and Walters, 2006). Prison scholars have yet to examine 
these parliamentary committees’ effectiveness in developing and implementing 
paradigm shifts for prison and prison healthcare. 
3.6.3 Independent prison inspections 
Compared to other aspects of England’s prisons, the effectiveness of prison 
inspections and monitoring have attracted little scholarly attention. The HMIP 
monitors service delivery, reporting the findings of its inspections directly to the 
Secretary of State for Justice concerning the treatment and conditions of prisoners—
as outlined in section 5A of the Prison Act of 1952 (as amended). In line with its 
reputation for “conspicuous independence” (Morgan, 2002, p.146), the HMIP 
undertakes its work through announced and unannounced inspections. The Care 
Quality Commission (CQC) usually accompanies the HMIP inspections, verifying that 
places of detention demonstrate compliance with the CQC Code of Practice to 
prevent and control infections and other related health guidelines. Both HMIP and 
CQC form the UK NPM and are answerable to the UN Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (OPCAT) (National Preventive Mechanism [NPM], 2021).  
Both announced and unannounced prison inspections draw on a range of five 
datasets: 1) a confidential survey of a representative proportion of the prisoner 
population; 2) prisoner focus groups; 3) individual interviews with staff and prisoners; 
4) documentation analysis; and 5) observation by inspectors throughout the 
inspection duration (Bennett, 2014; Harding, 2006; van Zyl Smit, 2010). The 
inspections are based on a set of expectations relating to the level and quality of 
service that the HMIP expects in prisons. These include promotion of health and 
well-being among prisoners; the expectations are derived from various international 
and regional standards (HMIP, 2020). 
Robust prison health governance and monitoring have not prevented a reduction of 




Annual Reports. The HM Chief Inspector of Prisons has been calling for urgent 
notifications for HMPs Nottingham, Exeter, Birmingham, Bedford and Bristol, and the 
Feltham Young Offender Institute since January 2018 (HMIP, 2019). It has cited 
surges in deaths, drugs, degrading living conditions, and overall failure in 
maintaining institutional safety (ibid.). Further, almost one-half of the HMIP 
recommendations for improvement have not been achieved in 2019/2020 (HMIP, 
2020). This suggests that inspections of prisons and their healthcare services have 
failed to ensure prisoners’ health and well-being. 
The Prisons & Probation Ombudsman (PPO) is another effort that has not prevented 
failures in prisoner health. The PPO was established in 1994 (PPO, 2021) following 
recommendations from the Woolf Report on the need for an independent complaint 
adjudicator for prisoners (Woolf and Tumim, 1991). The PPO investigates complaints 
submitted by individual prisoners who have failed to obtain satisfaction from the 
HMPPS. Most complaints concern mismanagement of prisoner property, staff’s 
excessive use of force, and fatal incidents involving prisoners, the latter which 
increased by 6% to 334 in 2019 (PPO, 2019). 
A third mechanism that has not sufficiently protected prisoner health is the 
independent monitoring board (IMBs). Established in 1898, its function is to act as a 
watchdog for the daily life and regime in an individual prison; it is empowered to 
investigate complaints from prisoners regarding their prison conditions (Livingstone 
et al., 2008). These boards consist of over 1,300 volunteers from local communities 
who visit prisons 50,000 times a year and report their findings to the Secretary of 
State on the conditions and treatment of prisoners (ibid.).  
By recruiting members from the community, the boards have an important role in 
highlighting and preventing abuse, as well as upholding public accountability 
(Bennett, 2016; Lewis, 1997; Ramsbotham, 2003). However, IMBs have recently 
assumed a more managerial agenda: they are increasingly becoming a purely 
monitoring body, despite being involved in monitoring, in an independent and loosely 
defined manner (Behan and Kirkham, 2016; Bennett, 2016; Padfield, 2018). 
Additionally, findings from studies on the awareness of human rights among 
prisoners are inconsistent, thus creating scepticism about the boards’ efficacy. For 
instance, one investigation revealed that “some prisoners are well-informed about 
their rights” (Hulley et al., 2011, p.20). However, Karamalidou (2017) identified an 
almost total lack of awareness of human rights amongst prisoners in English prisons.  
Despite occupying a prison monitoring remit, HMIP, PPOs, and IMBs are not 
necessarily uniform in their foci and efforts, which could be detrimental to 
monitoring prison health. These organisations have expressed serious concerns 
about prison staff’s failure to implement improvements following their reports—
learning lessons, implementing changes, and sustaining resulting improvements 
(House of Commons Justice Committee, 2019b). However, HMIP has undermined 




although only a minority of prisons are relatively safe, calm, and professional and 
have caring staff (HMIP, 2019). However, the PPO, in its annual report, described 
the prison system as in crisis (PPO, 2017). Additionally, although these monitoring 
organisations lack formal powers, they were nevertheless observed to develop 
relatively informal mechanisms for implementing some level improvements (Hood et 
al., 1999). Thus, the establishment of these institutions alone cannot constitute an 
effective remedy for rectifying human rights breaches of prisoners.  
3.6.4 Advocacy by voluntary organisations  
Voluntary organisations, particularly those with an advocacy remit, can hold the 
government to account for its treatment of prisoners. They can do so by demanding 
transparency and accountability from governing institutions as part of their efforts to 
protect marginalised populations. Many of these organisations provide service and 
campaign for the improvement of services for prisoners (Kendall and Knapp, 1995), 
although there are some influential advocacy organisations—such as the Howard 
League for Penal Reform and the Prison Reform Trust—that solely focus on 
challenging the government through the policy and legal routes (Padfield, 2018). 
Extant literature has suggested a reorientation of these organisations towards a 
neoliberal structure that has undermined this function. Social movements and human 
rights activists have witnessed equality and justice being morphed to fit within a 
consumerist logic (Clarke, 2008; Hall, 2011; Larner et al., 2007; Massey, 2011). Hall 
(2011) referred to ‘disaffected consent’, whereby the authorities use tactics, such as 
resource allocation, to disseminate their neoliberal logic via charitable organisations’ 
aims and objectives. As Newman (2012) proposed, these efforts raise a question 
regarding how far the local democracy, as championed by these actors, can serve as 
a challenge to hegemonic processes.  
There is sparse research on how voluntary organisations, particularly those that are 
detached from the state, respond when expected to incorporate neoliberal mutations 
into their work. According to Harris and Raviv (1990), being a beneficiary of state 
financial assistance reinforces the principal-agent relationship and eventually erodes 
the autonomy of organisations. Increased dependence on state funding has raised 
concern that independence and autonomy of the voluntary sector would be 
undermined, especially when there are strains between service providing and 
advocacy roles (Baggott, 2013; Carmel and Harlock, 2008; House of Commons 
Select Committee on Public Administration, 2011; Kelly, 2007; Lewis, 2005; Martikke 
and Moxham, 2010). Although there is a consensus among theories regarding how 
the state’s extensive resources and political power could force voluntary 
organisations to conform to a top-down agenda (Baggott, 2013; Hodgson, 2004; 
Independence Panel, 2012), they have yet to be tested. 
Furthermore, recent developments have shown these non-state actors can be 




the government’s prevailing political ideologies (Gostin et al., 2019). The Lobbying 
Act of 2014 imposed restrictions on openly criticising government policies. The 
Citizens Advice Bureau was among the first major organisation to acquiesce to the 
clause, taking £51 million in contracts to provide advice to universal credit claimants 
in exchange for promising not to criticise publicly the Department for Work and 
Pension (Disability News Service, 2019). The then-chair of the National Association 
for Voluntary and Community Action, John Tizard, criticised the law, where he 
argued that the government was distorting England’s pluralistic democracy and 
devaluing charities (The Guardian, 2019). How the gag clause will affect prison 
health organisations remains to be seen. Nonetheless, there is cause for concern 
that it could tamper with the independence of these organisations in challenging 
adverse treatment of prisoners. 
Summary 
This chapter has outlined the structure of governance and delivery for prisons and 
prison healthcare in England. The absence of a clear aim of imprisonment blurs the 
role of health and rehabilitation, especially when government prioritises punishment, 
cost-saving, and efficiency over rehabilitation.  
While poor health precedes neoliberalism for prison healthcare, the prevailing nature 
of neoliberalism prioritises punishment and deprivation of liberty over health. The 
increasing level of privatisation continues this perspective, with misconceptions 
around moral legitimacy, service efficiency and quality being key to the extant 
academic discussion. Although various monitoring organisations exist, they lack 
sufficient power and independence to instigate reforms, with independent 
organisations—such as voluntary ones—being subjected to a gag clause in return 
for funding. The effects of this pervasive structure of neoliberalism will be seen in the 









This chapter concludes the literature review of the thesis by detailing the current 
state of health in English prisons. It commences by analysing the social determinants 
of prisoner health. In so doing, it discerns that poor health is a by-product of a 
punitive cycle that has evolved from neoliberalism in the current period. The cycle 
begins in the community and is reinforced in prisons.  
Then the chapter discusses the sociological underpinning of prison health using the 
lenses of habitus, importation and deprivation. It considers the worsening of prisoner 
health during the austere time post-2010 and the government responses to it. 
Although the thesis focuses on governance and delivery of prison healthcare rather 
than on prisoners per se, this chapter essays to demonstrate how the prevailing 
neoliberalism limits political possibilities for reducing health inequalities among 
prisoners and the wider population, as well as causing human rights violations. To 
understand the impacts of austerity on English prison health governance and 
delivery of prison healthcare, appreciation of the context of health in English prisons 
is requisite. 
4.1 Social determinants of prisoner health 
 
According to the most recent figures, about 10.7 million people are held in penal 
institutions worldwide, predominantly as remand or sentenced prisoners (Walmsley, 
2018). The prison population grew by 24% between 2000 and 2018, which is about 
the same as the estimated increase in the world’s general population over the same 
period (ibid.). The picture by country, however, varies. The UK and Italy are 
experiencing progressive increases in the rate of imprisonment, whilst Romania, 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation are witnessing a gradual decrease between 
2015 and 2018 (ibid.). In England and Wales, the current rate of incarceration is 174 
per 100,000 people, notably higher than the global average rate of 132 per 100,000 
(House of Commons Library, 2019a).  
 
The health of people in prison has been a looming issue. As early as the 19th 
century, Buxton (1818, p.19) observed that incarceration “impaired [prisoners’] 
health, debased [their] intellect and corrupted [their] principles”. Relatedly, Bentham 
(1864, pp.351-352) wrote that prisons comprised of “every imaginable means of 
infecting both body and mind,” with “forced idleness” leading to “enfeebled faculties” 
and loss of “suppleness and elasticity” to prisoners’ vital organs. More recently, 
Spencer (2001, p.18) argued that, “the seeds of poor health are sown for the majority 




prisoners’ coming from the most deprived sections of society and often experiencing 
the greatest health needs (ibid.).  
Existing scholarship has found a well-established link between poverty and social 
exclusion that compromises health (Marmot, 2005; Whitehead, 2006; WHO, 2014). 
Indeed, an extensive study by Davey Smith, Dorling and Shaw (2001) across two 
centuries demonstrated the long-standing association between poverty and ill-health. 
Not only is one’s health experienced within settings of people’s daily life (WHO, 
1986), the unequal distribution of health-damaging experiences is a systemic 
combination of poor social policies, unfair economic arrangements, and bad politics 
(Marmot et al., 2008). 
 
Overwhelming evidence has demonstrated that prisoners are more likely than others 
to suffer physical and mental ailments (Dolan et al., 2016; Fazel et al., 2016; 
Forrester et al., 2013; Herbert et al., 2012; Ritter et al., 2011; Stürup-Toft et al., 
2018). Stürup-Toft et al. (2018) identified cardiovascular issues as the biggest killer 
in English prisons, exceeding mental health and substance misuse. In a sample of 
prisoners diverted from prisons to mental health institutions, over one-half had 
comorbidities of mental health and drug or alcohol addiction (NHS England, 2017). 
HMPPS and NHS England lack accurate data regarding the number of prisoners 
with mental health needs (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2017; 
NHS England, 2017). Many of the entrants in the criminal justice system have poor 
educational backgrounds, low incomes, meagre employment opportunities, transient 
abodes, and unstable family relationships (Prison Reform Trust, 2019). These 
circumstances may reflect prison conditions or the prisoners’ chaotic lifestyles prior 
to imprisonment (Baybutt et al., 2014; Woodall, 2010). Indeed, these experiences 
are cumulative across multiple determinants (ibid.).  
 
During a time of austerity, these experiences are even more pervasive and have a 
compounding effect on the population’s health and well-being. Many local 
governments in England have impaired their Local Welfare Assistance Schemes, 
leaving vulnerable people and those facing emergencies without anywhere to turn 
(UN General Assembly, 2019). Homelessness is up 60%, fitful sleeping 134%, and 
use of food banks has increased four-fold between 2010 and 2018 (ibid.). Although 
austerity seemingly does not affect local authorities’ public health budgets, it has 
nonetheless impacted the population’s health. Progress in reducing preventable 
disease has flatlined since 2012, and the Institute for Public Policy Research (2019) 
attributes 130,000 preventable deaths in the general UK population to austerity. 
Moreover, large income differences have damaging health and social consequences 
(Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Such consequential precursors cause neglect, 






4.2 Prison environment 
Discussions of the state of ill-health in prisons often discount living conditions that 
consist of the regime, social environment, and purposeful activities—all which are 
key factors in enabling or impairing prisoners’ health. As early as 1990, the CPT 
highlighted the problem of overcrowding in English prisons (CPT, 2020a). Six in ten 
(n=70) prisons in England and Wales were overcrowded at the end of December 
2019 (NAO, 2020), with most prisons exceeding their certified normal 
accommodation level, a measure that denotes an acceptable standard of 
accommodation (House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee, 2018). In 
fact, the ten most crowded prisons exceeded 147% of their operational capacity; this 
implied that many prisoners at these establishments shared cells designed for fewer 
people (NAO, 2020). 
Official reports note that legislative changes have negatively affected the number of 
individuals entering prisons and their duration. Key legislative changes that 
contributed towards high imprisonment rates are illustrated in Figure 4.1. Ministry of 
Justice (2013) highlights key reasons for the increased incidence: 1) a rise in the 
number of offenders entering prison receiving an immediate custodial sentence; 2) 
the growth in recall populations who stayed longer in prisons; 3) an augmented 
overall average of custodial sentence length; and 4) a decrease in parole rates since 
2007.  
 
The Ministry of Justice (2019c) also highlighted that offence groups that rarely 
receive home detention curfew or release on licence—including those convicted of 
violence against the person, drug offences, and sexual offenders—had the largest 
impact on increasing the prison population. Successful prosecutions for sexual 
offences and continued incarceration of those imprisoned under indeterminate 
sentences (a total of 2,223 prisoners)—despite being abolished as an option in 
2012—also play a role in the rising prison population (Prison Reform Trust, 2020). 
Given the decreasing trajectory of crime rates in England and Wales since mid-
1990s, the resulting increment in the average length of stay in prison reflects not a 
need but an unabated punitive legislative framework and public opinion concerning 
criminal activities, as well as politicians eager to please the public through a tough-




Figure 4.1  
Key legislative changes from the 1990s that increased volumes of individuals 
entering prisons and their length of stay 




4.3 Habitus, importation, and deprivation 
Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus de classe denotes social orchestration without 
a conductor. It reflects the impacts of people living in different communities and how 
these impacts lead to different lifestyles and life outcomes. Social issues associated 
with relative deprivation, including imprisonment, are strongly linked to society’s 
unequal income distribution (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).  
Prisoners tend to come from deprived areas with entrenched poverty; this 
complicacy reflects class-related experiences that determine inequalities in health 
(Williams, 1995). The more deprived the neighbourhood, the more likely it is to have 
social and environmental problems presenting risks to health (Marmot et al., 2008). 
The modus operandi of the government’s concentrated budget cuts has transpired in 
the most deprived regions (Beatty and Fothergill, 2017; Taylor-Robinson and 
Gosling, 2011)—such as areas that in previous generations depended on 
employment in mines, steelworks, and shipbuilding. These areas never fully 
recovered from the deindustrialisation of the 1980s or the failure of miners’ strike and 
the long decline of working-class agency through the trade union movement (Milne, 
2014). Premature mortality is greater (Taylor-Robinson and Gosling, 2011), and 
there are much more clearly defined patterns of social deprivation and spatial 
segregation in such areas (Marmot, 2020; Pacione, 1997).  
A reduction in local authority budgets between 2010 and 2015 and a further 56% 
reduction in central grant funding to local authorities between 2015 and 2020 (HM 
Treasury, 2015) reinforced the aforementioned inequalities. This accords with 
Spencer’s (2001) observation that poor health in prisons is derived from prisoners’ 
communities of origin; moreover, the implications of austerity are most severe in 
deprived areas where the need is greatest (Clifford et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2016; 
Marmot, 2020).  
In the United States, austerity has crime increased in deindustrialised communities in 
a cumulative pattern over a long trajectory. American criminologists have found that 
street crimes rise as unemployment augments; after a lag period of 
deindustrialisation, more serious criminality develops (Linkon and Russo, 2002). 
Additionally, between 2001 and 2014, deindustrialisation and incarceration in the 
United States subtracted roughly two and a half years from the lifespan of the poor, 
pointing to their role as major health determinants (Nosrati et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, because recession is cyclical, each recession impacts these groups 
more harshly, and they have enhanced difficulty for recovery (Clark and Heath, 
2014). US-type studies have yet to be replicated in the UK, but the rise in the use of 
prison is indeed associated with government decisions to withdraw from a welfare-
based approach to solving social problems (Drake, 2018). 
According to Crewe (2005), imprisonment provides an opportunity to improve 




(1968) importation theory that proposed that prisoners bring their life experiences 
with them into prison and that these experiences must be addressed during 
imprisonment. In fact, Wacquant (2002, p.388) has argued that health in prison or jail 
facilities cannot be described as “distortive and wholly negative” because 
imprisonment acts as a “stabilising and restorative force”, especially for those with 
many barriers to access healthcare in the community. Nevertheless, this situation 
manifests the failure of the welfare state: citizens’ need for healthcare can remain so 
underserved in the community that imprisonment offers an improvement.  
In his classic study of a maximum-security prison, Sykes (1958) described 
imprisonment as the deprivation of physical liberty, goods and services, sexual 
relations, autonomy, and security. Prisons, in fact, diminish prisoners’ self-worth. 
Because this deprivation inflicts pain and hardship on prisoners, it is antithetical to 
the health values of autonomy, participation, and empowerment (Woodall, 2010). 
Contrary to the observation that imprisonment merely deprives prisoners of their 
liberty (Sparks, 1996), deprivation techniques—such as exclusion and social 
isolation—seek to remove individual control of prisoners and disempowers them, 
which has a detrimental effect on mental health (Rhodes, 2005) and exacerbates 
feelings of anxiety and hopelessness (Kurki and Morris, 2001). As previously 
discussed, prisoners with mental health issues are often criminalised, but the 
oppressive structure of imprisonment can worsen these issues.  
4.4 Prison health during the era of austerity 
The government imposed strict austerity that led to insensitivity towards the needs of 
the incarcerated population. This can be seen in reports post-2010 that correlate 
austerity and its impact on prisoners’ inaccessibility to healthcare, prisoners’ 
degrading living conditions, and lack of availability of purposeful activities, along with 
an increase in the levels of violence—collectively which hinder the aspirations of 
health and well-being in prisons. As described in the previous chapter, quotidian 
healthcare delivery is highly dependent on a stable prison regime, which is currently 
deteriorating. This dynamic is explored below. 
4.4.1 Impeding access to prison healthcare 
Reports by the HMIP, CPT and the Nuffield Trust document the regular cancellation 
of prisoners’ imperative hospital appointments owing to the lack of available 
discipline officers to escort them to their appointments. This situation also infers that 
the reduced number of prison officers has created up to a 12-week delay for the 
assessment and treatment of prisoners with mental health-related issues in HMP 
Foston Hall in Derbyshire and HMP Bronzefield in Surrey (HMIP, 2017). Additional 
observations by the CPT regarding severe delays in transferring prisoners to 
psychiatric hospitals and inappropriate placement of acute mental health prisoners in 
segregation units are rife (CPT 2017; 2020a). Further, insufficient general healthcare 




over 1,000 detainees; plus, several vacant posts within prison healthcare and 
substance misuse teams are extant (CPT, 2017; 2020a). The Nuffield Trust (2020) 
stated that 40% of prisoners’ outpatient appointments (32,987) were not attended—
more than double the number in the general population. Also, over 75% of missed 
appointments were partly blamed for the lack of staff and a cost to the NHS of £2 
million (Nuffield Trust, 2020). 
This inadequate health and social care support runs the risk of breaching Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. This article bans torture and inhumane 
or degrading treatment or punishment. In two cases in which a complainant accused 
the UK of violating Article 3, McGlinchey v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 41 and 
Price v United Kingdom (2001) ECHR 453, the court held that the state has a literal 
obligation to protect the health and well-being of detainees, particularly when a 
prisoner is at increased vulnerability following severe health concerns—something 
increasingly prevalent in English prisons. Article 3 denotes absolute rights that the 
government cannot neglect, even in times of war or other public emergencies. Thus, 
the principles from McGlinchey and Price are binding on national authorities having a 
duty to develop and apply the common law in a manner that is consistent with the 
convention. The conditions reported in the above official documents clearly violated 
these obligations, although it has yet to make any material improvement to the 
existing situation.  
4.4.2 Degrading living conditions 
Prison overcrowding imposes degrading conditions on English prisoners. Lengthy 
confinement within locked and poorly maintained cells can accelerate the 
progression of disease. This deplorable condition is evidence that the overall prison 
regime is inhumane or degrading. Prisoners in HMP Doncaster and HMP Liverpool 
suffered from overcapacity conditions: 152% and 112% beyond the certified normal 
accommodation rate, respectively, along with unsanitary cells (CPT, 2020a). These 
circumstances included pest and vermin infestations and dilapidated bathroom 
facilities, with no plans for refurbishment due to inadequate funding (HMIP, 2017). 
Additionally, at HMP Pentonville, most prisoners live, eat, and sleep in cells designed 
for single use, with filthy toilets that are either only partially or totally unscreened 
(CPT, 2017).  
Two cases that applied Article 3 in Greece and one that applied it in Bulgaria, 
Dougoz v Greece (2002) 34 EHRR 61, Peers v Greece (2001) 33 EHRR 51, and 
Kehayov v Bulgaria (application no. 41035/98), suggest that such inimical conditions 
in English prisons also violate Article 3. The point of law in Karalevicius v Lithuania 
(application no. 53254/99) and Staykov v Bulgaria (application no. 49438/99) 
stipulates that a lack of financial resources does not absolve the state from its 





4.4.3 Lack of access to purposeful activities 
Staff shortages have been linked to limitations on prisoners’ entitlement to access 
purposeful activities. Despite a recommendation that prisoners should spend a 
minimum of eight hours daily outside their cells, prisoners in HMP Winchester in 
Hampshire and HMP Wormwood Scrubs in London spent up to 22 hours per day in 
their cells without opportunity for educational or social activities (CPT, 2017). 
Additionally, the HMIP has found that prisoners in HMP Full Sutton (York), HMP 
Elimley (Kent), and HMP Swinfen Hall (Staffordshire) had very limited time outside 
their cells to demonstrate improvements in their behaviour (HMIP, 2017). Moreover, 
in HMP Pentonville, 36% of inmates did not have entree to employment or 
education, despite the wide range of activities available to them (e.g., textile and art 
workshops, sports, and internal employment) (CPT, 2017). Although there had been 
improvements in the out-of-cell time for employed prisoners at each prison visited by 
the CPT in 2019, prisoners who were unemployed were spending 21 to 23 hours a 
day confined to their cells (CPT, 2020a). 
Collectively, these incidents contradict the expectation of the HMIP that prisoners 
should be unlocked for at least 10 hours a day and are supported by a survey that 
found that only 3% of prisoners realised this goal (HMIP, 2019). The lack of access 
to purposeful activities represents not only an inhumane condition, it also imperils 
prisoners’ health, especially their mental health. Self-inflicted deaths in prisons per 
capita increased 37% between March 2010 and March 2020 (Figure 4.2) (House of 
Commons Library, 2017). Purposeful activities might help prisoners deal with the 
boredom and stress of imprisonment in productive ways (HMIP, 2017). A lack of 
access to opportunities for education, employment, training, and volunteering 
suggests that the government has minimal interest in using rehabilitation as a core 
driver for reducing incarceration rates. 
Figure 4.2 





Source: Ministry of Justice, 2020e; Ministry of Justice, 2020g.  
4.4.4 Increasing levels of violence 
The growing number of violent episodes in English prisons has been directly linked 
to the decreasing number of prison staff. Deployment of tactical intervention teams 
from the National Tactical Response Group is redolent of this situation. These teams 
responded to hostage-taking and concerted riot incidents between 30 and 40 times a 
month in 2015 (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2016). There were also 
nearly 2,000 reports of deliberate fires in 2015, which represented a 57% increase 
compared to the previous year (Ministry of Justice, 2017b). The conflagrations 
prompted the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, to describe the English prison 
system as ‘scandalous’, ‘failing’, and ‘shameful’ (Prime Minister’s Office, 2016).  
Even worse, prisoners in both HMP Doncaster and HMP Pentonville complained that 
prison staff did not respond promptly to incidents of violence. Such nonresponse 
fuelled an atmosphere of fear and a lack of confidence in the prison management 
and staff in maintaining institutional safety (CPT, 2017). This observation was further 
demonstrated when several violent incidents were not adequately reported or were 
reported to be less serious than they were (ibid.); as such, a true picture of the 
severity of the situation in English prisons went unrecorded. Essentially, the CPT 
recommended that the UK government should provide additional investment in 
English prisons to prevent violence from becoming a norm, as well as calibrating 
strategies to ensure that staff can control prisons (ibid.).  
Despite acknowledgement by some politicians of the precarious conditions in English 




HMIP (2017), violent incidents in English prisons have become worse since 2012. 
The number of assaults has increased since 2010 (Figure 4.3): at the end of March 
2020, there were 31,568 recorded incidents of assault, including both prisoner-on-
prisoner and prisoner-on-staff (Ministry of Justice, 2020f). The number of assaults is 
rising even with the addition of new staff (Ministry of Justice, 2020b; 2020f; 2020g). 
This represented a 53% increase since March 2010, although it is likely to be an 
underestimate given inadequate reporting practice across prisons (CPT, 2020a). 
Beyond the direct impact of such incidents on the targets of violence, they create a 
general feeling of danger among prisoners that has a negative psychological impact 
(HMIP, 2017). 
Figure 4.3 
Assaults per 1,000 prisoners compared to the number of core prison staff 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice, 2020f; Ministry of Justice, 2020g.  
4.4.5 Self-harm 
The Ministry of Justice Safety in Custody Statistics Bulletins provides an accounting 
of incidents of self-harm. It registered a 61% increase in March 2020 over the 
number of incidents in March 2010 (Figure 4.4, Ministry of Justice, 2020f). Similar to 
the assault figures, these are likely to be underestimated given the poor recording 
practice across prisons. Self-harm in prison is a risk factor for suicide (Hawton et al., 
2014). A systematic review of 34 studies identifying other clinical, psychosocial, and 
environmental risk factors for suicide in prison included recent suicidal ideation, 
psychosis, depression, alcohol misuse, a sense of hopelessness, family history of 
suicide, poor social support, and prior experience of the death of a partner or a child 





Self-harm per 1,000 prisoners compared to the number of core prison staff 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice, 2020f; Ministry of Justice, 2020g.  
4.4.6 Novel Psychoactive Substances 
Drug use has long been a central feature of prison life for reasons such as prolonged 
engagement with drug use prior to imprisonment, self-medication, and a time “killer” 
(Bullock, 2003; Cope, 2000; Crewe, 2005; Penfold et al., 2005). Staff reductions 
have also hampered stemming the flow of illicit drugs in prison. New psychoactive 
substances, such as Spice and Black Mamba, have been increasingly linked to 
medical emergencies and violence. At the end of the fiscal year 2019, these 
substances were seized in 6,699 instances, a dramatic increase from the 15 
recorded seizures in 2010 (Ministry of Justice, 2019b). These drugs have been 
linked to increases in organised crime and prison gangs operating both within and 
beyond the prison walls. Transnational studies reveal that criminal groups create and 
administer the governance of institutions (Skarbek, 2011). Although Maitra (2010) 
suggested such groups are less entrenched in English prisons, recent research 
indicates otherwise: sophisticated financial trading and ease of consumption (Gooch 
and Treadwell, 2020) have enabled organised crime and prison gangs to engage in 
coercion, violence, and usury, and facilitate overdoses. Such adverse efforts lead to 
a decline in the legitimacy of prison authority. The National Drug Strategy (HM 
Government, 2017) included a plan to address the growing presence of NPS in 
prisons via intelligence, treatment, and legislative measures; to date, though, it has 




4.4.7 Ameliorating strategies that appear to maintain the neoliberalism stance  
The government has responded to crises in English prisons through investment, but 
only when spending coheres with its neoliberal vision of recruiting more prison 
officers and building more prisons. Following a speech at the Conservative Party 
conference in 2016, the former Justice Minister Liz Truss allocated £291 million to 
recruit 2,500 additional prison officers (Ministry of Justice, 2016). This reform was 
incorporated into the Prison Safety and Reform White Paper 2016, which also 
sought, inter alia, to enhance the commissioning autonomy of prison governors, 
increase the transparency of prison monitoring, and build new community prisons for 
women (Ministry of Justice, 2016). While most proposals from this White Paper were 
halted because of the UK General Election in June 2017, the policy implementation 
on the staffing levels of the 2016 White Paper have been carried forward by the 
subsequent Justice Ministers.  
A further allocation of £10 million was provided by the former Prison Minister, Rory 
Stewart to reduce violence and restrict drugs in ten underperforming prisons 
(Ministry of Justice, 2018a). The government managed to recruit an extra 4,500 
prison officers from September 2016 to September 2019 (Parliament UK, 2020). 
Although prison officer numbers are nearly at the same level as they were seven 
years ago, the workforce is now much less experienced. In March 2019, 50% of 
prison officers had less than five years’ experience compared to 22% in March 2010 
(Institute for Government, 2019). Just under one-half (46%) had at least 10 years’ 
experience, down from 56% in 2010 (ibid.). As the HMIP (2019) observed, new and 
inexperienced staff sometimes struggle to challenge poor prisoner behaviour.  
The government responded to the CPT’s (2017) statements of concern by unveiling 
a plan to build enough prisons to house 7,000 additional prisoners (CPT, 2018). 
Also, after a follow-up inspection in 2019, there are plans for further space to 
accommodate an extra 20,000 prisoners (CPT, 2020b). The government reasoned 
that it should never be asked to set an arbitrary rate of imprisonment (ibid.); this 
assertion was in response to the CPT’s (2020a) recommendation to reduce the rate. 
These super-prisons do not seem to eliminate existing overcrowding and degrading 
living conditions in English prisons. In fact, Garland (2001) argued, building new 
prisons can potentially lead to more imprisonment, which does nothing to address 
the effect of austerity on prison institutions. Building more prisons signifies a 
motivation to use imprisonment as a tool of social control and management of 
perceived risky communities. These motives accord with neoliberal ideology but fail 
to improve the safety of English citizens. Attending to prisoners’ entitlement to health 
fails to receive attention with this approach.  
For 2020/2021, the government recommended a 4.9% increase (in today’s monetary 
value) in the budget for the Ministry of Justice, as well as a commitment of £2.5 
billion to build an additional 10,000 prison spaces and an extra £100 million to 




to address concerns over drugs and violence, these efforts took the focus off the 
existing issue of chronic overcrowding and degrading living conditions in English 
prisons.  
Summary  
This chapter highlighted the growing health disparities within the growing and 
increasingly diverse prison population in England. It largely theorised using 
underpinnings from social determinants of health, habitus, importation and 
deprivation. It sought to operationalise the notion of imprisonment from a sociological 
approach rather than a pathogenic and biomedical model of health. Because the 
current political economic system prioritises neoliberalism over moral and ethical 
standards, prisoners suffer from a lack of access to acceptable healthcare. They live 
in substandard conditions and do not have access to purposeful activities. The 
vector of violence in English prisons remains uncurbed. This creates ongoing 
instability in English prisons, hampers the aspiration of the rehabilitation agenda, and 
increases the likelihood of breaching the principles of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The state’s inadequate and inept response to the crisis and its 
limitations, unless vigorously challenged and then modified, will continue to support 
human rights violations against prisoners and their health. 
Conclusion 
These literature review chapters appraised the existing literature of austerity against 
the wider backdrop of neoliberalism, the governance of prisons and prison 
healthcare in England, and the current state of health across English prisons. It 
theorised the ways in which austerity policies—despite being ideologically rather 
than economically driven—have intensified the deepening health inequalities within 
the wider population. Although existing studies have yet to illustrate the impacts of 
austerity on prison health governance and delivery, the stance of tough-on-crime and 
the privatisation of prison services over the past few decades have demonstrated 
that the guiding norms of neoliberalism permeate management of the English 
criminal justice system.  
Although there is a robust structure in governing prisons and prison healthcare and 
its delivery, incoherent policies concerning imprisonment, a fragile institutional base 
at all levels of governance, and persistent political intrusion weaken the potential for 
sustainable health gains. There have also been signs of a diminishing state 
presence following an increase in the privatisation of the criminal justice sector. This 
ethos continues the traits of neoliberalism, with continual impotence of prison and 
prison healthcare’s monitoring structure, given the lack of power and independence 
to instigate reforms. 
This chapter also outlined the current state of health in English prisons. The 




populations in England illustrates how their ill-health originates from pre-
incarceration and is further impaired during incarceration. The pervasive impact of 
austerity since 2010—as illuminated by the literature on the lack of access to 
healthcare, demeaning living conditions in prisons, and growing levels of violence—
has contributed to ongoing prison instability and poor governance for prisons and 
prison healthcare. It also has enhanced the potential that England will breach 
international and European human rights principles regarding humane treatment 
during prisoners’ detention. 
The current literature clarifies the effects of top-down government implementation of 
austerity measures across the public sector, including prisons, and the potential 
breach of international obligations that seek to protect prisoners’ entitlement to 
health. However, it does not contextualise the impact of austerity on prison health 
governance and delivery in England. Thus, understanding the views of experts in the 
English prison health field is a necessary prerequisite. The next chapter on the 
methodology and methods used in this research will describe the qualitative 
research processes undertaken to obtain 87 prison health experts’ views on the 






Chapter 5: Methodology and Methods 
Introduction 
Existing literature (see Chapters 2, 3, and 4) elucidates how austerity has been 
utilised as a vehicle in strengthening the principles of neoliberalism. However, the 
literature does not contextualise the manifestations and impact of austerity on prison 
health governance and the delivery of healthcare services in England. Specific 
impacts on different prison establishments remain unknown. Additionally, 
governmental responses towards incidents that were directly linked to austerity 
remain under-theorised. Notably absent from the academic and policy debates are 
discussions around remedial actions to counter the effects of austerity on prison 
health.  
To unpack these discussions, this study investigated the topic critically from the 
perspectives of actors who occupy positions in this governance structure—namely 
international and national experts in prison health. Additionally, local prison 
governors and officers, as well as representatives from private and voluntary sector 
organisations which were commissioned to mobilise the prison healthcare agenda in 
England, also took part in this research.  
This chapter presents the rationale and philosophical underpinning of the research, 
for which constructivist grounded theory provides the core approach. Subsequently, 
it offers an overview of the research design by explaining the process for accessing 
and recruiting participants and the procedures for data collection and analysis. 
These expert interviews highlight issues pertaining to ‘studying up’ with elite 
participants, as well as challenges involved in undertaking health research in a highly 
regimented environment with ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980). Given the 
qualitative nature of the study, measures were undertaken to establish the 
trustworthiness of the research project, including the principles of credibility, ethical 
conduct, and sincerity. 
5.1 Grounded Theory  
The approach of grounded theory employed in this study helps to examine the many 
dimensions of austerity in governing and delivery prison health. It is an inductive 
approach used in qualitative research to build theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), 
characterised by a juxtaposition of systematic and flexible guidelines for collecting 
and analysing data, as theory construction takes place (Charmaz, 2006). By 
operationalising grounded theory, the study was able to co-construct (Silverman, 
2013) the meaning of austerity with the participants, grounded in empirical data from 
their experiences in prison and prison health experts at the international, national, 




Despite its widespread use as a qualitative methodology in various social science 
fields over the last five decades (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), grounded theory 
remains under-utilised in prison research. Qualitative prison health research to date 
typically focuses on the lived experiences of the prisoners or takes a ‘studying down’ 
approach to the phenomenon (Morris, 2015). What remains scarce, however, is 
‘studying up’—particularly in examining the interactions of actors and institutions—as 
well as the study of specific sectoral cultures, especially when they undergo systemic 
reorganisation (ibid.). As grounded theory positions itself as a suitable methodology 
for a new, emerging phenomenon that has yet to be theorised, especially the 
impacts of austerity on prison health governance and delivery (Birks and Mills, 2011; 
Charmaz, 2006), this methodology is considered particularly pertinent for this study.  
This study adopts a constructivist approach to grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). 
This was a fully conscious choice made from an epistemological, ontological and 
subjective point of view, and which is underscored by the research imperatives and 
practicalities of the project. In keeping with Charmaz’s (2006) proposal, constructivist 
grounded theory has an axiological orientation; that is, it views research as a tool for 
advancing social policy. Applying this observation to my own study, I interrogated a 
social justice issue (prison health), together with its prevailing structural conditions 
(political and economic position) and internal structure (organisations and actors who 
are mandated to implement the policies). Unlike the classical approach of grounded 
theory that proposes a distant relationship between the researcher and the 
participants (Glaser, 1978), the constructivist stance brings many practical benefits 
to the co-construction of knowledge.  
First, from an epistemological standpoint, constructivism asserts that knowledge and 
meaning about the world are constructed by participants (Appleton and King, 2002). 
Meaning is not waiting to be discovered, but rather is constructed as participants 
interact with, and interpret, the subject (Crotty, 1998). A constructivist stance 
encourages a study ‘with the participants’. This involved providing them with a safe 
space to engage with the topic, humanising the research interactions and avoiding a 
mechanistic process of engagement. This approach also recognises the relativism of 
multiple social realities (Charmaz, 2003; 2009). Truth or meaning, according to 
Crotty (1998), only comes into existence when we engage with the realities of our 
world. The informants’ experiences, along with the context within which these 
experiences took place, played a key role in theorising the impact of austerity on 
prison health governance and delivery. These research interactions enacted a 
symbiotic relationship between the participants and me. Through the prolonged one-
to-one engagement with each participant, my interaction was heuristic, using 
discourses to unpack the phenomenon of austerity and how it influences and 
restructures the overall governance of prison health and the delivery of healthcare in 
England. Simultaneously, rather than positing the view that truth can only be 
discovered in a posteriori knowledge, the ontological perspective of constructivist 




constructed by the research participants, are shaped by the intersections of political, 
cultural and social norms, and lead to a theory that “is situated in time, place, culture 
and situation” (Charmaz, 2006, p.131). 
Second, from a viewpoint of subjectivity, an approach based in constructivist 
grounded theory acknowledges overtly the subjective role of the researcher in the 
process of both generating and analysing data (Charmaz, 2014). More specifically, 
there were two key dimensions to my subjective position as researcher: 1) my 
professional experiences as a health commissioner prior to entering academia; and 
2) the prior knowledge of the topic generated via an initial literature review. My 
background as a former community and prison commissioner in the public health 
sector for nearly a decade has helped ensure that I am conversant with the prison 
health governance and the delivery of prison healthcare services in England.  
Many grounded theorists have been criticised for not attaining a sufficiently close 
level of familiarity with the phenomenon under investigation (Lofland and Lofland, 
1984). Instead, their views remain partial and superficial (ibid.). To overcome this 
potential weakness, I ensured that I used my professional background to my 
advantage in appreciating the threat posed by austerity to the delivery of the health 
services in English prisons. The constructivist approach used in this study 
incorporates me as part of the heuristic journey, rather than imposing an artificial 
tabula rasa (i.e., remote observation) and the passive theorisation of the social 
phenomenon being examined (Birks and Mills, 2011; Charmaz, 2003; Lincoln et al., 
2011). Acknowledging that researchers play an active role in telling the story and 
constructing the theory (Charmaz, 2006), my background has, to a certain extent, 
ensured that I have not examined the phenomenon superficially, since I can draw 
upon my first-hand experiences witnessing this phenomenon across prison 
institutions. As Kools and colleagues (1996) suggest, it is rare for researchers to 
abandon subject or methodological knowledge to understand a complex social norm. 
Thus, this heuristic journey runs parallel to the ontological assumption that reality is 
socially constructed and, therefore, that it cannot be viewed as independent from 
those who have co-constructed it (Creswell, 2007). 
In embracing practicality, constructivist grounded theory encourages me to be 
acquainted with the existing literature, with the aim of augmenting my knowledge 
prior to entering the field. Conducting a literature review within a grounded theory 
framework is an issue of recurrent epistemic struggle. Classical grounded theorists 
objected to engagement with the existing literature prior to beginning data collection 
(Glaser and Holton, 2004). Hunter (2000), for example, proposes that approaching a 
research problem without preconceptions will eventually lead to the emergence of a 
theoretical framework for the data. Indeed, Glaser and Strauss (1967) even went as 
far as to argue that researchers should “literally ignore the literature of theory and 





However, this stance does not reflect the reality in which real-world research studies 
are conducted. Researchers, like myself, do not exist in a vacuum. Thus, the context 
around individual perceptions and their conceptual frameworks cannot be side-lined. 
In fact, as Charmaz (2014) indicates, “data do not provide a window on reality. 
Rather, the discovered reality arises from the interactive process and its temporal, 
cultural, and structural contexts” (p.524). Having background knowledge reinforces 
my knowledge and credibility, and, in turn, contributes to the authority of the ensuing 
arguments. As Dey (1993) puts it, “there is a difference between an open mind and 
an empty head” (p.65).  
Equally, I was also mindful that familiarity with a wide range of existing literature 
should not place limits on my theorisation. Efforts were taken to remain open to 
concepts that were missing from the initial literature review and to adopt a creative 
attitude (Charmaz, 2006; Henwood and Pidgeon, 2003). One practical example here 
is the participants’ discussion of the denial of the impacts of austerity by a minority of 
policymakers. Denial, as a theme, was not covered in the initial literature review. I 
avoided being resistant towards what were unexpected and newly emerging data. In 
so doing, I ensured I was not acting so as to enable a self-fulfilling prophecy 
(Thornberg and Dunne, 2019). At the same time, it also demonstrated my empathy 
and sensitivity towards the participants’ disclosure. 
In addition, research gatekeepers often require researchers to demonstrate prior 
knowledge of the field, which can be evidenced via a prior literature review.8 Beyond 
identifying relevant works and establishing connections between the research and 
earlier studies, it was also necessary for me to convince research collaborators of 
‘what was in it for them’ and how, in return for their contribution, the outputs from this 
research could support their strategic and operational aims. Undertaking a thorough 
literature review before entering the field ensured that I was capable of articulating 
the potential academic originality of my study to these gatekeepers, including its 
theoretical and conceptual contribution, and this was a notable advantage of my 
awareness of the grounded theory paradigm that would suit the mode of enquiry. 
Thus, as Strübing (2007) confirms, the important insight from a literature review lies 
in how the researchers make proper use of extant knowledge to further themselves 
in the field, rather than questioning whether that previous knowledge should be used 




8 To obtain the funding for my doctoral study, I was also required to demonstrate how my research is 
in line with the priority research areas of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), namely 
‘understanding the macroeconomy’ (ESRC, 2016), whilst explaining how my research proposal was 




5.2 Access to participants and their recruitment 
A 13-month period of research fieldwork was undertaken intermittently between 
January 2018 and September 2019, with 87 prison health professionals who operate 
within the international, national and local governance structures. Given the 
interdisciplinarity and scale of the investigation into the governance strata of prison 
health in England, the sample size was inevitably large. Figure 5.1 below 
demonstrates the number of participants who were contacted and subsequently 
participated during the three phases of this research. Out of 246 potential 
participants who were approached, 87 (35%) agreed to take part. Drawing upon a 
large group of potential participants helped to minimise the uncertainty around non-
participation.  
Figure 5.1 
Number of participants who were contacted and participated in the research 
 
Although the Findings chapters (Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10) will report the cross-
cutting themes across all participant groups, for pragmatic reasons, this research 
was divided up into three stages of fieldwork, each dealing with a different group. At 
the first fieldwork stage, 29 policymakers from key organisations relevant to 
international prison work, such as the UN, the WHO and the Council of Europe, were 
invited to provide accounts on the research topic, together with those from other non-
governmental organisations, such as Amnesty International and the Association for 
the Prevention of Torture. This was followed by the second wave of fieldwork, where 
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England and PHE) and non-governmental organisations, reflecting the broad 
composition of the prison health terrain in England.  
To reflect ground-level experiences, 22 prison governors and officers across 17 
prison sites–ranging from high, medium and low security prisons, as well as 
resettlement prisons, and with a mixture of public and private sector institutions – 
took part in the final stage of the research. Additionally, nine representatives from the 
voluntary and private sector organisations who were commissioned to deliver the 
prison health agenda across English prisons, took part in this research. 
Table 5.1 below details each participant’s professional standing, association, mode 
of interview, and the total length of the interview. The participants’ details were 
anonymised to ensure that their actual credentials were not exposed, while at the 
same time providing enough information for the readers to judge the range of their 















































Despite the varied sample, all stakeholders were guided to address the same aim, 
namely to highlight the impact of austerity on prisons, regardless of the stratum that 
they occupied. As Charmaz (2006) indicates, “the studied experience is embedded 
in larger and, often, hidden positions, networks, situations and relationships. 
Subsequently, differences and distinctions between people become visible” (pp.130–
131). As such, I was alert to similarities and differences between participants, in 
order to ensure that all perspectives were considered sufficiently.  
While all the participants of this research are experts who occupy positions in the 
governance structure for prison health, they are clearly sub-divided into two groups: 
elite participants and ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980). International and 
national policymakers may be considered fall into the former category, while prison 
governors and officers, as well as the representatives from private and voluntary 
sector organisations, fall into the latter category. The processes for gaining access to 
these two groups and recruiting from them are explained further below. 
5.2.1 Elite participants: international and national policymakers and experts 
 
Of the 87 study participants, 56 of them were international and national prison and 
prison healthcare policymakers and experts who can be considered as elite 
participants. Dexter (1969) defines ‘elites’ as a group whose members are “the 
influential, the prominent, and the well-informed” (p.19). Although the elite 
participants included in this study cannot be neatly defined as a homogeneous 
group, they share several of the following traits: engagement with policy-making 
activities in prison health (Lilleker, 2003); occupations with authoritative positions in 
the field (Littig, 2009; Mikecz, 2012); professional skills and competencies; and the 
ability to exert influence through social networks, social capital and their strategic 
positioning within social structures (Harvey, 2011). They have also exerted greater 
influence on political outcomes than general members of the public (Richards, 1996).  
 
It was important to obtain their perspectives on the research topic because of their 
potential involvement in shaping and implementing policy imperatives relating to 
prison health governance, and because of their direct or indirect experience of 
responding to the policy imperatives that resulted from austerity regimes at the 
international and national level. Previous research concerning elite communities in 
prison health is almost entirely absent. This omission follows directly from Hunter’s 
(1995) and Ostrander’s (1995) suggestion that elite participants are an understudied 
population in general, because of their position in an asymmetrical distribution of 
knowledge and their insularity from the public, which can be attributed to their power. 
Lilleker (2003) suggested that elites are in the position to “provide insight into events 
about which we know little: the activities that take place out of the public or media 
gaze, behind closed doors” (p.208). ‘Studying up’, in the form of interviews with elites 
provided insight into the hidden elements of the austerity phenomenon, specifically 





5.2.1.1 Recruitment of elite participants 
 
Recruitment of the elite participants was purposive and theoretical, and employed a 
snowball sampling technique. Purposive sampling was used by “seeking out 
individuals where the processes being studied are most likely to occur” (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994, p.202). Participant selection was based on four inclusion criteria: 1) 
perspectives that reflect the diverse disciplines covered by this research; 2) the 
richness of experiences that reflect participants’ seniority in the field; 3) participants’ 
decision-making capacity, based on their position in the organisational hierarchy; 
and 4) familiarity with the English prison landscape—particularly, the principle of 
equivalence, that is, that the NHS delivers health services in both prisons and the 
community (Till et al., 2014)—together with some additional involvement with other 
prison systems across Europe for comparative purposes. 
While elites are generally quite visible, they are also relatively inaccessible. Previous 
research on qualitative elite interviewing warns that approaching elite participants 
can be administratively and logistically challenging (Laurila, 1997; Ostrander, 1995; 
Sabot, 1999; Thuesen, 2011; Welch et al., 2002). For this reason, invitation 
strategies were carefully planned and executed. These strategies included 
examining official documents on international and European prison health, where the 
names of the authors and consultees were recorded. Additionally, several 
international and national research organisations agreed to provide advice on the 
research design, recommend potential participants for the interviews, and furnish 
their contact information.9 I also made use of my attendance at both of the WHO’s 
Joint International Meetings on Prisons and Health, in Lisbon, Portugal, in December 
2017 and in Helsinki, Finland, in March 2019, where I met with potential research 
participants and exchanged business cards with them. These initial encounters 
enabled me to collect their contact details and refer to our conference conversation 
in the subsequent formal invitation which possibly increased the likelihood of their 
participation. 
These recruitment strategies yielded 56 (36%) of the 154 participants approached in 
phases 1 and 2 of the study. The majority of the participants initially declined to 
participate in the study, citing logistical and institutional barriers, such as time 
constraints, lack of familiarity and involvement with the English prison system, and 
the confidential nature of the work. The majority of those who declined the invitation 
also believed that the interdisciplinary nature of the research was a cause for 
concern. That is, they believed that they would only be able to articulate their point of 
view from a particular disciplinary position. They were conscious that their 
 
9 These collaborators include the following: the UK Collaborating Centre for WHO Health in Prisons 
Programme for the European Region (England), the European Prison Observatory (Italy), the 
Association for the Prevention of Torture (Switzerland), the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human 




background, for instance in Law, which they perceived to be at the periphery of 
prison health, would limit their response. I attempted to reassure them by reiterating 
that the research positively welcomed these interdisciplinary perspectives. Moreover, 
I shared a copy of the topic guides (Appendix 4) with these tentative participants to 
ensure that they were able to judge whether their contribution would be fruitful for the 
research.10 In all 56 cases, I managed to secure their participation.   
Mason (1996) defines theoretical sampling as “selecting groups or categories to 
study on the basis of their relevance to your research questions, your theoretical 
position […] and most importantly, the explanation or account which you are 
developing” (pp.93–94). In general, theoretical sampling is characterised by its link to 
preliminary data analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). That is, theoretical sampling 
involves “much calculation and imagination on the part of the researcher” (Strauss, 
1987, p.39). Theoretical sampling was implemented when, following preliminary data 
analysis, some data categories became saturated and participants introduced new 
concepts (Milliken and Northcott, 2003). For instance, to provide a more nuanced 
discussion on the emerging issue of privatisation, I reached out to new participants 
who might have perspectives that could either further support or challenge these 
provisional findings (ibid.). As theoretical constructs evolved, further information was 
sought to refine the emerging ideas.  
Finally, snowball sampling was used during the participant recruitment process. In 
this way, participants were identified by drawing on the professional contacts of the 
researchers and collaborators. By using known contacts and affiliates, it became 
possible to establish my credentials with the interviewees and avoid cold canvassing. 
There is general agreement in the literature that one should work through existing 
networks to try to find a known sponsor who can provide referrals or facilitate entry 
into the field (Patton, 2002; Vallance, 2001; Weiss, 1994). At the end of each 
interview, the participants were speculatively asked, “Who else should I talk to about 
this research?” This strategy proved to be useful. On many occasions, I was given 
the contact details of potential interviewees and, after interviewing them, I asked the 
same question, which allowed me to use their authority to access colleagues 
operating in a similar, or deeper, way within the same field (MacDougall and Fudge, 
2001; Thomas, 1995). At times, the participants introduced me directly to other 
potential participants. On one occasion, a participant sent an email request to his 12 
contacts (Figure 5.2), which yielded a third of the participants (n=4) from the 
policymaking field.  
 
10 Occasionally, participants also requested a copy of the topic guide to aid their preparation; this was 
more frequent among the policymakers who were less experienced in dealing with research 
interviews. Having a topic guide might have made the interviews slightly mechanical rather than more 





Introduction email by an international policymaker to his network 
 
 
The familiarity with their colleagues and the trust in their recommendations were 
beneficial for gaining access to international networks of prison health wider than I 
would have been able to otherwise. This opportunity would have been missed 
without such referrals. Indeed, as Thuesen (2011) points out, “networks, social 
capital, and trust are often paramount for gaining access to elites” (p.620). Hence, by 
being a part of the trusted circle, I was able to conduct research within the close-knit 
community of powerful and influential participants. 
5.2.1.2 Contacting elite participants 
Following ethical approval to conduct this study (see section 5.5.2 below on ethical 
conduct), a multifaceted recruitment plan for the international experts was 
implemented over a 17-week period from 13th December 2017 to 17th April 2018. 
Additionally, a recruitment plan was implemented over 16 weeks, between 13th 
February 2019 and 30th May 2019, for the national experts. 
All elite participants were initially contacted via email. I found that these elite 
participants were highly receptive to email communication, since all had access to 
smartphones, either personal or work-related, or both. Previous literature has 
suggested that researchers should send formal letters, followed by phone calls and 
emails only as the last resort (Conti and O’Neal, 2007; Stephens, 2007). However, 
these means of communication seemed redundant, considering that technological 




Previous literature has also illustrated that elite groups are harder to reach because 
they are more adept at negotiating the terms of the interview and can prevent access 
to others (Cochrane, 1998; Desmond, 2004; England, 2002; Sabot, 1999). However, 
I found that this community holds academic research in high esteem, and they were 
willing to participate in the research. All of them perceived social research as an 
impetus for policy and political change, and, therefore, they welcomed this research 
as a lever to voice their opinion, particularly on such an important and enduring 
issue. 
Persistence and perseverance were keys to initiating contact with the elite 
participants. On a few occasions, I had to either wait longer for a response or send 
multiple emails. I began to develop an understanding that emails sent between 7 am 
and 9 am usually received prompt responses compared to those sent at other times, 
which suggested that the majority of the participants responded to their emails during 
their commuting times. Peabody et al. (1990) emphasise that gatekeepers, such as 
personal assistants, secretaries, and office managers, will attempt to protect the 
interests of their organisation and personnel. In my case, however, most of the elite 
participants were able to respond directly using their smartphones. The gatekeepers 
in question were only involved in the logistical arrangements.  
In addition, I deployed the techniques proposed by Welch and colleagues (2002). 
These techniques drew the informants’ attention to the researcher's professional 
credentials, publications, affiliations, and standing, or alerted them to a personal 
connection that helped to establish trust. In my case, each letter used the UWE 
letterhead with the ESRC logo. The invitations were personalised, and the content of 
each letter emphasised that the recipient had experience and insights that would be 
of value to the wider community. This departs from the previous research undertaken 
by Lilleker (2003), who suggested that a standard letter used with a mail-merge 
facility would be able to reach all correspondences at the touch of a button. In fact, 
the high rate of participation in this study can be largely attributed to the tailored 
correspondence. The letter (Appendix 5) was accompanied by a two-page summary 
of the research project that was written free of academic jargon (Appendix 6).  
On numerous occasions, I had to overcome the logistical barrier of ‘ghosting’ by 
potential participants. This occurred when those who were approached remained 
silent, despite being approached repeatedly, which intensified the data collection and 
analysis process. For each research phase, participants who did not respond to the 
initial invitation would be reminded every two weeks until the completion date of that 
wave of interviews was reached. In total, up to seven reminder emails were sent to 
each potential participant. In my research, the ghosting issue was most prevalent 
among the monitoring and voluntary sector organisations. Debriefing sessions were 
held with research collaborators who provided valuable insights into the factors 
relevant to these constellations of actors. These included the potential perception of 




and concern that speaking out might put their funding position in jeopardy, 
institutional secrecy, and competing priorities. To mitigate these factors, good 
research management skills were adopted: being resilient and facing challenges as 
they surfaced, being politically astute, exploring alternatives, and balancing between 
persistence and politeness throughout the interactions. Managing the data collection 
process called on my soft skills as a researcher: organisational skills, patience, 
persistence, the ability to deal with uncertainty in a conciliatory manner, and 
creativity in looking for different options to ensure that the setbacks did not derail my 
fieldwork.  
Elite participants were given the opportunity to be interviewed at a date, time, and 
venue that was convenient for them (Harvey, 2010; Odendahl and Shaw, 2002; 
Thomas, 1995). They were contacted at least two months in advance. Scheduling 
each interview was kept open and flexible throughout the recruitment phase, 
acknowledging that the participants were busy. This flexibility included being 
available for interviews on evenings, weekends, and Bank Holidays. Sometimes the 
interviews had to be rescheduled due to circumstances that included urgent briefings 
with ministers, court appearances as expert witnesses, and last-minute requests to 
chair intergovernmental meetings. In these circumstances, my willingness to be 
flexible with the fieldwork was appreciated by the participants.  
5.2.2.1 Recruitment of the ‘street-level bureaucrats’ 
According to Lipsky (1980), the term ‘street-level bureaucrats’ denotes frontline staff 
who use power and discretion in delivering public services. Prison governors and 
their officers, as well as the workforce of the private and voluntary sector 
organisations who deliver healthcare provisions in English prisons, fall into this 
category.  
From the outset, invitations were primarily circulated to 34 prison governors, with the 
intention that prison officers from those particular sites were also invited to 
participate. In total, 17 prison governors and five prison officers provided accounts 
on the topic. The range of prison establishments was selected in order to meet the 
following different characteristics: public and private prisons, male and female 
prisons, and prisons with older prisoners’ wing. The sample also included the 
different categories of prisons: either high-security, local or training, open or 
resettlement prisons. Other key factors were also considered as part of the research: 
institutions requiring pressing improvement, based on the urgent notification 
triggered by the Chief Inspector of Prisons to the Secretary of State for Justice 
(HMIP, 2019), were selected, as were the ten most challenging prisons affected by 
high levels of violence and drugs (Ministry of Justice, 2018a). Finally, stakeholders 
who were part of the management structure of the Prison Governors' Association 
(PGA) and the POA were approached to provide input for this research project. 




the proposed sites (high, medium, or low) can impact on the feasibility of the 
fieldwork process. According to Martin (2000), high-security sites may be less 
amenable to taking part in the research, because of the trade-offs between research 
and resources, and this contrasts with open prisons where minimal involvement of 
prison officers is required. My research, however, confronts this intuitive reasoning, 
as it was critical for me to ensure coverage from all the major prison categories and 
security levels in order to understand how austerity impacts different kinds of prison 
establishment. Coverage from all type of prisons was pivotal, as this would support 
me in triangulating the varied viewpoints and experiences of the participants in each 
of these establishments (Shenton, 2004). When similar results emerge from different 
sites, the findings are deemed to be credible, which contributes to the 
trustworthiness of the research and its conclusions. 
Securing the participation of prison governors and officers was contingent on three 
factors. Having ethical approval from the National Research Committee of the 
Ministry of Justice (discussed in the Ethical Consideration section below) provided 
some level of assurance for these participants. Participation by the prison officers 
was also reliant on the availability of officers on the interview day. In contrast to the 
work of Martin (2000), it was more challenging to secure participation from prison 
officers in open prisons. Because of their low security setting, these establishments 
do not have as many prison staff as other closed prison establishments. Availability 
was also dependent on the time of the interviews, so that it was easier to secure 
their participation in the morning. Finally, the fact that these were one-to-one 
interviews was perceived to be an advantage by most governors, as they would not 
take up as great a commitment of time and human resources from their institutions. 
In fact, one governor commented explicitly as follows: “luckily your visit only involved 
one-to-one interviews. If it involved prolonged observations [i.e. ethnography], I 
would have declined your invitation.” In contrast, the recruitment process for potential 
participants who came from the private and voluntary sector organisations was 
linear, in that it did not have to go through gatekeepers who could complicate issues 
of access. In total, 18 potential participants were approached from these sectors, 
nine of whom participated in the research.  
Similar to the process with elite participants, theoretical sampling was adopted to 
explore new concepts that had not emerged from the initial literature review. For 
instance, there was the emerging issue of how closed, medium-sized prisons are 
perceived to be more heavily impacted by austerity, compared to high-security or 
open prisons. Pursuing these emerging avenues required me to work simultaneously 
on data analysis and participant recruitment in order to support or challenge the 
emerging account. 
Finally, snowball sampling was put into practice. On a small number of occasions, 
academic collaborators from PHE and an academic institution served as a conduit, 




research invitation (Figure 5.3).  
Figure 5.3 
Introduction email to five prison governors by a research collaborator 
 
By using known contacts and affiliates, I established a connection with the 
interviewees and avoided cold canvassing. Notably, the snowball sampling was used 
least in the street-level bureaucrat interviews because the Ministry of Justice controls 
the permission to contact potential prison establishments. I had to obtain permission 
from the Ministry prior to approaching these new establishments, explaining how 
these establishments would fit within my snowball sampling criteria for this study 




establishments that were already resource-stretched. 
5.2.2.2 Contacting the street-level bureaucrats 
 
Invitation strategies were carefully planned by personalising email invitations to 
these bureaucrats by emphasising how their experience, alongside the insights of 
prison officers, would be of value to the wider community. Aside from demonstrating 
that the research had received ethical authorisation from the Ministry of Justice, I 
also drew their attention to my professional credentials, affiliations, and standing in 
order to help establish their trust. Interestingly, the rapid turnover of governors at 
these institutions meant that it was not unusual to receive bounced emails or for my 
emails to be redirected to the successor governors, which inevitably prolonged the 
recruitment process. 
 
Interviews were arranged at least two weeks prior to the visit, although last-minute 
arrangements were also to be anticipated. Decision to participate in the research 
was polarised. There were several occasions where the governors were content to 
take part in the research but where they refused permission for their staff to be taken 
away from their daily duties to participate. Some prisons–especially private prisons–
refused point blank to take part in the research. It was not unusual for email 
reminders to be sent up to five times before receiving a response from these 
participants.  
 
When institutions declined to participate, this was predominantly due either to 
operational barriers or research fatigue (i.e., the institutions had already participated 
in several research projects in the current financial year). To deal with these issues, 
it was important that I was adaptable to the situation while remaining courteous. This 
proved to be useful where, on one occasion, I accepted a rejection from a prison 
governor of a female estate. Following my preliminary data analysis, it was apparent 
that the perspective of the female estate was missing. I contacted this governor 
again in order to determine whether she had any availability to participate, explaining 
how it would be beneficial to obtain the perspective of a women’s prison perspective, 
which at that time was lacking, and reassuring her that the interview would only take 
up to an hour, whereupon she agreed to do so. In another situation, a Head of 
Healthcare did not arrive at the interview appointment, following an internal 
altercation that had taken place with the prison management earlier that day. These 
scenarios taught me to be flexible and to remain professional in the face of adversity. 
 
Similar to elite interviewing, interviews with street-level bureaucrats rarely proceeded 
according to plan. Given the fragility of the institutions with increasing levels of 
suicide, self-harm, and assault (Ministry of Justice, 2019b), the research process 
was uncertain and iterative, meaning that security, protection, and pragmatism had 
to be prioritised over research engagement. There were two actual postponements, 




HMP Winchester that received national press coverage (BBC, 2019), two 
participating governors were called upon to form a task and finish group in 
transferring those violent prisoners from this institution to another one. Fortunately, a 
deputy governor was briefed and agreed to fill in, while the other governor postponed 
his interview to the following week. Additionally, there were several occasions where 
prison officers were not available on the interview day because of sickness. In all 
cases, I attempted to be adaptable to the situations and take into consideration the 
broader context which informs the uncertainty of the prison situation.  
 
5.2.3 Consent and confidentiality 
 
In both the elite and street-level bureaucrat groups, all participants were informed 
verbally during the interview of its aim, the procedures that would be followed, and 
the questions that would be asked. They were given the opportunity to ask questions 
before giving their consent for participation. Written informed consent was obtained 
from all participants. Participants were assured that their consent was ongoing and 
that they could withdraw from the study at any time. Before commencing the 
interview, all participants were given time to read the information sheet, ask any 
questions, and sign the consent form. They were also guaranteed confidentiality at 
both organisational and individual level, in order to promote candour, considering 
that austerity is a politically contentious topic. Equally, they were informed of 
reciprocal arrangements allowing them to access the findings of the research to 
assist their policymaking.  
 
The participants were informed that the interview would last between 30 and 60 
minutes. This range of time allowed some leeway as I chose to “specify a time a 
little, but not much, less than the normal time which interviews on the particular 
project take” (Dexter, 2006, p.49). Nevertheless, the length of the interview was 
predominantly dictated by the participants. Nearly a third of the interviews exceeded 
the maximum allotted time, which suggested there was a high level of engagement 







5.3 Data collection 
Data were collected via face-to-face, telephone, and online interviews. In keeping 
with constructivist grounded theory, a semi-structured interview format was used to 
“elicit data on perspectives of salience to [interviewees] [and] balancing the 
researchers’ agenda with the capacity to leave some room for the interviewees to 
provide his or her own insights and reflections” (Barbour, 2014, p.120). Through 
directed, but open-ended, exchanges with participants, the aim of the interviews was 
to elicit the participants’ own accounts of their experiences and perspectives, which 
are usually absent from official documents on prison health. My intention was to 
construct a variegated picture by talking to several people, comparing one person’s 
version with that of the others, tackling important issues from different angles, and by 
carefully probing and triangulating participant responses with previous literature. 
5.3.1.1 Face-to-face interviews 
Considering the nature of the research topic, face-to-face interviews were prioritised. 
A total of 61 face-to-face interviews were conducted. The average duration of this 
interview was 53 minutes. The interview length helped to establish rapport and trust 
with the participants to elicit more in-depth responses (Lincoln and Guba, 2000; 
Morris, 2009). The interviews supported the premise that reality is constructed both 
individually from the sum of experiences and in a relationship and conversation with 
others (Birks and Mills, 2011; Charmaz, 2006; Gergen, 2001; Gergen, 2009). I also 
attempted to create a positive atmosphere that simulated natural, day-to-day 
conversations (Carr and Worth, 2001; Opdenakker, 2006). 
For the elite interviews, most participants were interviewed at their respective office 
locations. The majority of participants were based in major cities in their respective 
countries.11 Travelling to these cities involved a great deal of waiting between flight 
and train connections. I attempted to capitalise on my presence in these cities by 
scheduling more than one meeting a day, although, at times, there were time gaps in 
between appointments. Many of these participants showed sensitivity towards my 
welfare. Some even apologised for insisting that I meet them at their offices. I 
explained diplomatically that this is a norm in research and that face-to-face 
interviews are considered the gold standard in qualitative research, particularly as I 
would be eliciting responses on a sensitive topic. I frequently used my free time for 
reading, writing chapters and publications, and, where possible, networking with 
research collaborators, if they were located in the same cities.  
I wore a suit and tie to all interviews with the elite participants because this is the 
norm in these professional communities, while opting for less formal attire with prison 
governors and officers to match the informal environment of prisons. This enabled 
 
11 These locations included England (i.e., London, Reading, and Oxford), as well as major European 




me to blend in, create a good impression, and build a rapport with the participants 
(Cochrane, 1998; Richards, 1996). While most interviews took place at their offices, 
for three elite participants, the interview was held at another location out of office 
hours, specifically: in Vienna at a cafe over coffee and pastries, in a café in London, 
and in a restaurant and a hotel bar in Leeds. Elwood and Martin (2000) contended 
that meeting outside the elite’s offices may enable them to talk more freely about 
their opinions. My experience confirmed this observation. I perceived these three 
participants to be more fluent, open, and transparent in their responses. 
Nevertheless, interviewing in public places had unique challenges, particularly 
because of noise, so that the participants and I had to lean toward the audio recorder 
and speak louder to overcome the impact of the background noise. 
In addition, it was not uncommon for these senior participants to bring a junior 
colleague with them to the interviews. In my research, this happened on four 
separate occasions. They believed that their junior colleagues would be able to 
assist with the statistical details and policy documents, as these officers were often 
involved in devising these documents on the ground.12  
Similarly, most interviews with prison governors and their staff, as well as with 
representatives from the private and voluntary sector organisations, took place at 
their establishments. According to Martin (2000), prisons have their own 
subculture—behaviours, rules and attitudes—which is familiar to those who work and 
live there. The way that the governors responded to my invitation–either directly or 
through an intermediary, in a collegial or authoritative manner–was reflective of their 
leadership and the working culture that they instilled for their organisation. In most 
cases, professionalism, openness, accommodation, and honesty were my immediate 
impression when corresponding with them and meeting them and their workforce for 
the first time.  
Visiting most prison establishments was logistically challenging. Given my reliance 
on public transport, it could take up to four train journeys before I reached the 
destination.13 I was escorted to all places within each establishment, save the toilet. 
Going from one interview venue to another within the same establishment was less 
fraught, however, particularly when most interviews were undertaken in the 
management wing. I also had an interesting glimpse of day-to-day prison life during 
my short visits, from drug dog training and prisoner carpentry workshops, to 
 
12 There were good dynamics in these group interviews. Indeed, participants’ comments often 
complemented or supplemented other’s remarks, thus filling knowledge gaps and actuating peer 
participants. As one participant said, “So, we’ll chip in, and I’ll let you know if I forget something, then 
[my colleague] will remember it, and, and vice-versa.” Beyond this immediate situation, that dynamic 
reflects the level of collegiality, trust, and understanding within each organisation among the senior 
management and staff. 
13 On one occasion, there was no public transport nor taxi or footpath available for me to reach the 




prisoners’ being escorted to hospitals or family visits.14 These experiences provided 
contextual insights into the diurnal operations in prisons and revealed their human 
side.  
Similar to the elite interviews, creating a good impression was key. As Hammersley 
and Atkinson (2007) indicate, impressions which might hamper access must be 
avoided or countered as much as possible, while those which facilitate access 
should be encouraged, within the limits set by ethical considerations. I was aware 
that, as part of the exchanges, I too was being interviewed and evaluated 
(Zuckerman, 1972). By appearing empathetic to their stories, I managed to gain their 
trust and ensure openness throughout the process. 
5.3.1.2 Telephone interviews 
 
Telephone interviews (n=16, average: 48 minutes) were conducted as a substitute 
for in-person interviews when the participants had time constraints that could not 
accommodate meeting in person. Donovan et al. (1997) and Stephens (2007) argue 
that telephone interviews can be more time-efficient, as they are relatively easily 
administered when the interviewer and interviewee are in different regions. 
 
Considering that telephone interviews are a second-best interviewing medium, they 
were only offered if suggested by informants. Disclosure on what is considered to be 
politically sensitive topic is easier in person (Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004), 
particularly as I was unknown to some participants prior to the research engagement 
(Polit and Beck, 2012). Hence, it was more difficult to establish trust over the 
telephone than in person (Healey and Rawlinson, 1993). The participants provided 
less detailed responses via telephone interviews. They may have felt uncomfortable 
sharing stories over the phone, particularly in the absence of visual cues (Garbett 
and McCormack, 2002; Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004). As Cohen et al. (2007) 
contends, “telephone interviews can easily slide into becoming mechanical and cold” 
(p.153).  
 
I attempted to maintain my overt presence in telephone interviews by echoing what 
the participants said and by using verbal fillers like ‘hmm’, ‘I see’, and ‘OK’, while 
also conveying different tones of voice and asking follow-up questions that included 
the participants’ own words to demonstrate my active listening. Telephone interviews 
prevented me from familiarising myself with the participants’ environment and 
thereby acquiring an insight into their surroundings. Sometimes, the participants 
could be distracted by their environment, for instance, by barking dogs, children 
requiring attention, and their partners or colleagues who were not aware of the 
recorded conversation. In this instance, I agree with Harvey (1987) and Fontana and 
 
14 On one occasion, my visit coincided with a staff appreciation day. I was invited to attend the award 
ceremony and join their lunch barbecue. The prison governor jokingly commented, “We knew you 




Frey (1994) that telephone interviews should be reserved for short, close-ended, and 
highly structured questions, and that face-to-face interactions remain the ideal mode 
of engagement.  
5.3.1.3 Online interviews 
There were 10 online interviews conducted via Skype. Each interview lasted an 
average duration of 49 minutes. Online interviews have been considered in the 
literature as an alternative to the gold standard of face-to-face interviews (McCoyd 
and Kerson, 2006). Skype helps to eliminate the drawbacks of telephone 
interviewing, because the participant can see the researcher and vice versa (Hooley 
et al., 2012). Apart from minimising the number of opportunities that would have 
otherwise been lost because of access and distance (Burkitt, 2004; Deakin and 
Wakefield, 2013; Evans et al., 2008; Sedgwick and Spiers, 2009), it is also possible 
to achieve rapport, sensitivity, and degrees of collaboration using this medium 
(Oates, 2015). It was also possible to avoid encroaching into the participants’ 
personal space, in that they were able to choose a neutral venue that suited them 
(Hanna, 2012; Rowley, 2012). 
Despite the many advantages of online Skype interviewing, visual and interpersonal 
aspects of the interactions remained key barriers. A poor internet connection with 
one participant interrupted the visual display. Drop-outs were relatively common and 
to be expected, where the conversation had to be stopped, because the screen had 
frozen and the participant was unable to hear my questions or I could not hear their 
response. On one occasion, this resulted in me having to type some of the interview 
questions. Even when the internet connection did not drop, there were issues 
hearing the participants’ words correctly and clearly. This was problematic, 
considering that qualitative interviewers seek to capture the participant’s experiences 
“in their own words to show how they make sense of the world” (Yilmaz, 2013, 
p.313).  
The inaudible segments were challenging for transcribing the recorded interviews. I 
had to listen to the audio recording multiple times, and I had to refer to notes jotted 
during the interview to fill in the blanks. Furthermore, the position of the camera 
made it difficult to make eye contact with the participants, which may have impeded 
building trust with them (Petralia, 2011; Seitz, 2015). Additionally, it was not possible 
to conduct online interviews with street-level bureaucrats, as the lack of IT facilities 
and the risk-averse culture in prisons that prioritises safety and security prevented 
this technology from being used in that context. In this instance, I arrived at the 
conclusion that face-to-face interviews should still be prioritised over online and 




5.3.2 Participants’ profiling 
Each participant’s background information was evaluated prior to each interview. 
Basic data on participants’ professional backgrounds were collected prior to 
scheduling to interviews. The exception to this were the prison officers, as their 
details were not provided to me until I arrived at the prison establishment.  
Participant profiling was undertaken for triangulation purposes, which allowed the 
participants’ statements to be verified (Davies, 2001; Lilleker, 2003), rapport to be 
built by making references to the information before each interview, and cross-
checking that each participant qualified for the study according to the selection 
criteria. This information was obtained via internet searches, especially via official 
publications, institutional webpages, press releases, and soft intelligence from the 
research collaborators. Other sources include social media: half of the participants 
were active on Twitter and almost all the participants were active on LinkedIn. Figure 
5.4 provides an excerpt of a participant profile devised before the interview. 
Figure 5.4 
Example of a participant profile 
 
 
Several studies have emphasised the importance of thorough preparation prior to 
interviewing, as part of “impression management”, particularly in projecting a serious 
and positive image of the interviewer to gain the participants’ respect (Berry, 2002; 
Harvey, 2011; Mikecz, 2012; Thuesen, 2011; Zuckerman, 1972). My experience 
confirmed the proposition that preparation prior to the interviews is vital, where the 
researcher’s knowledge of the participants helps establish rapport, trust and 
credibility. On several occasions, for example, I was asked, “How much do you know 




5.3.3 Interview guide 
Prior to data collection, an initial interview guide was created. This interview guide 
was completed using two processes. First, a preliminary literature review was 
conducted. Charmaz (2006) suggests that conducting a literature review prior to 
fieldwork can help to develop theoretical sensitivity. Critics often dismiss such an 
approach, maintaining that preconceived questions impede participants’ ability to 
generate their own accounts and performances (Rapley, 2001; Silverman, 2013). 
However, as we noted in the discussion of grounded theory above, undertaking a 
literature review before the study acknowledges that researchers do not exist in a 
vacuum, but rather that they are influenced and informed by their context. 
Additionally, researchers like myself do not come to the field with a clean slate 
(Charmaz, 2006). However, efforts were made throughout to remain open towards 
concepts that were missing from the initial literature review (Charmaz, 2006; 
Henwood and Pidgeon, 2003). This included a discussion about the repercussions of 
the continuation of the austerity regime on the governance and delivery of prison 
health.  
As a new researcher, having background knowledge reinforced my credibility and 
the authority of the resultant arguments. Additionally, constructing an interview guide 
helped me address issues relating to the content, pacing, and intensity of the 
interviewing, as well as prevent—or minimise—potential intrusiveness of the 
questions.15 The interview guide began with an open question (i.e., ‘In what ways did 
this study appeal to you?’), followed by a list of broad, provisional topics that would 
help guide the interview process loosely, while also allowing my approach to remain 
informal and flexible. The questions moved from the non-intrusive to the more 
intrusive (Lilleker, 2003). No loaded questions, closed questions (i.e., yes or no), or 
poorly structured questions were used.  
The participants were encouraged to talk freely. Where appropriate, I provided 
latitude for the participants to deviate from the initial question and then returned to 
the questions using the interview guide or prompts. At times, I adapted the broad 
questions according to the participants' responses (Lofland and Lofland, 1984). 
Profiling participants prior to the interviews also ensured that I could adapt the 
interview questions to the participants’ experiences. Balancing my own requirement 
to elicit responses to the interview questions, while also being mindful of the need to 
 
15 Peabody et al. (1990) advocate that researchers should ask their questions using colleagues and 
friends before posing them to interviewees; doing so can help clarify and refine the questions. In this 
instance, I piloted the questions with a senior research fellow at the Centre of Public Health and Well-
being at UWE to determine appropriate questions and their flow and sequencing. I was reminded to 
use probing techniques more frequently, a recommendation I adopted in my actual fieldwork. I also 
circulated the draft questions to research collaborators for feedback. Following some minor changes 
to make the questions more user friendly, these individuals all agreed that the questions were 





allow the participants to reflect on the questions and their broader experiences, 
demanded active listening with the participants (Noaks and Wincup, 2004). 
5.3.4 Probes 
It was apparent during the interviews that some participants’ responses lacked 
meaningful depth. Some studies have testified that elite communities are particularly 
adept at reducing their responses to ‘soundbites’ (Hallin, 1992). The soundbites 
perhaps arise because the participants are familiar with media interview processes, 
which require them to be succinct in their messages or cautious not to divulge 
anything that could be misinterpreted (Petkov and Kaoullas, 2016). Similarly, elite 
participants are proprietors of confidential and sensitive information, which means 
that they may be accustomed to being cautious from divulging information that can 
potentially be misinterpreted.  
Indeed, a subset of participants–predominantly several national policymakers, prison 
governors, and prison staff–are civil servants. Given the politically contentious topic, 
there was a risk that these informants might not be entirely forthcoming in their 
responses. This could potentially lead to superficial responses, which might 
subsequently affect the rigour of the findings.16 Going beyond mere soundbites was 
critical, as in-depth and rich responses are vital to the trustworthiness of qualitative 
research (Shenton, 2004; Shenton and Hayter, 2004). When necessary, then, I drew 
on Patton’s (2002) and Lilleker’s (2003) techniques for probing participants: 
• ‘Detail-oriented probes' helped to obtain more information about the 
phenomenon described by the participant. I used this with Participant 59, a 
senior prison officer of a closed prison with an urgent notification status, when 
I asked: “Were any channels made available to you to enable you to raise 
your concerns regarding the impact of austerity on prison health?” 
 
• ‘Elaboration probes’ required the participants to expand their initial response. I 
used this with Participant 6, a strategic lead of a non-governmental criminal 
justice organisation, when I asked: “You had briefly mentioned about one of 
the impacts of austerity on prisons, which is the reduction in numbers of 
prison officers. How is this impacting the delivery of the prison health agenda 
in English prisons?” I also used elaboration probes that included non-verbal 
cues such as nodding and silence. 
 
 
16 This was evident in several interviewees’ responses. Those occupying senior management 
positions in the civil service were adamant that they would refuse to answer questions that they 
considered to be averse to the official stance of the current government. Some were skilled at 
deflecting sensitive questions (Ostrander, 1995): “I have a personal view, but that is not the point of 
this interview.” At other times, they provided “on-the-fence” answers to questions addressing 




• ‘Clarification probes' were used by rephrasing the participants’ answers. I 
used this with Participant 30, a Senior Commissioning Lead of a national 
justice ministry: “You observed that Brexit is a huge factor in diverting your 
organisation from the core business in managing offenders in prisons and the 
community. Would you be kind enough to expand on your response, please?” 
 
• ‘Contrast probes’ provide participants with something to push off against. I 
used this with Participant 3, a lead of a European prison research institute 
when I asked: “You mentioned that the government has obligations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights to protect the rights of prisoners to 
healthcare provisions. But it seems that the UK government has ignored it 
based on the restricted access to healthcare services. How would you 
reconcile these two conflicting situations?” 
 
• ‘Criticism probes' included introducing criticism from the previous interview to 
the next participant to help understand what his or her position was and to 
obtain a new perspective, as part of data triangulation. I asked participant 61, 
for example, a governor of a high-security prison: “Previous interviewees 
believed that high-security prisons, like your establishment, would be immune 
from any financial cuts. They felt that the government could not afford to have 
escapes from high-security estates, which would be career-ending for the 
justice ministers. Where do you stand on this view?” 
 
The use of the probes signifies active listening, a non-judgmental approach, and a 
willingness to reciprocate between parties (Charmaz, 2006; Kvale, 1996; Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1984). Fluid and dynamic exchanges occurred between the research 
participants and me as a result of establishing rapport with the participants. I 
reassured the participants that the interviews were a collaborative learning process, 
where there were no right or wrong answers. Furthermore, I emphasised the point 
that their anonymity would be protected by ensuring that their answers would not be 
attributed to their name or professional credentials. Such measures help to establish 
the rapport and trust necessary to elicit more in-depth responses (Morris, 2009), 
which then separates the “front page performance” from the “behind closed doors 
reality” (Goffman, 1959, pp.106 and 140). Sometimes the participants said, “but don’t 
quote me on that.” Often, they were referring to the background and contextual 
information relevant to the point that they were making, including their encounters 
with ministers, the forthcoming policy development that needed to remain 
confidential, or disagreement with the imposition of policies by their superiors. Their 




Following each interview, I sent an email thanking the participants for their 
cooperation in the study. This gesture not only served as a reminder, in case the 
interviewee had something more to say, but it also kept the door open for follow-up 
questions. Post-interview cooperation can be helpful. All interviewees were offered 
the opportunity to check their transcripts for accuracy, which helped to ensure 
trustworthiness (Welch et al., 2002). However, none of them took up the offer. 
Perhaps, they did not want to unnecessarily prolong their engagement with the 
research because of their busy schedule, or they trusted me to represent their 
accounts accurately. Nevertheless, the post-interview engagement also led to some 
unexpected opportunities. For example, I was offered access to their networks, 
research ideas for a postdoctoral project, and a placement with an international 
organisation prior to completion of my PhD and was invited to present at European 
conferences. 
5.3.5 Transcribing 
All interviews were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim. The duration of the 
interviews was considered appropriate to understand the reality and meaning of the 
experience, and to understand the process from both an emic and an etic perspective: 
that is, respectively, the viewpoints of the participants who experienced austerity in 
their working environment on a daily basis and my observations as a researcher. 
Overall, the transcripts generated over 1474 pages and 689,664 narrative texts for 
analysis.  
Interviews were transcribed within one week of the interview to ensure that the data 
collection and analysis processes would simultaneously occur. A university-approved 
transcriber was appointed to transcribe a sample of the interviews. Based on my 
experience, there was no material difference regarding the data analysis between 
undertaking my own transcriptions and outsourcing the task to another professional. 
My research supervisors were given the opportunity to listen to a sample of 
interviews and review selected transcripts to identify errors and, where applicable, 
provided feedback for improving the interviewing technique. No significant errors 
were noted, suggesting that a simultaneous review of all the transcripts was not 




5.4 Data analysis 
The analysis stage took place concurrently with the data collection for each interview 
phase, in an iterative way. The data were analysed and used to inform future data 
collection (Pope et al., 2000), prompting a refinement of the interview questions 
while highlighting emerging avenues of further inquiry. The challenge here is to strike 
a careful balance between embracing the messiness of the process while also 
demonstrating rigour in the data analysis. Some academics caution that fluidity and 
incoherence in grounded theory do not necessarily provide a guaranteed level of 
certainty in scrutinising data (Goulding, 1998; Pulla, 2016). To mitigate against the 
perceived flexibility of the analytical process in grounded theory, I ensured that I 
followed the constructivist grounded theory process closely, especially in terms of 
data preparation and coding, as will be elaborated below. 
5.4.1 Data preparation 
Transcripts were each read four times prior to the coding. This helped me to 
immerse myself in the data and to be empathically introspective, while also giving 
me the opportunity to identify the broad themes of each interview and correct any 
transcription errors (Liamputtong, 2010; Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). All 
transcripts were imported into NVivo 12 software (QSR International, Australia) to 
organise the data for coding. In particular, NVivo assisted with managing data that 
were created by multiple interviews, helping to manage complex data, to identify 
emerging ideas and patterns, and to link meanings to different parts of the analysis. 
NVivo takes manual labour out of the organisational process, allowing the researcher 
to focus on creative thinking about the data (Serry and Liamputtong, 2013).  
Despite the availability of NVivo to assist with the data analysis, as a researcher, I 
remain responsible for the interpretation of the data. Hesse-Biber (1996), Fielding 
and Lee (1998), Glaser (2003) and Bazeley (2007) suggest that the use of the 
software could inhibit researchers’ creativity and destroy the intimacy between 
researchers and their data. In fact, the use of the data management software 
demonstrates a diligent and disciplined approach towards data management. As 
Tesch (1991) suggests, “the computer does not make conceptual decisions, such as 
which words or themes are important to focus on, or which analytical step to take 
next. These analytical tasks are still left entirely to the researcher” (p.37). 
Charmaz’s (2014) constructivist grounded theory was incorporated throughout the 
data analysis process, especially when I went ‘‘beyond the surface in seeking 
meaning in the data, searching for and questioning tacit meanings about values, 
beliefs, and ideologies’’ (Mills et al., 2006, p.31). At the same time, care was taken 
during the data analysis to ensure that I did not separate the participants’ accounts 
from their context. I also took time to listen to their stories in their own environment, 




health in England. In addition to coding the interview data, I was also able to 
annotate contextual information as part of the NVivo process. 
5.4.2 Coding 
The coding process involves forming short phrases, each of which “symbolically 
assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, [and] evocative attribute for a 
portion of language-based data” (Saldaña, 2013, p.3). Coding provides a critical link 
between data collection and the explanation of meaning. In grounded theory, coding 
is a non-linear and iterative process, denoting the concurrent process between 
collecting data and analysing it. I began data analysis early in the research project, 
by systematically breaking up the data, sorting it, comparing and synthesising 
segments of the data through cycles, and coding it until a theory emerged from this 
analytical process (Charmaz, 2006). To ensure consistency with the grounded theory 
approach, three stages of coding were undertaken: (a) open coding, (b) focused 
coding, and (c) axial coding. Further, I devised an additional stage, which I have 
called ‘The Fourth Order’, to consolidate the axial codes to form a central research 
thesis, which is further elaborated in the thesis contribution section of the Conclusion 
chapter. 
First, the open coding process started with the labelling of each line of text by 
focusing on specific words or phrases. This ensured that I remained close to the data 
and open to nuances that might otherwise be overlooked (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990). According to Silverman (2013), this type of microscopic and 
granular analysis, allows the text to be broken down into its key elements, so that 
they can be compared to other elements according to what is a constantly 
comparative analytical approach. In keeping with grounded theory, I coded using 
gerunds in order to capture the opinions directly described by the participants (i.e., 
‘in vivo’ themes; Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000; Charmaz, 2014; Saldaña, 2013). 
Apart from remain close to the data (Charmaz, 2006), using gerunds enabled me to 
reveal links and relationships between data, rather than treating them rigidly as 
separate, discrete units. I reduced each transcript to create as many nodes as 
possible. This ranged from 16 to 77 nodes per transcript.  
By being faithful to the participants’ accounts, the coding process motivated me to 
examine hidden assumptions in the language that the participants and I had used 
during the interviews (Charmaz, 2014). As a critical social scientist, I am attuned to 
the concepts of power, equality, equity, and agency, and this called upon a certain 
amount lateral thinking. One notable challenge during the coding process was 
ensuring that I was able to see the bigger picture when the data were fractured. 
Grbich (2007) suggests that there is a fine line between fracturing the data too much 
and not fracturing them enough. Therefore, care was taken to ensure the data were 





Subsequently, the coding process became more focused, as the differences in 
codes were reconciled and as the categories were matched to other categories as 
part of the analysis (Dey, 1993). To fulfil theoretical sufficiency (Dey, 1999), a 
thorough analysis of the line-by-line coding was undertaken, where all of the codes 
were revisited to ensure that they contributed to theoretical development. At this 
stage, the coding became focused and the emerging theories were reviewed. 
Interpreting the observed data and matching it to the best explanation helped to form 
a tentative theory, which then needed to be confirmed or disconfirmed with the help 
of further data collection and analysis. This procedure was repeated until the most 
plausible interpretation of data was found (Charmaz, 2006). Finally, the process 
continued with axial coding, a process which reassembles the data to give 
coherence to the developing theory (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
Throughout each phase, I moved toward the development of theory and shifted 
between levels of abstraction, which subsequently formed a central category. Figure 











From the outset, condensing the data from 87 interviews and devising cross-cutting 
theories across all interviews seemed an unsurmountable task. I was conscious that 
the large sample size might prove too great to ever establish theories that would 
provide thorough coverage of the key issues under investigation. After the open, 
focused, and axial coding stages with the different participant groups, I introduced a 
new analytical stage, which I termed ‘The Fourth Order’. Here, all the axial 
categories from the different interview phases underwent a further deductive and 
synthetic process to form a central research thesis.  
Four additional data analysis techniques were used to help theorise the findings: (a) 
constant comparison; (b) memoing; (c) categorising; and d) data saturation 
(Charmaz, 2009; Saldaña, 2013). 
a) Constant comparison 
 
A constant comparative method was employed to identify patterns and to compare 
meanings among the codes. This method entails going back and forth during data 
analysis, so that the data are inspected thoroughly at each stage and the 
relationships between the emerging categories identified. The constant comparative 
method was particularly beneficial for moving from theoretical findings to conceptual 
development. As Bowen (2008) indicated, “the constant comparative method serves 
to test concepts and themes with a view to producing a theory grounded in the data” 
(p.139).  
At the same time, the constant comparison helped me to remain flexible during the 
data analysis process, particularly when encountering data that did not fit the theory. 
Charmaz (2006) encourages researchers to “learn to tolerate ambiguity [and] 
become receptive to creating emergent categories and strategies” (p.168). Allowing 
the data to emerge serendipitously, as well as tolerating cognitive dissonance, I 
made sense of the inconsistencies in the data by keeping the wider picture and 
context in view. 
b) Memoing 
 
Memos are written interpretations about the data. These conceptualised my ideas 
about the data that I came across and situated them into my broader analytical 
process. This process also assisted me in devising provisional conclusions for a 
code or prompted the need for further data. Apart from serving as an aide memoire, 
memos helped to define and clarify the property of each category and each 
category’s connection to the other categories.  
Saldaña (2013) suggests that when significant data or an emerging theory comes to 
mind, researchers should stop and write a memo. My experience echoed this 




also occurred when I was in a liminal state, either thinking or not thinking of the data. 
As a minimum, each code had one memo appended to it (see Figure 5.6).  
Figure 5.6 
Example of a memo 
 
This memo refers to the development of a conceptual understanding of an 
alternative to imprisonment, a strategy against the government’s austerity regime. It 
illustrates how the memoing process contributed to the conceptual development of 
the study. My memoing technique confirmed Tweed and Charmaz’s (2012) 
observation, that early memos tend to be exploratory and tentative, while later 
memos are likely to be more precise and refined. It is through memo writing, and not 
simply through coding, that “the interpretative and theory generation processes 




Categorising was used as part of my coding strategy. Patton (2002) suggests that 
data analysis involves a well-defined process that begins with basic descriptions and 
then moves to conceptual ordering and theorising. In constructing a central category, 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest a taxonomy comprising five criteria: 
• It must connect all major categories 
• It must appear frequently in the data, with indicators pointing to the chosen 
concept 
• It is logical and consistent with the data 





• It should grow in depth and have explanatory power, with each category 
related to it via statements of relationship.  
 
This study theorised that austerity measures deteriorates the governance structure 
of healthcare and the supporting regime of prisons, and perpetuated double 
punishment on prisoners when the government imposes strict austerity. This central 
theory fulfils all of the requirements outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1998). 
d) Data saturation 
 
The transcripts were analysed until data saturation was achieved. Data saturation 
was reflected when new data do not add any further insights to the core categories 
(Charmaz, 2006). Saturation occurred at 29 interviews with the international 
participants, at 27 interviews with the national participants, and at 31 interviews with 
the institutional participants. This data saturation was achieved by continuing to code 
through the entire dataset, returning to what seemed to be the most divergent stories 
within the sample and looking for deviant cases, where the theory did not fit, and by 
looking at contextual and intrapersonal influences that the model did not address 
(Charmaz, 2006; Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  
Academics’ concerns relating to data saturation stem from the perception that data 
saturation can never be achieved in real research. Marshall (1996), for example, is 
concerned that “an iterative, cyclical approach to sampling, data collection, analysis 
and interpretation makes predicting sample size in advance difficult” (p.523). To 
date, guidance on how to achieve data saturation has been vague. For instance, 
Kvale (2007) advises that researchers should interview “as many subjects as 
necessary to find out what you need to know” (p.43), whilst others go as far as 
suggesting a ‘magic number’ for the sample size, for instance, somewhere between 
20 and 30 participants (Creswell, 2007; Polit and Beck, 2012). Yet, no consensus 
has been reached when data saturation is achieved. To resolve this ambiguity, I 
drew upon a five-dimension framework (Aldiabat and Le Navenec, 2018; Bonde, 
2013; Bowen, 2008; Morse et al., 2009): 
• The scope of investigation: the scope of the investigation includes the 
nature and complexity of the study, which subsequently manifests itself in the 
research questions. The nature of my research cuts across many disciplines, 
which necessitates more time interviewing and making meaning out of the 
theories that emerged from the fieldwork. The gathering of data continued 
until saturation occurred. Charmaz (2014) suggests that, when the categories 
and focused codes are saturated, they are compared and analysed to identify 
the interactions and relationships between them and to create a constructivist 
theory. 
 




study–predicated on the interdisciplinarity of the research–means that data 
saturation cannot be achieved in a small number of interviews. In this regard, 
87 participants helped to achieve data saturation and to reflect the 
experiences of the interviewees at all layers of the prison health system. 
 
• Theoretical sampling: Theoretical sampling helped achieve data saturation 
by connecting the categories together to form an emergent theory (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). It directed me to inspect the data and, subsequently, to focus 
further data collection on the emerging theories from the initial interviews. 
Using this strategy was beneficial for determining the sampling size. Many 
academics have difficulties articulating what is an acceptable sample size 
(Creswell, 2007; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Guest et al., 2006; Morse, 1995). 
Bloor and Wood (2006) suggest that this apparent obsession with the number 
of interviews, and epistemic tension associated with it, should be put aside, 
and theoretical saturation should be the regulator of data saturation. The 
constant comparative method and theoretical sampling were used to 
investigate the data to ensure that ‘there was no stone left unturned’ (Morse et 
al., 2009) and that “one keeps on collecting data until one receives only 
already known statements” (Seldén, 2005, p.124). 
 
• Triangulation of sample: Aldiabat and Le Navenec (2018) suggests that 
triangulation should be applied to sample selection. Applying Aldiabat and Le 
Navenec’s premise, data saturation was achieved via snowballing sampling. 
At the end of interviews, I asked for recommendations for additional potential 
participants for the research. Here, I devised a new concept called ‘participant 
saturation’, which describes the situation where researchers have been given 
recommended names but those names have already been approached for 
interviews. Discussions with each participant, as well as research 
collaborators, usually confirmed that all key stakeholders had been 
approached for the interviews and that most of them had agreed to participate 
in this research. Once this kind of saturation is achieved, it will be futile to 
interview additional stakeholders for the research. 
 
• Experience of the researcher: Given that the researcher is the central 
instrument for data collection (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Miles et al., 2014), 
novice researchers, like me, need to use subjectivity and intuition to 
determine data saturation. Having some previous research experience on a 
related topic helped me judge whether data saturation was achieved. 
Frequent discussions with supervisors and research collaborators also helped 





5.5 Establishing trustworthiness 
 
It is important that qualitative research establishes the trustworthiness of findings at 
each stage of the data collection, analysis, and interpretation (Elo et al., 2014; Guba 
and Lincoln, 1981; Shenton, 2004). Shenton (2004) and Tracy (2010) define 
trustworthiness as research that demonstrates both credibility and plausibility. Using 
Shenton (2004) and Tracy (2010) as a pedagogical compass, this section presents 
an overview of the specific measures related to credibility, ethical conduct and 
sincerity that contribute to the trustworthiness of the study.  
5.5.1 Credibility 
To establish credibility, thick descriptions, multivocality, data source triangulation, 
member checks, and peer debriefing were undertaken. 
• Thick description 
 
The hallmark of achieving credibility in qualitative research is the provision of thick 
descriptions. Thick descriptions are accomplished via in-depth illustrations of the 
phenomena being examined (Geertz, 1973) and through concrete details (Bochner, 
2000). I made a challenging decision about which findings to report to ensure that 
the findings were in-depth, concrete, and authentic. In doing so, I used Guba and 
Lincoln’s (2005) questions, “Are these findings sufficiently authentic […] that I [and 
the research participants] may trust myself in acting on their implications? More to 
the point, would I feel sufficiently secure about these findings to construct social 
policy or legislation based on them?” (Guba and Lincoln, 2005, p.205). In this 
instance, I sought to provide rich and varied findings from different participants with 
diverse backgrounds to achieve thick descriptions of the phenomenon under 
investigation in the Findings chapters of this thesis.  
• Multivocality 
 
Multiple and varied voices attest to the richness of the data. These varied voices 
support the requirement of credibility in qualitative analysis. Multivocality is pertinent 
to this research, because the 87 participants represented many different 
organisations and seven different disciplines. Multivocality emerges from the 
verstehen practice of analysing social action from the participants’ point of view, 
which requires thick descriptions of the interviewees’ responses (Lindlof and Taylor, 
2002). Multivocality was also achieved through a prolonged collaboration with the 








The triangulation of data sources was used during the interview phase to look for 
similarities or dissimilarities between the viewpoints and experiences of the 
participants (Shenton, 2004). These prompts were given to several participants from 
different institutions to reduce local factors that may have been unique to the 
particular institution: 
• "Some participants believed that England and the UK, in general, should take 
comfort from the fact that the human rights conditions in English prisons are 
not as bad as other countries, such as Ukraine, where prisoners have to ask 
their family members to purchase medications for their consumption in 
prisons. I would be interested to know your opinion on this suggestion." 
 
• “Are the impacts of austerity on the prison workforce and prison 
establishments similar to other establishments that you are familiar with?” 
 
Diverse data from various sources can strengthen the credibility of the findings. 
Rubin and Rubin (2012) suggest that the process of triangulation can also protect 
and delimit the research from the investigator’s personal preferences. However, the 
triangulation of the data does not mean that the analysis will lead to a single and 
consistent picture (Pope et al., 2000). Rather, the data should be complementary to 
build an accurate picture (ibid.). 
Van Maanen (1983) proposes another form of triangulation based on using a wide 
range of informants. This wide range of informants allows for each individual’s views 
to be compared to others, which helps to enrich the phenomena under scrutiny. In 
other words, it can reduce the idiosyncrasy of local factors relating to one 
organisation or country. When similar results emerged from different sites, findings 
were deemed to have credibility. Dervin (1983, p.7) calls this “circling reality”, where 
a stable view of reality can be achieved based on a wide base of observations. 
• Member checks 
 
According to Lindlof and Taylor (2002), member checking is a process of “taking 
findings back to the field and determining whether the participants recognise them as 
true or accurate” (p.242). While many academics recommend member checking to 
help build the trustworthiness of results (Doyle, 2007; Lincoln and Guba, 2000), a full 
member check exercise was not undertaken for this phase of research. All the 
participants were offered the opportunity of reviewing their own transcript and none 
of them took up the offer. Although there may have been the risk of a tokenistic 
involvement on the part of participants (Estroff, 1995), the broader context of 
interviewing elite participants and street-level bureaucrats should be considered. 





engage with research in a protracted manner. They may have perceived member 
checking as a waste of time (Birt et al., 2016).  
To date, in mitigating against the lack of member checking, I have produced a two-
page briefing note which was circulated to the international and national 
policymakers who participated in the research (Appendix 7). In producing this 
briefing note, I was guided by two questions: 1) Does it have relevance to the 
participants in their substantive field?; and 2) How applicable are these findings for 
policy and practice?17. A more immediate way to mitigate against the superficiality of 
the findings and guard against their misrepresentation is the peer debriefing strategy 
discussed below. 
• Peer debriefing 
 
Peer debriefing describes activities that were undertaken to present the tentative 
findings of the study with the aim of further refining the theory generated. Apart from 
sending each participant the preliminary summary findings of the study, to date I 
have also presented my findings at five conferences in Europe and North America 
between May 2018 and November 2019 (Appendix 8). 
I was interested in my peers’ views on my findings and what they might find to be 
missing or needing improvement. Their questions and recommendations were useful 
to inform the research phase and provide alternative interpretation for some data. In 
a sense, these presentations may serve as a form of external review for this study 
(Ely et al., 1991; Erlandson et al., 1993; Glesne and Peshkin, 1992; Lincoln and 
Guba, 2000; Merriam, 1998) by providing further analytical insight into the 
developing theory.  
Given the close-knit community of the prison sector, several research participants 
were, in fact, in attendance at these presentation sessions. Feedback on the findings 
were solicited from them, in which they unanimously agreed that I had represented 
their account accurately and that my theories resonated with their policy and practice 
experiences. Hearing their opinion on the findings mitigated to a certain extent the 
current lack of member checking. 
5.5.2 Ethical conduct 
The participation risks of this research were reviewed through procedural and 
relational assessments (Tracy, 2010). The ethical requirements of the university, 
sponsor (ESRC), and gatekeeper (Ministry of Justice) were abided by at all times. At 
the time of these ethical applications, the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) was yet to be implemented at UWE Bristol, although the good practice 
 
17 This note was accompanied by my recent publications in BMC Public Health and the Journal of 





relating to consent to participation, data storage, management, privacy, and respect 
towards participants had already been embedded as part of the research project to 
meet the highest ethical standards possible. 
• Procedural ethics 
 
In terms of procedural ethics, ethical approval was granted by the Faculty Research 
Ethics Committee at UWE Bristol in December 2017 (reference number: 
HAS.17.11.054) for the research involving international policymakers (Appendix 9). 
Approval for this study was obtained from the Ethics Committee within a week of 
submission. For the research with the national policymakers and the local prison 
actors, approval from the National Research Committee of the Ministry of Justice 
was obtained in January 2019 (Appendix 10). This was followed by an approval from 
the University Faculty Research Ethics Committee in February 2019 (Appendix 11). 
Given the sensitivity of the topic, a full review of the research by these ethics 
committees was required. The core principles of ethical research set out by the 
ESRC (2019) were used as guidance: research should aim to maximise the benefit 
for individuals and society whilst minimising risk and harm; the rights and dignity of 
individuals should be respected; participation should be voluntary and informed; 
research should be conducted with integrity and transparency; there should be a 
clear definition of responsibility and accountability; and the independence of the 
research should be maintained. 
Obtaining institutional ethical approval is a multifaceted, resource-intensive, and 
time-intensive process. The key was to begin the process early. When completing 
the ethics application to the Ministry of Justice, I reviewed my application against the 
following seven criteria prior to submission (HMPPS, 2017b) that ranged from linking 
the research to one of the HMPPS priorities to anticipating demands on resources 
for each individual establishment (Appendix 12).18  
It is also crucial that prison researchers develop a close relationship with their key 
contact on the Ministry of Justice’s National Research Committee. The relationship 
with this gatekeeper was useful in requesting necessary time extensions to the 
fieldwork, and in gaining access to additional sites to boost the sample size. The end 
date of my fieldwork had to be extended three times to accommodate the availability 
of the prison governors and their officers. Through this gatekeeper, I was also able to 
get the Committee’s permission to gain access to additional prison sites on two 
occasions, to ensure access a larger sample size. Forming and nurturing a good 
 
18 I was also invited to submit relevant supporting documents, such as my curriculum vitae, a research 
proposal, a research invitation letter, a topic guide, and a consent form. This was to ensure that the 






working relationship with the National Research Committee is instrumental to prison 
health research, not only to ensure that the researchers are accountable within the 
parameters of institutional ethical approval, but also to ensure their understanding of 
the challenges faced by researchers in undertaking fieldwork in prison institutions. 
• Relational ethics 
 
In terms of relational ethics, the ESRC (2019) mandated that researchers should 
consider potential physical and psychological harm, discomfort, stress, or 
reputational risk to the participants and their organisations. Fulfilling this requirement 
is demonstrated at a number of points in the research: during the snowball sampling 
stage, when dealing with enquiries from the participants about other participants’ 
details and data, and in the dissemination of the findings. Each of these will be dealt 
with in turn below. 
There was an ethical conundrum regarding the snowballing exercise, because some 
participants might not have felt able to refuse their colleagues' invitation to 
participate, which essentially amounts to coercion. However, using my experience as 
a researcher, it was important to reiterate that participation was voluntary and that 
the participants were given sufficient time and space to reflect upon the invitation 
before making a decision. In addition, these participants hold senior positions within 
their respective organisations, and, therefore, this potential vulnerability could have 
been mitigated, because they had the capability to decline my invitation. For prison 
officers, although the invitations were made via their institutional governors, it was 
made clear throughout all of their interviews that the invitation was not being 
imposed upon them by their governors, but rather that they wished to contribute 
voluntarily towards the research. In fact, all participants demonstrated a keen interest 
in the topic, illustrated through their responses to the first question of the interview 
that attempted to determine their motivation for participating in the research. 
Considering that the health and justice community are closely networked and that 
individuals know one another or know of one another, there was also a risk of 
breaching confidentiality during the interview process (Damianakis and Woodford, 
2012). Often, the interviewees were inquisitive about who else I had been or would 
be interviewing. They also enquired as to whether their responses were in line with 
other stakeholders who participated in the research. Here, I was particularly vigilant 
about not disclosing the names of the participants or the content of discussions to 
other participants, to ensure that all discussions remained confidential. Additionally, I 
was also mindful of the effect of snowball sampling, which could compromise 
participants’ anonymity. To mitigate this impact, I was careful not to share the details 
of who had agreed to participate in the research with the gatekeepers. Moreover, 
those who agreed to participate in this study contacted me directly without copying in 





Finally, I ensured that the dissemination activity, predominantly via journal 
publication and, eventually, this PhD thesis, did not explicitly identify any 
participants. Particular care was taken when describing the data or the professional 
role of participants to ensure that they were not identifiable, while also balancing the 
need to be transparent and ensuring that the patterning of the data analysis was not 
compromised. I also ensured that I did not misrepresent their views to further my 
research agenda in highlighting the presence of austerity across each layer of prison 
health governance and delivery in England. 
5.5.3 Sincerity 
Researcher reflection on my part is the hallmark of an ongoing, honest assessment of 
my strengths and weaknesses as a researcher. This type of reflection represents 
sincerity, which consists of self-reflexivity and transparency (Tracy, 2010).  
• Self-reflexivity 
 
Self-reflexivity was realised through self-awareness about my background and my 
views that could have possibly shaped the research process. According to Charmaz 
(2006), reflexivity requires researchers to scrutinise their ‘‘research experience, 
decisions and interpretations in ways that bring the researcher into the process and 
allow the reader to assess how and to what extent the researcher's interest, position, 
and assumptions influenced inquiry'' (pp.188-189). To demonstrate sincerity, I 
maintained a reflective journal and general field notes before and after the 
interviews. These notes provided an audit trail that provided clear documentation on 
my views and various decision-points concerning changes to methods throughout 
the study (Creswell and Miller, 2000; Seale, 1999). Moreover, I used this opportunity 
to reflect on my concerns and the challenges I faced during the research process.  
While my background in prison health commissioning, policy, and the law has been 
useful in facilitating my understanding of this topic, I was mindful of my own thought 
processes, so that I did not unduly influence the participants' accounts. Indeed, in 
keeping with Shenton (2004), one's background should also support the credibility of 
the research by demonstrating knowledge of the topic area. The constructivist 
paradigm allowed me to construct the meaning of austerity and its impact on prison 
health and, therefore, I contributed to shaping the research process, including data 
collection and analysis (Charmaz, 2006). This enhanced my ability to identify 
nuances in the data, which helps to reinforce the trustworthiness of the study. 
In addition, I opted for self-disclosure of my insider status to the participants using 
my email and letter signature, which included a link to my university profile. At the 
beginning of each interview, I mentioned my background and how I came to be 
investigating this area. This disclosure of insider status, according to Bosworth et al. 





power between the participants and researcher, and gaining their respect. The 
participants in this research did not consider it unusual that I had prior knowledge, 
experience, and interest in the prison health field. In fact, it helped instil confidence in 
me, as they viewed me as one of their colleagues. This could be seen from the use 
of such phrases as “Well, going to prisons as we do” or “You know this already from 
your work.” Additionally, the support from a prestigious funder, the respected 
reputations of my supervisors, and the robustness of the institutional ethical 
governance were used as legitimising markers to ease my access into the field. 
I also reflected on my overall experience as a new researcher in the field. Admittedly, 
some of my earlier interview sessions were quite formal and rigidly structured, but, 
as they progressed—owing to increased confidence and awareness of the process—
the interviews began to flow better, and I was able to settle into a more 
conversational style of interviewing. As well as piloting the interview questions with a 
senior research fellow, I drew upon my experiences of teaching students on 
qualitative research methods module, by applying these pedagogic skills to the 
interview situation that requires building rapport, active listening, and sustaining 
dialogue with participants. Frequent debriefing sessions with my supervisors helped 
to develop my understanding of the research methods and provided a sounding 
board to develop my ideas related to the research (Shenton, 2004).  
Self-reflexivity also raised the question of intersectionality and the power dynamic 
between the participants and me. For instance, elites were portrayed in the literature 
to be male, older, and of a higher social class compared to the researcher (Winkler, 
1987). Similar observations were also made for prison governors and staff, although 
the class portrayal of this group was absent in the academic literature. This 
representation proved to be true to a certain extent in my case, although it did not 
play a critical role in conducting the research. Nearly three-quarters of the 
participants were men. In all cases, there was an age gap between the interviewer 
and interviewees. Nevertheless, I felt like I was treated as an equal. This was partly 
because of my insider status.  
Equally, in line with Herzog’s (1995) proposal that informants have an interest in the 
information they provide, participants in this research viewed the interview process 
as a mechanism to further their own perspectives on the impact of austerity in their 
work. This was particularly the case with several participants who were considered 
civil servants, where they wished to vent their frustration towards policies that they 
viewed as harmful, but where they were unable to do so in an overt way. This was 
evident from their honesty in answering the interview questions, the profanity of 
language used to emphasise their points, and their reflection at the end of the 
interviews: for example, “I would like to say thank you for choosing to ask me those 
questions. It has been quite therapeutic unloading it all.” Research interviews, 








In terms of transparency, I explicitly identified power dynamics between the elite 
community and myself. Feminist scholars, such as Conti and O’Neil (2007), have 
been attentive to these issues by recognising that the power dynamics between an 
interviewer and an interviewee will have direct implications on the type of knowledge 
that is constructed. Many publications problematise this power dynamic as being 
asymmetrical. That is, elites have the authority and power to set the terms for being 
studied, and they can control the overall flow of the research process (Burnham et 
al., 2004; Bygnes, 2008; Desmond, 2004; Mikecz, 2012; Ostrander, 1995). Some of 
the other tactics for controlling the interview and flow of research include shutting 
down or deflecting questions (Batteson and Ball, 1995) and manipulating the 
dissemination process (Sabot, 1999; Welch et al., 2002). Paradoxically, elites may 
also feel exposed and vulnerable (Schoenberger, 1992).  
Similarly, for the ground-level participants, many publications problematise this 
power dynamic as being asymmetrical. Liebling and Arnold (2004) and more recently 
Tournel (2014) have depicted the complexity of conducting research in prisons, 
which is perceived as a low-trust environment. Implicit in these theories is the 
suspicion of outsiders who attempt to understand the prison lifeworld. It is not 
uncommon that prison researchers have to choose sides (Becker, 1967; Tournel, 
2014). Additionally, several studies postulate that security and institutional order 
often implicitly determine the prison health agenda (Arnold, 2008; Woodall, 2012), 
raising potential idiosyncrasies whereby this research was considered a non-priority. 
Although I patently acknowledge the contributions of germane previous literature, my 
personal and professional experience challenged the certainties surrounding these 
foregoing claims. I rarely felt that the interview space consistently manifested 
asymmetrical power relations favouring interviewees. In fact, I was frequently 
surprised by the level of self-reflection, uncertainty, and nervousness evident in 
some of the most senior interviewees, as well as their willingness to share their 
thoughts—despite the challenging interview questions. Participants were articulate 
and knowledgeable and spoke freely about the issues under investigation.19 
A diverse range of existing literature overwhelmingly depicts the position of elite and 
prison interviewing as one of ‘us against them’. This is the opposite of my own 
interactions, which tended to be non-adversarial, reciprocal, and symbiotic. I had a 
positive experience and felt grateful for the participants’ openness in sharing their 
 
19 Sometimes, they seemed guarded by using such phrases as “this is between you and me only" or 
“this is confidential, right?”. These infer that I might have had the power to do or undo certain things 
with their information that I possessed. On several occasions, they expressed the following: “You 
asked hard questions!” Or they casually informed another colleague within the prison health sphere 





views on a politically contentious topic. When the fieldwork went smoothly, I was also 
mindful of the dilemma of seduction. Elites in particular are considered to be minor 
celebrities in their field, who are often highly respected, even idolised, because of 
their power, position, and contributions to the field. Delaney (2007) suggests that 
interviewers, like myself, could often overly empathise with the interviewees, in a 
manner akin to the Stockholm Syndrome, a condition which could cause me to 
develop a psychological alliance with the interviewee, which may challenge the 
objectivity and trustworthiness of the study. Several strategies proposed by Delaney 
(2007) were adopted during this research, which included being objective and 
focused during the interviews, using probes to ask the participants to elaborate, 
challenging their viewpoints rather than merely accepting their propositions and, at 
the same time, being able to view and analyse the data collectively as a body of 
evidence, rather than focusing primarily on the interview subjects at the analysis 
stage. 
Conclusion 
This study is the first in-depth, large scale qualitative study exploring the impact of 
macroeconomic austerity on prison health governance and delivery in England. 
Guided by the methodology of constructivist grounded theory, semi-structured 
qualitative interviews were conducted with 87 experts in the international and 
national prison and prison healthcare fields (termed ‘elite participants’), as well as in 
prisons and their extended workforce from voluntary and private-sector organisations 
(termed ‘street-level bureaucrats’). The process focused on ‘studying up’, which was 
imperative in understanding interactions of actors and institutions when they 
underwent systemic reformation that was predicated by austerity. Although previous 
research concerning elite participants framed the suspicion of ‘us against them’ 
among these participants, my experience was the opposite: it was amenable and 
mutual. Their willingness to participate in this research demonstrate their perception 
that social research is an impetus for policy and political change, and welcomed this 
research as an opportunity to raise their concerns regarding the impacts of austerity 
on prison health governance and delivery.  
 
This chapter also advances several methodological contributions. It is one of the 
largest prison health studies in the world, which can enable greater transferability of 
findings across the prison health system. It addressed academic concerns’ relating 
to data saturation that often frames as out-of-reach particularly for novice 
researchers. Additionally, it introduced the concepts of the ‘Fourth Order’ in refining 
the analytical categories during the analysis stage. Although grounded theory is a 
fluid methodology, in a world that is driven by credibility, rigour, and transparency, 







The next chapter examines the findings of the research, including the themes that 
emerged to answer the central research question: “How does austerity affect prison 
health governance and the delivery of prison healthcare services in England?” In 
particular, it will examine the development, implementations and impacts of austerity 
on the governance and delivery of healthcare in English prisons, analyse how the 
governmental responses towards incidents that were directly linked to austerity 
remained under-theorised and explore potential remedial actions against the effects 










The next five chapters present five major categories and sub-categories of findings 
resulting from 87 interviews regarding the impact of austerity on prison health 
governance and delivery in England. To answer the primary research question—
“What are the impacts of austerity on prison health governance and delivery of 
prison healthcare in England?”—each chapter begins with a brief introduction and 
description of its structure and main argument. Then, each chapter reviews the main 
categories and sub-categories that emerged during the research. An overview of 
these categories is provided in Figure 6.1. 
Grounded in participants’ perspectives, Chapter 6 presents their views on the effect 
of the government’s austerity programme on prison healthcare governance and 
delivery, as well as on the broader prison regime. Participants cited the 
Benchmarking programme of the Ministry of Justice, implemented in 2012, as being 
responsible for executing the government’s reduction of prison spending. This 
chapter articulates participants’ responses towards the government’s rationales for 
austerity, which were explained with such verbiage as “unavoidable”, “inevitable” and 
“unnecessary”.  
Chapter 7 describes the austerity programme’s manifestations in prison healthcare 
and the broader regime that supports it. It catalogues crises directly experienced by 
prisoners—namely, decreased access to health services, reduced access to 
purposeful activities, and increased drug use among prisoners. It also analyses the 
impact of austerity on different types of prisons. Participants’ views on the 
burgeoning effect of continued austerity measures on prison health governance and 
delivery are also outlined. Additionally, the chapter analyses participants’ 
observations of the challenges in commissioning healthcare services under the 
government’s austerity agenda, alongside the increasing privatisation of the prison 
healthcare services and prison establishments. 
Chapter 8 articulates participants’ observations on how the extant context of English 
prisons—overcrowding and poor living of prisons, and the lengthier and harsher 
sentencing commitment—have intensified the adverse experience from austerity in 
administering and delivering prison health governance and the overall prison 
regimes. It provides participants’ views on the impact of the rapid turnover of justice 
ministers over the last ten years, as well as the effects of reduced welfare provisions 
in the community—which increasingly have relegated prisons to the role of first 
responders for vulnerable adults. This chapter thus reveals how these contextual 
factors have further reinforced the existing prison instability during austerity, which 






Chapter 9 explores governmental responses to incidents that reflected the ongoing 
prison instability that participants believed was directly linked to austerity. Their 
opinions predominantly pivoted on recruitment of new prison officers since 2016, 
which the government believed would increase prison stability. The chapter retails 
participants’ scrutiny of the effectiveness of internal and external feedback channels. 
It concludes by presenting participants’ thoughts about recent political 
announcements, delivered in 2019, regarding the end of austerity. 
Finally, Chapter 10 discusses participants’ proposed policy solutions that could 
counterpoise austerity. Their recommendations include reducing the current rate of 
imprisonment, increasing investment for prisons and community services, enhancing 






Figure 6.1  




Chapter 6: Political constructions of austerity narratives  
Introduction 
This chapter explores participants’ understanding of austerity and how austerity 
measures has been operationalised in the policy and delivery of prison healthcare 
and prison services. It investigates participants’ perspectives on the construction of 
political narratives that have made austerity economically unavoidable but yet 
seemingly a necessity, as well as offers supportive evidence for this claim. It 
concludes by unpacking participants’ views on the mobilisation of austerity 
programmes in English prisons. 
6.1 Participants’ understanding of austerity  
This section explores participants’ understanding and interpretation of austerity. It 
reveals their awareness of the political undercurrent of the austerity measures, as 
well as how these measures have been translated into policymaking and delivery of 
prison healthcare and prison services in England. In so doing, their accounts reveal 
a depiction of both austerity as financial cuts and austerity as a political ideology and 
how both perspectives have shaped the policy and delivery of prison healthcare and 
prison services. 
Almost unanimously, participants agreed that austerity meant government funding 
cuts directed at public services. Several participants serving at the macro- and 
meso-level of governance level adopted a definition of austerity that included such 
common phrases as “demand and supply” and “purposeful disinvestments”. As 
illustrated by Participant 43, a research lead of a national think tank: 
We focus on the important relationship between the extent to 
which demands on the prison service and prison healthcare 
services have gone up at the same rate as, or faster than, the 
spending they see. To put this in simpler terms, these services 
have not seen the spending that they need to match the 
demand at the same time. 
As explained by Participant 41, a regional prison director of a justice ministry, 
austerity denoted a tight control of financial expenditures from one year to another:  
I associate austerity with tight control of spending. Usually, in 
our business, that means that less is spent on running prisons, 
and that particularly impacted snacking budgets—certainly in 
the period from about 2012 to 2016 or 2017. That meant we 
were going to year-on-year producing budgets. That is what 




Moreover, phrases such as “overstretched and under-resourced services” 
(Participant 59, senior prison officer of a closed prison with an urgent notification 
status) and “no flexibility in the budget, compared to the pre-austerity era” 
(Participant 75, prison governor of a closed prison with an urgent notification status) 
were common refrains.  
Often, participants, irrespective of the level of governance they occupied, linked the 
imposition of austerity to the political ideology of the current government. Several 
participants mocked the reasons politicians used to justify austerity. In so doing, 
they referred to such political rhetoric as “maxing out the national credit card” and 
“the need to balance the economy”, as is exemplified by the following excerpts: 
The way in which politicians like George Osborne20 talks: “We 
have maxed out the national credit card.” That is just 
economically illiterate. That is a whole pile of bollocks, but, of 
course, people buy that reason that if we have spent up to the 
whole limit on our credit card, then we have to pay it back. 
(Participant 10, an academic and advisor to a European anti-
torture organisation)  
These politicians have never to my satisfaction justified long-
term austerity. They tend to revert back to the balancing the 
books thing that is based on their neoliberal ideology. Now, a 
well-managed economy is versatile. You can do different things 
with it depending on the needs of the day and also long-term 
prospects. Balancing the books is such a primitive approach to 
economic management. (Participant 15, an academic and 
former Cabinet Office advisor)  
Reinforcing the perception that austerity is a vehicle to advance political ideology, 
Participant 50, head of legal of a national penal reform organisation, clarified that 
economic rationing has always been political in character, regardless of the 
economic condition: 
So, irrespective of how the economy is performing or ways in 
which the economy could be managed, the way actually it is 
being managed, and the way the decisions are made all come 
down to being political decisions.  
In translating the political mandate of austerity into resource allocation for prison 
healthcare and prison service, many participants functioning close to the delivery of 
prison healthcare articulated difficult decisions that they had had to undertake to 
 
20 Chancellor of the Exchequer under Prime Minister David Cameron from 2010 to 2016, who 




keep their services afloat. Ineluctably, the costs of delivering services frequently 
trumped quality and best practices, as reflected by Participant 66, a head of a 
substance misuse service operating in various closed prisons: 
We try to, as far as possible, deliver our mission, which is to 
help people turn their lives around, keep them alive and help 
them to move away from drugs and crime. But we are walking a 
tightrope, between quality and cost, to win healthcare contracts 
in prisons. It is a constant battle. We always try and come up 
with more efficient models, but they were rarely driven by 
evidence and good practice, they were driven by “How do you 
do this for 30% less?” Constantly, questions such as “Do you 
pay your staff less?” or “Do you provide a weaker service?” or 
“Do you rely on volunteers more?” popped up more frequently. 
Beyond cost saving efforts, many participants were aware of the political undertone 
that riddled the resource allocations for prison healthcare and prison service. These 
programmes were perceived as predicated on unsound economic decisions. The 
top-down imposition of austerity programmes upended difficult decision-making 
processes, with participants witnessing scaling back of services and trade-offs 
between cost-cutting and delivering quality prison healthcare services.  
6.2  Perspectives on the government’s adoption of austerity: Austerity as 
unavoidable and inevitable 
This section illustrates the shared perception among participants about how the 
government’s political narratives of austerity had been presented as economically 
unavoidable. It investigates participants’ belief that such a claim was not evidence-
based and that this hollow assertion was further reinforced by limited public scrutiny.  
Despite the political narrative attempting to justify austerity as economically 
unavoidable, several national participants, particularly civil servants, noted that 
commitment across all post-2010 election manifestos reduced public sector 
spending. As reflected in the comments of Participant 35, a regional health and 
justice lead of a national health organisation, the government engaged in politically 
motivated efforts to provide justification to the financial cuts, in the process 
disparaging the opposition, even though it did so without utilising measured 
approaches.  
The [politicians] justified it politically, didn’t they? They justified it 
politically on the basis that we have got less money, and we 
have all got to make sacrifices. They did not justify it on the 
basis that they could deliver it. They did not do any kind of 




understanding of what the impact of cutting funding would be 
and what the impact of that would be on life.  
The government’s failure to complete a cost-benefit assessment of the impact of 
reduced state spending on the prison system led Participant 10, an academic and 
advisor to a European anti-torture organisation, to argue that austerity was an 
ideological, rather than economic, decision: 
I do not believe that austerity is about making things more 
efficient. George Osborne, who was basically the architect of all 
this financial mess, had a target to reduce state spending […] a 
decision that was not based upon cost-benefit analysis. It was a 
priori an ideological decision that he had taken.   
Some participants also believed that the government tended to blame previous 
Labour governments (that had held office between 1997 and 2010) for leaving the 
country in a state of debt, thereby making austerity unavoidable (Gamble, 2014). 
Yet, after a decade of austerity policies, austerity measures remained in situ. 
Participant 55 (a prison health lead of a national health organisation and magistrate) 
stated:  
Whenever I have heard government ministers being challenged 
about austerity, you will hear the same old broken record of “it is 
because of the previous Labour government leaving us with 
debt”. Actually, there is only so long you can keep saying that. 
Is that a good enough excuse for allowing everything to fall 
apart?   
Although small in number, several participants articulated a nuanced view that 
framing austerity as a technical economic “fix” limits the public’s ability to engage in 
the austerity debate. These participants argued that because politicians set the 
terms of the debate and framed austerity as economically inevitable, it removed the 
public’s efforts to scrutinise the austerity programme that blighted public services. 
For example, as Participant 19 observed: 
These austerity measures are presented but not justified. They 
are framed as unavoidable. [T]his has effects on the 
participation of people in politics. They cannot scrutinise these 
political strategies. If you present that something is just a 
technical issue and not a political issue, there is no space for 
public engagement. Austerity was presented in such a way.  
In summary, this section illustrated the views of participants about the political 
narratives that justified the putative necessity of austerity. Despite being presented 




motivated. In particular, they felt that such action was bereft of underpinning 
evidence and that current politicians imputed the draconian measures to the 
previous administration’s fiscal ineptness. They were querulous about the validity of 
this political framing. 
6.3 Perspectives on the government’s adoption of austerity: Austerity as 
necessary 
This section will delve into a range of perspectives participants have on the 
government’s justification that austerity is necessary, as well as the impact of their 
acceptance of this narrative. There were discrepancies in participants’ reaction 
towards the language the government employed to justify the necessity of austerity. 
Their responses ranged from positive and passive acceptance to active resistance.  
The reactions were contextually driven and varied according to participants’ location 
within the governance and delivery structure of prison healthcare in England.  
Albeit a small group, some participants, notably those within civil service, explicitly 
accepted austerity as necessary. Their responses focused on prison healthcare and 
prison service policy and delivery. Several understood austerity to be a necessary 
evil, where “[it] makes people more aware that whatever they are doing is limited by 
the resources that are reducing” (Participant 55, a prison health lead of a national 
health organisation and magistrate). Others viewed it as an opportunity to streamline 
service delivery: “…identifying what is working within the system, and what is not 
working, [because] austerity exposes gaps much more” (Participant 35, a regional 
health and justice lead of a national health organisation).  
Similarly, phrases prevalent in these civil servants’ descriptions included “living 
within financial means” and “doing things differently,” (Participant 34, the head of a 
national prison health charity) and “becoming more financial[ly] savvy” (Participant 
35, a regional health and justice lead of a national health organisation). The 
response of these individuals denoted how they perceived that government 
justifications for the resource reduction were merely semantics. Unlike opponents of 
austerity measures, however, these participants did not regard the government’s 
actions as politically motivated. 
Other participant comments demonstrated compliance and a realisation that 
participants felt that they had no ability to challenge the situation. Participant 28, a 
former head of a prison inspectorate, argued that “the civil servants have no control 
over the resources they have got, and they have not got any control over the 
numbers of people that are sent to the prisons”. Some simply accepted the narrative 
of austerity from a pragmatic standpoint. As Participant 20, a public health specialist 
at an international health organisation, stated: “There’s no money left. Just put up 
with it […] people tend to accept it and try to avoid the subject altogether. Because 
what’s the alternative?” Echoing this stance, Participant 22, an advisor to a 




I can simply [say], “Oh, economic austerity is terrible. We can’t 
do this; we can’t do that.” The fact is we have economic 
austerity. There is less public service. You can either be one of 
those people that is “I cannot do my job because I do not have 
enough money”, or you keep going. The fact of the matter is we 
have got to do our job whether we have enough money or less 
than enough money. You have got to look at how you do things 
in order to look at what you can do against what are your real 
priorities and what is the best and most efficient way to do that. 
That is a fact of life in public service austerity, because there is 
no cash cow coming to resolve that.   
Evident from the interviews was that the majority of policymaking participants tended 
to avoid using the term “austerity”. Instead, they used euphemisms, such as “lack of 
funding” (Participant 17, an advisor to a European intergovernmental human rights 
organisation) or “working under financial pressure” (Participant 4, an advisor to a 
European intergovernmental human rights organisation) to express the continual 
austerity challenges they faced. Participant 29, an academic and consultant for an 
international health organisation, acknowledged this behaviour and stated: “[W]e 
hardly use the word austerity […], but we all know we are working in a resource-
constrained environment”. They seemingly utilised such verbiage deliberately to 
maintain their neutral position and to ensure that they did not cross the political line. 
Many participants provided a more nuanced approach, arguing that the 
catchphrases of “efficiency”, “economies of scale”, and “doing more for less” are 
masking the reality that prison healthcare and the prison service were eventually 
compromised. As articulated by two participants below, such language avoided 
confronting the reality of an increased demand for prison healthcare during a time 
when resources were being reduced. To some extent, the government’s response 
had become a public relations exercise in framing austerity as necessary and 
unavoidable. 
[Health organisations] have been given their budgets against 
the contracts that they have tendered for with the expectation 
they will deliver those contracts. We have seen a reduction in 
staffing for services such as drug treatment, and many uses of 
words such as “efficiency” and “economy”. In reality, we have 
not got the staff on the ground. Demands on health services, on 
the other hand, are increasing. It means that our services are 
not going to be as robust as they were before, in terms of those 
interventions for health. (Participant 32, a regional health and 
justice lead of a health organisation) 
The government is packaging [austerity measures] up to make 




efficient. They promise that there will be better communication, 
that the right people doing the right things and tackling all these 
complex issues. So, the public feels satisfied: “Good, they are 
actually going to do something about this now.” That is the sell. 
But the subtext beyond […] you cannot grow the prisoner 
population but cut the staff at the same time. You just cannot do 
that without having a negative impact. (Participant 44, a criminal 
justice lead of a nursing trade union)  
Some participants expressed dissenting views, directly confronting the argument that 
austerity was a necessity. Although they acknowledged that there would always be 
room for improvement, participants perceived that their organisations had always 
been prudent with their resource allocation. As argued by Participant 55, a prison 
health lead of a national health organisation and a magistrate: “We were fairly good 
at [looking for value for money] anyway. It was not like we were wasting resources”.  
This section has illustrated how framing austerity as necessary was actively resisted, 
passively accepted, or positively accepted by the participants. The majority felt that 
they were compelled to agree with the narrative of austerity, considering their 
inability to challenge it. 
6.4 Mobilisation of the austerity programmes in prisons 
The majority of participants cited the Prison Unit Cost Programme, also known as 
the Benchmarking Programme, and the Fair and Sustainable Programme as 
responsible for executing the government’s austerity efforts. Ultimately, they 
concluded that these programmes sought to reduce state expenditure in prisons by 
reducing the workforce size without reducing the prison population, thus resulting in 
a compromise in safety in operating the prison regime. Two participant quotations 
support this belief: 
I have looked at staff-to-prison[er] ratios in Trinidad and Tobago 
[and] all the West Indian islands. I have been to prisons in India, 
Australia, Germany, America, and Canada, the UAE, and 
Mauritius. All of them had a proper ratio of prison staff to 
prisoners. They never let the ratio fall between one [staff] to 
three prisoners. [In England], it is now one to six, which it was in 
1960. You do not find a single European country where the staff 
numbers are so low. (Participant 18, an academic and advisor 
to a European administration organisation)  
My establishment [a men’s resettlement prison in Midlands] 
went through a change where the Benchmarking Exercise set 
the level of staff that we believed was wrong. As a result, we 




everybody needs to make cuts. But in places like this, there 
needs to be a minimum of staff for it to be safe, for both the 
prisoners and the staff, because that is when the frustrations 
start. (Participant 74, a senior prison officer of a resettlement 
prison) 
Participant 43, a research lead of a national think tank, observed a disconnect in how 
the reduction of prison workforce measures were executed based on the premise 
that savings could be made from a reduction in prison service. She argued that the 
time-lag effect suggested that the budget decrease continued to work for some time 
before prison stability began to deteriorate:  
They operated on the assumption that there was a lot of fat in 
public services – “Let’s just top-slice all the budgets and let 
people figure out how to do that”. The budget reduction 
suggests that that did work for a while. The quality of services 
did not decline in most areas for a while, but that has become 
harder and harder to sustain as time has gone on and more and 
more problems bubble up.  
Taking into account the desire to localise the decision-making process of the budget 
cuts above, consistent international and national participants’ responses suggested 
that participants did not think that the UK government undertook a thorough 
assessment on what the reductions would mean in practice for the prison service. In 
particular, as highlighted by Participant 49, an investigator for a regulatory 
organisation, the lack of a thoughtful approach to reduce expenditure on prisons 
defied the logic of austerity as being necessary: 
There are risks to taking a lot of money out of budgets in a very 
unplanned way. The Ministry of Justice has lost an enormous 
amount of money. But, it also has fairly fixed costs. Prisons are 
a massive part of its expenditure; it has to provide prison places 
for the people who are sentenced to prisons. It is a very difficult 
financial situation. If you are going to perform radical surgery, 
you should know where the heart is. This is not the case for this 
Ministry.  
Overall, participants with views against austerity measures noted the direct 
consequences of austerity measures to prison service. Via the Benchmarking 
Programme, they observed how the government’s unplanned approach in reducing 
the prison workforce without reducing the prison population compromises the 





This chapter has demonstrated how participants believed that austerity has been 
politically constructed and mobilised across all levels of governance and delivery of 
prison healthcare and prison services in England via three distinct ways. First, based 
on participants’ arguments, austerity was a political choice, despite its reliance on 
economic measures for justification. Second, despite an awareness that the 
narrative was not evidence-based, the framing of austerity as necessary was 
accepted by participants, especially those who were part of the civil service, 
compatible with the ruling government’s will. This was perceived as the lack of an 
alternative to austerity. Third, participants’ accounts detailed the implementation of 
the austerity measures across prisons via the Benchmarking Programme, which was 
not executed in a considered way and compromised the system stability. 
The next chapter will demonstrate how research participants perceived the 
implementation of austerity policies as leading to a deterioration in prison 
governance and prison healthcare delivery in England. It will critically examine 
participants’ views of how the reduction in prison funding across England impacted 
prisoners’ access to healthcare services and purposeful activities. The by-products 
of increasing prison instability—per participants’ perspectives—created a ripple 
effect across the prison governance structure in which healthcare delivery is highly 
dependent. The chapter will also explore the participants’ accounts on the intensified 
commissioning and delivery of healthcare across English prisons, as well as 





Chapter 7 – The impacts of austerity on the governance and delivery of prison 
healthcare services  
Introduction  
Following the preceding chapter’s analysis of participants’ views of how politicians 
had constructed, accepted, and mobilised austerity, this chapter illustrates the 
specific impacts of the austerity programme on delivery of healthcare and prison 
services in England. The barriers to accessing prison healthcare services, as well as 
prisoners’ access to purposeful activities, and the increasing availability of drugs, are 
critically considered from participants’ perspectives.  
Participants’ responses revealed how delivery of healthcare and supportive prison 
regimes in certain types of prison establishments suffered a greater impact from 
austerity measures than conventional male establishments. The prolonged effect of 
continued austerity on the government’s aspirations for prison rehabilitation are also 
examined.  
Subsequently, participants’ beliefs about challenges in commissioning and delivering 
healthcare services across prisons are analysed. The chapter then explores their 
views of the concerted reduction in state interventions via increasing privatisation of 
prison healthcare and prison service.   
7.1  Declining access to healthcare services for prisoners  
This section details the analysis of the impact of reduction in the size of the prison 
workforce on prisoners’ access to healthcare. Based on the participants’ perceptions, 
these impacts will be examined in terms of the accessibility of healthcare services for 
prisoners. Also, given the broadly stagnant NHS England funding for prison 
healthcare, participants also highlighted the decline in the quality of services for 
prisoners, as well as how deterioration of services has affected the performance of 
the broader health system within prisons. An analysis of each of these themes is 
presented below.  
Almost unanimously, and irrespective of the level on which they functioned, 
participants argued that the reduction of prison officers was a barrier to prisoners’ 
accessing prison healthcare services. Participant 47, the project lead of a national 
penal reform organisation, noted: “There are a lot more lockdowns; people cannot 
leave their cells, and sometimes they cannot attend their healthcare appointments”. 
A salutary prison regime that supports prisoners’ availability to health care is critical, 
but reduction in prison staff diminishes such access. As asserted by Participant 21, 
the regional lead of an international health organisation: “Even if you have the most 
effective, efficient health system in the world sitting in a prison, it is not going to be 
able to deliver its service without the support and enablement of staff in the prison 




highlighted the dependency of healthcare services on the availability of prison 
officers: 
Health services cannot operate in isolation in a prison. Prison 
officers need to be available in order to supervise clinical 
deliveries. They are not in the consulting room, but they are 
waiting outside, and they have to operate in a much tighter way. 
Sometimes these officers are late getting to the start of the 
clinics because they have to do a different job first before they 
go to clinics, whereas previously they would just be allocated to 
the clinics for the whole of the day. So that causes a lot of 
disruption and a loss of clinical time.  
Inevitably, a few participants, notably health commissioners, mentioned their 
frustration about the decline on the healthcare delivery as not being within the control 
of NHS England. Participant 55, a prison health lead of a national health organisation 
and magistrate, highlighted the asymmetrical power by comparing the delivery of 
health services in prisons to other settings, such as hospitals, which had full 
autonomy in delivering services: 
Of course, we are completely reliant on the resources of 
HMPPS to facilitate our access to prisoners, outpatients, and for 
the environment in which we work. It is different than a hospital, 
where we have ultimate control over our clinic facilities or 
anything else. In a prison, we do not. We will set standards. We 
will expect the healthcare facilities that we are provided with to 
be appropriate and to be up to the NHS standard. That is 
actually not entirely within our control because it is prison 
service property.  
Participants at the operational level of prisons observed that postponement or 
cancellation of health appointments became more frequent after the austerity 
programme was implemented. Consequently, it led to blockages and waste across 
the prison and community healthcare settings. As Participant 61, the prison governor 
of a high-security prison, exposited: “We do not necessarily have people available to 
supervise escort out of the prison, so that can lead to cancellations or reorganising 
appointments outside of the prison, which can be problematic for us and the health 
system outside.”  
At a more strategic level, some participants noted how the service decline created a 
domino effect on the wider NHS performance, as both prison and community 
healthcare services fall within the same organisational umbrella. This point was 





NHS trusts are struggling more, and the kind of 12-week waits 
here need turnaround. All performance figures starting to turn 
from green to amber to red, and you are seeing that more. That 
partly has had an impact on prison healthcare and the rest of 
the system struggles.  
Similar to the healthcare services issues, many participants also observed 
deterioration regarding the quality of healthcare services. Longer waiting times and 
insufficient consultation time with medical professionals, they argued, further 
compromised the quality of prisoner healthcare. Participant 12, an advisor to a 
European intergovernmental human rights organisation and leader of a national 
medical organisation, stated: 
We often have just handfuls of sessions of psychiatry […] We 
have three days of psychiatry to manage a caseload of 300 men. 
The Royal College of Physicians says that we should have 30 
sessions to manage that caseload […] People often do not get 
seen or they wait a long time to be seen or they get seen for 
shorter periods of time than they should be seen […] It is really 
inadequate.   
From the prison officers’ perspectives, they felt often forced to make difficult 
decisions that represented a trade-off between sending sick prisoners to hospitals 
for treatment, while remaining prisoners were locked in their cells because there 
were insufficient officers to supervise them. 
I have been in charge of the prisoners at night, when we have 
got absolute minimal staffing levels. I am covering my backside 
by using the dedicated healthcare phone line when prisoners 
are unwell, and then they cover their backside by saying to me, 
“Yeah you’d better send them to hospital”. Then you are 
depleting your staffing levels because you have to send two 
members of staff out with that prisoner […] The next thing you 
know, we cannot even open a door because there are not 
enough staff now to let prisoners outside their cells […] And I 
am absolutely against there not being 24-hour healthcare. It has 
made life very, very difficult for us. (Participant 78, a senior 
prison officer of a closed prison) 
In contrast to the majority opinion, Participant 31, a head of custodial services at a 
justice ministry, had a dissenting response to some of the negative accounts that 
linked austerity to the reduction of prison officers, which impacted the delivery of 
prison healthcare. In particular, Participant 31, the head of custodial services at a 





I do not think it is all negative. I think some of it has been 
extremely challenging, things like the arrival of psychoactive 
substances. It probably has been as impactful on health as a 
range of other things. We do not have a clear evidential [base] 
that says the financial reduction causes instability […] It is very 
difficult to attribute certain effects that you might see to a 
particular cause, because there are so many other contextual 
and multiple factors going on that you cannot necessarily know.   
Although Participant 31’s statement highlighted the need for robust evidence on the 
association between financial reduction and current institutional instability, the 
analysis of other participants’ comments suggested that his view was an outlier. The 
overwhelming sentiment of the other interviewees was that such a dismissive 
perspective amounted to “living in denial” (Participant 36, an assistant head of 
health and justice of a national health organisation), was simply “a lazy way out,” 
(Participant 70, a healthcare manager of an NHS Trust in a resettlement prison), or 
sounded “outrageous” (Participant 40, the head of a national penal reform 
organisation).  
Overall, the analysis of participants’ responses implied that reduction in the number 
of prison officers often led to more frequent delays, postponements, and 
cancellations of health appointments in both prisons and community settings. Per 
participants’ viewpoints, the quality of healthcare also suffered when prisoners had 
inadequate contact time with medical professionals. Because prison healthcare 
services were located within the NHS umbrella, inevitably the performance of the 
organisation deteriorated.  
7.2  Declining access to purposeful activities and rehabilitative 
environments 
Almost all participants, irrespective of their governance level, stated how the 
shortage of prison officers had contributed to the decline in access to purposeful 
activities and rehabilitative environments in prisons. In particular, they questioned 
how violent incidents, as well as the harmful built environment in prisons, could 
hamper government aspirations pertaining to the prison rehabilitation agenda.  
First, almost all participants observed that prisoners had to spend long hours in their 
cells without opportunity to socialise with fellow prisoners and take part in the 
purposeful activities that were critical to their health and well-being. Participant 13, a 
former head of a prison inspectorate, compared the situation in England to his 
experiences when inspecting prisons in the Middle East: 
I went to inspect the prisons in the United Arab Emirates, where 
I discovered that they did not have one suicide in Dubai and 




cells are left unlocked, so by day everyone can mix freely with 
each other. It does not matter if you go and sleep in an 
overcrowded cell, because that is only by the night. But in 
England, we insist on separating people by day and doing 
nothing. That is not natural. I think that if you treat somebody 
like an animal, that is what you will get.  
The majority of participants, especially those at the national and local levels, 
observed that being locked in cells for lengthy periods of time triggered boredom and 
restlessness. In these instances, they noted that minor squabbles among prisoners 
could turn into major riots that could halt delivery of healthcare services. Participant 
53, a regional head of health and justice commissioning for the National Health 
Service, stated:  
The use of the Tornado Team [an elite squad tasked with 
bringing prison riots under control] has risen enormously. This 
team moves between prisons. We sometimes need to alert our 
healthcare providers. Going into prisons like we do, we hear a 
general alarm bell that [things have] gone through the roof. You 
just hear it more. You hear, “general alarm, general alarm, 
general alarm”. It is staggering.   
Moreover, owing to being locked in cells for too long, most of these participants also 
cited self-harm and burgeoning suicide rates and assaults among prisoners and 
staff. Participants noted that these extreme occurrences of “lockdowns” were now 
becoming a daily norm. Despite governing two different institutions with dissimilar 
security levels, both Participant 81, the governor of an open prison, as well as 
Participant 61, the governor of a high-security prison, shared the following 
sentiments, respectively: 
When we do not have enough staff, prisoners cannot get to 
[engage in] purposeful activity. They are kept in cells longer and 
therefore frustrations run high. It brings with it reaction and 
violence amongst the prison population that happens almost every 
day across the estates, like violence against staff and other 
prisoners, self-harm episodes, and even suicides.  
Health is not just about a health service. It is about the whole 
environment supporting people’s health and well-being. The 
deterioration that we have seen in safety is a sign of a much less 
healthy environment in which people are having to live. They have 
to live in an environment where there is more violence, more self-
harm […] that is going to affect, not just those individuals involved, 
but it is going to affect the general health and well-being of 




Numerous participants questioned the extent to which the prison rehabilitation 
agenda could be attained, owing to the lack of meaningful activities that the 
prisoners undertook to meet the rehabilitation aspiration.  
But in terms of prisoner well-being, it means that there are a lot 
more lockdowns, people cannot leave their cells, people have 
to spend more time in their cells, they have less time outdoors, 
and they have less meaningful activity. It means that people 
cannot be escorted to go to training, education, visits, do any kind 
of meaningful activity, that you would to actually make a prison 
experience in any kind of way useful. (Participant 47, a project 
lead of a national penal reform organisation) 
Additionally, Participant 12, an advisor to a European intergovernmental human 
rights organisation and leader of a national medical organisation, observed the 
cumulative impacts of the increasing levels of violence that instilled fear among a 
small pocket of vulnerable prisoners. To him, this could lead the vulnerable 
prisoners to become disengaged from the prison regime: 
Prisoners always say to me [during our visits] that when they do 
come out, they do not feel safe […] Especially in busy remand 
prisons, where violence is commonplace, bullying is rife, and drug 
activity is the norm. If you are a vulnerable prisoner in such an 
environment, it might make sense just to stay in your cell and not 
engage with anybody because engaging might be problematic.  
The majority of participants asserted that maintaining order safely and securely in 
their institutions had become increasingly fraught. Frequently, participants expressed 
fear and intimidation. For example, as Participant 78, a senior prison officer of a 
closed prison, stated: 
When the staffing levels [are] reduced so dramatically now, the 
prisoners know they can get away with it. They overstep the 
mark, and they keep pushing, and they keep pushing. Recently, 
I had a nose-to-nose with a prisoner, because he refused to 
take his dinner behind his door. He made a stand, and I looked 
at my watch and I thought, “Right, it is five to five. I want to go 
home at half past five in one piece”. No member of staff was 
there to back me up, and no-one was watching. The likelihood 
is, if I [had] carried on and stood my ground, he would either 
[have] spat [or] punched me, so in the end I just walked away. 
That is the difference now; you do not have the confidence to 




Participant 46 also commented on the experience of similar level of assaults being 
inflicted on the healthcare staff, similar to the frontline prison workforce: 
If there was an incident, you pushed an alarm button. There 
would be a lot of staff come to support you and deal with that 
situation safely and effectively. Unfortunately, there just are not 
people there to do that anymore. We have seen nursing and 
healthcare staff suffer attacks and assaults, and that has got to 
a point where it is just not acceptable.  
Overall, participants felt that shortages of prison staff contributed to a decline in both 
access to purposeful activities and to rehabilitative environments in prisons. 
Following regular occurrences of prison lockdown, most of them noted that violent 
incidents against prisoners and staff had become routine. Some questioned the 
attainment of the prison rehabilitation agenda in light of this deterioration.  
7.3  Increasing availability of drugs   
This section will explore the increasing availability of drugs in English prisons and 
how it impacts the delivery of prison healthcare services and drug interventions on 
prisoners. It will focus on participants’ observations on the insufficient number of 
prison officers needed to curb the drug supply and prisoners’ augmented demand for 
drugs (to cope with their poor living environment).  
Various participants believed the drug market operating outside the prison was 
responsible for supplying drugs inside the prison—including novel psychoactive 
substances. Participants attributed the increase in illicit drug use to an inadequate 
number of prison officers available to conduct drug searches, perimeter patrols, and 
intelligence gathering:  
In [our resettlement prison], prison officers were reduced by 
40%. Granted, a prison officer is not delivering healthcare. 
However, if they are not there on the wings or doing searches 
or finding that people use more and more drugs, that made a 
huge difference. (Participant 73, the head of a private 
healthcare organisation at a resettlement prison)  
The rising use of drugs has created a ripple effect on internal and external 
resources. These impacts included preventing healthcare staff from delivering 
planned activities, attending to medical emergencies, and calling upon external 
healthcare resources (e.g., ambulances). Participant 73, a head of a private 
healthcare organisation at a resettlement prison, reflected upon his team’s 
experience in responding to emergency incidents– ‘code blues’–that were caused by 




When code blue incidents happened as a result of prisoners 
using Spice, they did not all require [prisoners] to go out to the 
hospital, but they still interrupted a primary care clinic for hours. 
When a code blue is activated, an ambulance is automatically 
called as well. Now, when healthcare staff get to the scene, 
they will quickly assess the patient, and if they deem that the 
ambulance is not required, the ambulance stands down. But we 
had a situation where there were five ambulances a day coming 
here and then having to turn round. It has a big impact on the 
community, as well as the prison. 
Outside the office hours, prisons still had to rely upon external services to attend to 
medical emergencies, as the in-house healthcare services were not available 
beyond their operational hours: “We are not here 24 hours a day. We are only here 
during working hours, until half six in the evening. Then, the ambulance service or 
urgent care GPs take over during the night” (Participant 69, a prison officer at a 
resettlement prison). Consequently, prison staff had no other option but to draw upon 
community sources that were already hard-pressed. 
Many participants also believed that such events weakened the structure of 
institutional governance. This weakness has led to the growth of prison gangs and 
serious organised crime groups that supply illicit drugs to local prisons as part of the 
informal economy. As illustrated by Participant 25, a European law and human 
rights specialist: “[W]hen you have lower staff [levels] and less secure prisons, 
people start looking to informal structures, i.e., gangs, for their security”. Participant 
71, a prison governor of a resettlement prison, further articulated this problem, 
linking it to the increasing drug presence across prisons in England:  
Most prisons that have drug issues have serious organised 
crime involved because no one throws over drugs worth over 
£50,000 like a lottery and thinks it will not get there without 
having some serious backing.  
Participant 55, a prison health lead of a national health organisation and magistrate, 
also addressed the impact of organised crime on the prison healthcare and regime: 
The series of organised crime influence is making sure that 
those substances are available within the prison estate. Yes, 
there are some small, local-level dealers who will get stuff in. 
The scale of the supply into the prison system has to indicate 
that it is a problem of serious organised crime nationally, rather 
than just looking at small-scale individual dealers or small 
groups of dealers. Tackling that serious organised crime angle 




stability of the prison estate […] and, therefore, the delivery of 
healthcare.  
Some participating prison officers’ comments illustrated that these organised crime 
groups could pose insurmountable challenges to maintaining control in prisons. 
Gangs also prey on vulnerable prisoners. For example, as Participant 57, a head of a 
prison governor’s union, explained: “Strong gangs take control of our prisons. They 
bully other prisoners, weaker prisoners, and force them into taking drugs, which could 
potentially undo the health interventions on these prisoners”. 
Participant 65, the service manager of an NHS Trust in a closed prison, noticed how 
politicians opportunistically blamed increasing prison instability on the rising use of 
Spice. To her, imputing prison instability to drugs alone did not address the core of 
the problem and masked how the reduction in the number of prison officers 
exacerbated the less rehabilitative environment in prisons: 
Not admitting how austerity impacts prisons is bloody outrageous. 
Prison officer numbers went down, and, at the same time, the 
suicide rate was going up. It is an undeniable connection, and the 
government did not want to admit the harm that they inflicted. I 
hear political bollocks that the increased suicide rate is attributed 
to the availability of Spice in prisons, but that is a really good 
excuse and a really good smokescreen for not acknowledging 
what drastic impact the reduction in prison funding has had on the 
well-being of prisoners.   
Many participants believed that the prisoners’ poor living environment had increased 
their risk-taking behaviour. Drug use, in particular, had become a coping mechanism. 
As illustrated by Participant 40, the head of a national penal reform organisation: 
“People are being made ill, both mentally, through the stress of living in that 
environment, and physically, through taking substances to cope with it”.  
In summary, participants suggested that an inadequate number of prison officers to 
conduct searches and gather intelligence regarding illicit drugs and prisoners’ rife 
demand for coping with their stressful living environment had contributed to a 
marked accretion in drug use across prisons in England. Some of these issues, in 
turn, resulted in medical emergencies that impaired the efficiency and effectiveness 
of health services within and outside prisons. 
7.4  Understanding the uneven impact of austerity on the delivery of 
healthcare  
Participants’ narratives diverged when asked whether healthcare delivery and its 
enabling prison regime were disproportionately impacted by austerity in certain 




distinct levels of resources, assets, and resilience. As such, austerity effects lacked 
constancy across prisons. Partly, the inconsistent picture of the influence of austerity 
on certain prisons indicated the opaque climate in which prisons function. As stated 
by Participant 28, a former head of a prison inspectorate:  
Because prisons are a closed environment, you cannot compare 
what you are doing with what is happening in other prisons […] 
You do not have that direct experience. What might 
be unnecessarily poor conditions just becomes that is the way it is 
[…] There is a level of acceptance. 
Most participant remarks pivoted around their perceptions of the local, closed, high-
security, and private prisons. The variegated views of participants will be examined 
below.  
7.4.1  Impact on delivery of prison healthcare services on the local and closed 
prisons 
Several participants argued that austerity had a bigger impact on the closed prisons, 
as these establishments already had had a fragile workforce base following the 
Benchmarking Exercise in 2012. Participant 40, the head of a national penal reform 
organisation, named some of these prisons and how austerity destabilised the 
delivery of healthcare services in these establishments: 
The prisons that have always been worrying, such as HMPs 
Wandsworth [London], Pentonville [London], and Liverpool, all 
of those well-known Victorian-level prisons, have suffered as 
much as anybody through austerity and the culture of being 
incredibly fragile, vulnerable places to begin with. Even more 
worrying are the prisons in the middle. HMP The Mount 
[Hertfordshire] is just a classic Category C training prison. Two 
or three years ago, there were regular riots. If that is happening, 
then you can absolutely guarantee that basic services, including 
health services, will not be delivered in the way that they should 
be.  
Closed prisons were viewed to have been mainly blighted by drugs: “We are 
vulnerable to the throw-in of drugs from the outside” (Participant 79, a deputy 
governor of a closed prison with urgent notification status). In contrast, open prisons 
were relatively protected from this phenomenon, as “the men are kept busy, 
everyone has got jobs, everyone has got somewhere to go to, and they have got 
home leaves or temporary releases to demonstrate compliance and appropriateness 
of behaviour” (Participant 80, a governor of an open prison). These comments, to 
some extent, illustrated the fact that with the right level of purposeful activities, 




drug use.  
 
Other participants argued that rapid prisoner turnover that occurred in local prisons 
made it fraught to provide health interventions. The turnover highlighted tension 
between the long-term view of addressing prisoners’ health issues and the short-
term perspective of keeping these prisoners safe. Participant 44, the criminal justice 
lead of a nursing trade union, stated: 
I do see local prisons being directly affected by austerity. Where 
people come in and move on, that is really a big problem for 
practitioners and clinical staff. You might need to call up 
somebody’s past history and connect with their community 
healthcare and housing support teams, so you have got a real 
short space of time to be able to do something effective before 
they move on. Where you have a stable population, people who 
are there for a number of years, you can actually do something 
more meaningfully, whereas, [with] the former, you can only 
signpost, and the primary objective is to keep people safe in the 
short-term.   
Other participants observed that short sentences exacerbated the throughput of 
prisoners into some institutions. Participant 39, a policy lead for a penal reform 
organisation, stated: 
Prisons with high turnover of prisoners will be more impacted in 
terms of austerity. Because if you have got more people coming in 
and out and you have got less staff, with lots of incoming short 
sentences, they tend to have the most severe problems in terms of 
violence and deaths in local prisons—as opposed to a stable 
population of long-term prisoners and less issues.  
In summary, some participants opined that closed prisons were affected more by 
austerity than others owing to the poor level of staffing in those prisons. They also 
discussed how prisoners in closed prisons were vulnerable to supplies of drugs from 
outside. However, several other participants suggested that local prisons suffered 
from austerity more than other prisons, given the high throughput of prisoners, thus 
creating difficulties for addressing health needs of these individuals and the level of 
support required to ensure a safe custodial environment.  
7.4.2 Impact on delivery of prison healthcare services on the high-security and 
private prisons 
Participants’ responses varied markedly about the extent to which austerity affected 
high-security and private prisons. The majority of national and local participants 




cuts, dovetailing with a drive to lock up dangerous detainees for a long period of 
time: “[T]he high[-]security prisons already have a lot of staff […] My God, they are 
still throwing money at these places!” (Participant 71, a prison governor of a 
resettlement prison). Similarly, as argued by Participant 28, a former inspector of 
prisons: “If you look at it on the whole, the staff reductions have not been as great in 
high-security prisons, like HMP Long Lartin [West Midlands], as they had in other 
prisons”.  
However, participants who led and worked at high-security establishments 
challenged these viewpoints. The quotation below illustrated their disagreements 
with the wider perception of the impact of austerity on their institutions:  
We suffered from austerity too. For others to say, “Well, high-
security prisons are unaffected” is untrue. Our prison [a high-
security prison in South East London establishment] used to 
have a budget of £44 million. Now, our annual budget is £29 
million, so we have lost the best part of £15 million since 
2010. We used to have above 400 prison staff in 2010 and now 
we only have half of that size. (Participant 82, a senior prison 
officer of a high-security prison)  
Responding to the question of whether private sector prisons were more protected 
from austerity compared to the public sector prisons during austere times, Participant 
57, a head of a prison governor’s union, commented that most private prisons were 
newer and had better environments conducive to prison rehabilitation. They also, 
though, believed that such institutions had been more likely to be afforded freedom 
to deal with establishment issues compared to the public-sector-led prisons: 
Private sector businesses generally have got the new prisons, 
better accommodations, a more decent environment, and they 
have got more freedom in how they respond to issues in the 
private sector. In public[-]sector prisons, we have very little 
autonomy because we are civil servants, like a big chiming cog 
that takes forever to change. (Participant 57, a head of prison 
governor’s union) 
In summary, some study participants perceived that high-security prisons were 
relatively protected from funding cuts. However, participants managing such 
establishments challenged this viewpoint, although the extent of the financial cuts 
might have been fewer compared to other kinds of prisons. The majority of the 
participants’ comments also suggested that, regardless of an institution’s 
management, all public and private prisons were subjected to funding reductions—
either via Benchmarking Exercises or competitive tendering process. Participants, 
moreover, believed that these funding reductions were detrimental to the long-term 




7.5  Prolonged impact of continued austerity measures on prisons  
Participants were asked to envisage the potential impact of continued austerity 
measures on prison health. Their responses chiefly focused on four themes: poorer 
health outcomes for prisoners, increased risk to the health of the community, more 
violent activities potentially leading to the loss of prison governance, and a rising rate 
of reoffending. These themes will be explicated below. 
Some participants suggested that more serious health complaints were filed by 
prisoners when they could not adequately access healthcare services. Some of 
these complaints were so severe that it was believed that a lack of adequate access 
to healthcare rendered the prisoners disabled or even resulted in death. Participant 
50, the head of legal of a national penal reform organisation, and Participant 15, an 
academic and former Cabinet Office advisor, argued, respectively: 
The seriousness of the complaints seems to have increased. 
Heart medication had not [been] provided, and diabetes 
medications were not available. People could die; it was that 
serious. They do not happen every week, but they are 
happening, things that really should not be happening. Massive 
delays to operations. Or even things like cancer treatment. They 
are just cancelling appointments. Broken bones not being taken 
to hospital. A prisoner actually has lost sight in one eye recently 
because he was not taken promptly to hospital.  
There have been two recent deaths in HMP Liverpool. Even the 
prison governor has attributed it to the shortage of mental health 
staff […] They could not find any mental health professional, let 
alone a highly qualified forensic mental health professional. The 
prisoners were left in limbo […] and they killed themselves after 
quite a long wait.  
A small number of national participants, particularly those dealing with prison health 
policies, were concerned that reduced access to and availability of healthcare in 
prisons would eventually place the wider health of society at risk—given that the 
majority of prisoners who came from the community would eventually return to their 
community. As Participant 2, a consultant for an international health organisation, 
stated: 
[P]rison is not an isolated entity […] If, as a result of the 
austerity measures, sexually transmitted diseases or 
communicable diseases within the prison system [are not] kept 
isolated only [to] prisons, it will also affect society in general. [I]t 
also applies to mental disease. If you release people from the 




because of insufficient care for them, that has an effect on 
society.  
Most participants agreed that the prolonged impacts of austerity would mean an 
augmented incidence of suicide and violent incidents and heightened reoffending 
and radicalisation. Participant 18, an academic and an advisor to a European 
administration organisation, stated: “The ultimate fear is that we reach a stage where 
we cannot maintain security or order or governance of our prisons”. In particular, 
Participant 11, an advisor to a European intergovernmental human rights 
organisation, made a similar comparison to the Strangeways riot that took place in 
April 1990, which was portrayed as a consequence of prolonged austerity measures. 
He asserted: 
[There] will be higher suicide rates in prisons, more riots, more 
hostage-taking situations, an increase in re-offending, and an 
increase in radicalisation. Look at austerity measures in the 
British prison service, for example, the Strangeways riot in 
1990. That was directly due to austerity measures, [with the] 
lack of staff monitoring the situation; prisoners being locked up 
for a long period of time, [and] they will eventually explode. The 
government has not learned from it. If they had, they would not 
be doing these austerity measures.  
Some participants working within the prison oversight role believed that a lack of 
access to purposeful activities (which were designed to foster a beneficial quality of 
life post-release) would keep the rate of reoffending high. As Participant 13, a 
former head of a prison inspectorate, stated: “[T]hey come out in a worse state of 
mind then they went in, [and] they are not going to be resettled immediately”. 
Another participants also suggested that the offending rate would rise. 
 [W]e have a high rank of recidivism in England. Many, many 
prisoners are recidivists. Very likely the reason is that even 
when they are released, they do not find a possibility to have a 
different life, a life from that they had before entering the prison. 
(Participant 19, a former president of a European anti-torture 
committee) 
Overall, participants noted that the prolonged impacts of austerity would result in 
more violence that could lead to the loss of prison governance. Accordingly, the 
continued impact of austerity, according to participants, could worsen health 
outcomes as a result of more risk-taking behaviours, thus likely placing the health of 




7.6   Challenges in commissioning and delivering prison healthcare services  
Alongside the direct impacts of austerity on prisoners and their living environment, 
many participants also reflected upon austerity impact on the broader commissioning 
and delivery structure of healthcare services across English prisons. This section will 
highlight participants’ opinions of how, despite the protected nature of prison 
healthcare funding from the government austerity measures, the commissioning and 
delivery of healthcare services remained challenging. These challenges ranged from 
the increasing levels of prisoners’ health complexities to the lack of systematic 
planning of healthcare workforces. Collectively, these combined to make the delivery 
of healthcare services in prisons increasingly untenable.  
The majority of participants were clear that funding of prison healthcare by the NHS 
England was protected from the government’s austerity measures. Nevertheless, 
they added a caveat: the increasing demands of prisoners made plateaued financing 
unsupportable. Several participants also revealed that their healthcare organisations 
were expected to absorb the increasing demands themselves, often without 
additional assistance from their commissioners. These demands included 
recruitment of staff and purchase of healthcare equipment, alongside unanticipated 
issues surrounding the burgeoning use of novel psychoactive substances in prisons. 
Two participants echoed these sentiments: 
Things have changed massively. Six years ago, we did not think 
about dying well in custody charters. We did not think about 
palliative care necessarily. We did not think about prisons being 
old people’s homes with a locked door. We did not think about 
dementia care in the same way that we are having to think 
about that now. We have now got a huge piece of work going 
on around acquired brain injury. We have embedded learning 
disability and difficulties within our primary care specifications to 
be alert to that. We have not got those nuanced things in place 
and now we are having to be responsive about that. (Participant 
36, an assistant head of health and justice of a national health 
organisation)  
The difficulty is increased strain on services and not being able 
to spend more money to recruit more staff, better equipment, 
and all the rest of it that would meet demands there. When we 
first had our health budget for the current prison, it was put 
together in 2014. Back then, we did not know much about novel 
psychoactive substances, so we budgeted less to what we 
need now. We are not getting more money to deal with it, so we 
manage things with difficulty. We always try to go back to 




always forthcoming. (Participant 70, a healthcare manager of an 
NHS trust in a resettlement prison) 
Participants also made comments that noted high staff turnover was an ongoing 
challenge across prison healthcare services. They reasoned that a combination of 
poor pay and working conditions dampened recruitment and retention of the 
healthcare workforce within the prison setting. This was mentioned by Participant 30, 
a senior commissioning lead of a justice ministry): 
Attracting staff to work in the NHS in prison setting is a massive 
issue. One of the biggest problems is rate of pay and the 
working conditions. All of which indicate that usually people are 
worn out because they are overworked and people feel 
undervalued.  
Recruitment and retention issues of the healthcare workforce was reflective of the 
general trend in the healthcare system in England. Running in parallel with the 
austerity problems, some participants within the healthcare remit argued that there 
had yet to be any systematic workforce planning to recruit continually healthcare 
staff to work in prisons:  
More people are leaving the system. A significant number of 
GPs have left the medical profession. Others plan to leave. We 
have got retirement figures for the next five to ten years and we 
are going to be left significantly short of prescribing doctors. 
Those are the people we employ in prisons. We do not have 
enough nurses. That is nationally. That is not just prison 
healthcare, that is every healthcare department. There are 
40,000 nurse vacancies. Yet, the government removed the 
training bursary […] We have never been more desperate for 
more nurses and more GPs. (Participant 55, a prison health 
lead of a national health organisation and magistrate) 
As a short-term adaptation, several participants mentioned that they had resorted to 
using agency staff, who were inevitably more expensive. At the same time, they 
acknowledged that this alternative ironically opposed the government’s cost-saving 
motivation, as it was a normalised trend in the health sector in England, prisons 
included. As Participant 73, the head of a private healthcare organisation at a 
resettlement prison, explained: 
An agency nurse is far more expensive than even a top band 5 
nurse. However, we understand that we need it to run the 
service. So, [it is a] short-term solution […], but that short-term 




Overall, though prison healthcare budgets were technically protected from the 
government austerity measures, participants reasoned that the stagnant level of 
funding was unsupportable. After all, a conjuncture of prisoners’ health complexities, 
the service providers’ inability to recruit staff and purchase equipment, and the 
unanticipated excessive use of psychoactive substances was overwhelming a 
prison’s workforce. In addition to the continual procurement cycle, participants 
argued that low salaries and unsafe working conditions had negatively impacted 
recruitment and retention of the prison healthcare workforce, an issue that was 
further intensified by the lack of systematic workforce planning across the health 
system in England. 
7.7  Intensification of prison healthcare and prison establishment 
privatisation  
 
This section will detail participants’ observations of the increasing privatisation of 
prison healthcare and prison services. Although the government framed privatisation 
measures as efficient and cost-saving, this section will show how participants 
objected to privatisation measures on the grounds of morality, quality, and 
accountability.  
7.7.1 Strengthening of privatisation post-2012 programmes 
Privatisation of prisons first occurred in the 1990s through transferring prison 
operations to the private sector (Ministry of Justice, 2019a). The move towards 
further privatisation was reinforced with the introduction of the Prison Unit Cost 
Programme 2012; it required public prisons to reduce their costs and remain as 
economically efficient as those in the private sector (House of Commons Justice 
Committee, 2012). Participants described how this programme facilitated 
outsourcing of most services to the private and not-for-profit sectors, leading to a 
fragmentation of services that affected prisoners’ quality of care:  
Chris Grayling21 privatised different sorts of services […] [L]ots 
of the services within a prison, for instance, estates 
management, healthcare, [and] substance misuse, were 
contracted out. [It] was a fragmentation of delivery. The 
privatisation absolutely affected the throughcare that prisoners 
might be getting. (Participant 28, a former head of a prison 
inspectorate) 
National participants, particularly those in a commissioning position, often argued 
that they had to remain committed, from a legal perspective, to finding the best 
provider for delivering penal services, irrespective of providers’ organisational 
 
21 The former Justice Secretary between 2012 and 2015 who instituted the Benchmarking Exercise to 




arrangement. As Participant 55, a prison health lead of a national health organisation 
and magistrate, stated: 
We do not have a [preference for the services to be delivered 
by] the public, voluntary, or private sector providers. [The 
invitation] goes out to open tender. It goes into the Official 
Journal of the European Union as a tender opportunity. It is 
made nationally available. People bid against the specification. 
We then have a process of reviewing all of these bids against 
the specification, in detail. The most qualified provider within the 
cost envelope is awarded the contract. If they are the best 
organisation to provide it, great. They can come in, and they 
can show their worth, and they can provide it.  
Despite the government’s framing of privatisation as an improvement in efficiency 
and support for cost-saving agendas, those who operated outside the government 
structure disagreed with this reasoning. To them, the government’s manoeuvres 
were politically motivated.  Participant 52, a head of policy of a national penal reform 
organisation, asserted that the government attempt was about “marketing the 
criminal justice system and breaking it up so it is possible to sell bits of it off and 
contract it out”.  
Considering the ideological nature of privatisation of prison healthcare and prison 
services, the majority of participants objected to the measures on the grounds of 
morality, quality, and efficiency, which will be explicated below. 
7.7.2 Participants’ objections vis-a-vis morality  
Many participants from different levels of governance and delivery objected on moral 
grounds to private entities’ administering punishment. They opined that punishment 
should be managed by the state rather than by a private organisation. Participant 23, 
an advisor to a European intergovernmental human rights organisation and an 
international drug and crime organisation, made a forceful argument: “[I]t was the 
state who took away the liberty of persons, so it is the state’s full responsibility, direct 
responsibility to care for prisoners in a direct way and not to outsource it”. Moreover, 
Participant 75, a prison governor of a closed prison with an urgent notification status, 
was of the view that “[…] there is something morally wrong around making a profit 
out of people’s misery”. 
Participants exposited that private prisons required more hands-on management, 
which could inevitably increase transaction costs. Further analysis revealed that 
many participants operating in a commissioning capacity felt that they had to 
safeguard the need to fulfil the health needs of prisoners against the desire of these 
private organisations to deliver services in a commercialised way. As Participant 53, 





They are always looking at their profit margins. So, there is 
always that awareness, from a commissioning point of view, 
that there is an organisation that is not just about making 
positive outcomes for prisoners, or providing the best[-]quality, 
high-quality services that are responsive to need. It is constantly 
in my head that they are also looking at their profit margins.  
These concerns were supported by those who ran private prison healthcare 
services. The relationship between cost and profit margin was explicitly recognised 
in these individuals’ day-to-day functioning. Participant 73, the head of a private 
healthcare organisation of a resettlement prison, illustrated this point: 
We review our budget each year with our finance manager. We 
have far more hospital escorts that are going out. I can request 
more money, but it obviously reduces any sort of profit margin 
there. We pay for the prison officers escorting, so if somebody 
is going out to hospital and the officers that are escorting that 
patient it comes out of the healthcare budget. For one day, it is 
a £1000; so, if somebody had one day in hospital just the 
escorting of themselves, £1000 comes out of the budget. It is a 
lot of money and that is not to mention anything to do with the 
hospital and the care that they are getting, just for the two 
officers to stand there for £1000 for 24 hours.  
In summary, participants were adamant that responsibility for administering 
punishment remained with the state. Those participants in the commissioning role 
attempted to safeguard service delivery by increasing their monitoring level towards 
private contractors. However, in so doing, it would inevitably increase the 
administrative burden and costs to the government, which was the opposite of the 
cost-saving and efficiency ambition of the state. 
7.7.3 Participants’ objections vis-à-vis quality  
Although nearly all participants protested privatisation on grounds of morality, their 
confuting it owing to quality concerns was slightly less consentient. A minority of 
participants perceived that the private sector was better able at introducing 
innovation than the government. For example, Participant 48, a lead investigator of a 
regulatory organisation, stated: “The private-sector organisations tend to take a 
rational and analytical approach to assessing the challenges of prisons and what 
they want to do.” As substantiated by Participant 84, a director of a private closed 
prison, argued: 




collect their medications remotely. It will take the pressure out of 
the queuing system which is on the in-house doctors […] I have 
seen those queues grow massively. The experience for the clinical 
staff there is not great and the infrastructure in the rooms means 
that the amount of medication cannot be dispensed properly. The 
experience for the prisoners to have to go and stand in those 
queues and the ability to manage in-possession medics is an 
absolute nightmare. They have to wait to be unlocked; they have 
to wait 20 minutes in the queue so you are normally looking on 
average 40 minutes roughly to get their medications at a time in 
which you are expected to do all the good things in the regime. We 
are very good at innovations.  
Furthermore, arguing from a self-interested viewpoint, Participant 73, a head of 
private healthcare organisation of a resettlement prison, averred that his organisation 
self-sustained itself by removing employee-related costs, such as sick pay and 
pensions for employees. As he asserted:  
We get a set amount of money from NHS England. They will not 
reduce it year on year; it is just a set amount of funding each 
month, where with other Trusts you know they are told to save 
the amount. The benefit for NHS England to have a private 
provider is that you have not got to worry about NHS pensions 
or NHS sick pay, because those costs are huge—aren’t they? I 
personally know nurses that work in the NHS that will have six 
months off sick every two years because they can get full pay.  
Whereas if a nurse here goes off sick, they do not get paid; they 
will get statutory sick pay after two weeks, which for us does not 
have any effect really. I think there is more accountability, so we 
are far more aware that we must fulfil contractual obligations, 
and we cannot rely on the wider NHS to fund us if we go way 
over budget.  
Most participants considered health a common good. They felt that access to health 
provisions should not be dictated by financial capabilities. Though access to 
healthcare was free at the point of access and delivery for prisoners, several 
participants echoed that introducing a financial framework that rations access to 
healthcare under a privatisation framework, however, could indirectly limit access to 
healthcare:  
[H]ealthcare is a public good. Once you put it into a setting 
where it becomes dependent on a resource, you instantly 
create a problem where you might have unequal access to that 
resource. It also changes the way in which medical 




limit on the scans we can do for this person? What is this 
person’s cover?” I really would resist that very strongly, 
because I think it changes the nature of the relationship 
between the professional and patient in ways that many 
professionals do not want to happen […]. [I]t is dangerous on a 
number of fronts. (Participant 18, an academic and advisor to a 
European administration organisation) 
NHS England gives £5 million a year to a private healthcare 
provider in [a closed male prison near London]. The provider then 
has to spread all of that money across all the different healthcare 
functions. Of course, its sub-contractors, like us, who have the 
lowest priority. So, they cut our substance misuse services to 
relieve the pressure on their other healthcare services. The market 
dictates de-prioritisation of our service, but the policy documents 
of NHS England and the Ministry of Justice say that responding to 
substance misuse in prisons is a top priority, and they are 
committed to reducing drug problems and providing drug 
treatment. The policy and the commissioning do not fit together. 
(Participant 66, the head of a substance misuse service operating 
in various closed prisons) 
Overall, although a minority of participants articulated the perceived superior quality 
of private contractors vis-a-vis innovation and financial savvy, there remained 
broader concerns around the inimical impacts on prisoners and prison workforces in 
private prisons. 
7.7.4 Participants’ objections vis-a-vis accountability  
Participants from the advocacy and inspection spheres, in particular, observed that 
private and not-for-profit organisations hid behind a veil of commercial 
confidentiality to avoid external scrutiny. Participant 52, the head of policy of a 
national penal reform organisation, stated that both the Ministry of Justice and 
private providers “would just pass the buck between each other when they get 
questioned by [our organisation]”. Participant 52 continued this argument:  
The Ministry of Justice will say: “Well, that prison is not run by 
us. That is run by G4S or Sodexo”. These providers, in turn, will 
say: “We are just following government policy. This is what we 
have agreed in our contracts regarding how we will deliver 
services”. They just push the responsibility backwards and 




Participant 39, a policy lead at a national penal reform organisation, further 
commented on the accountability of private companies in which the veil of 
confidentiality often thwarted their data sharing and transparency: 
It is much more difficult to get information about accountability 
from private companies because they will say that it is down to 
confidentiality. It also adds another layer of bureaucracy and 
another layer of information sharing, which can make it more 
difficult.  
Fragmented services, according to several participants within the monitoring role, 
could further sever the chain of accountability of these private businesses. As 
reminded by Participant 37, a health and social care lead of a national social care 
organisation, responsibilities remained with the government in ensuring that the 
services were appropriately delivered despite contracting out service provisions: 
You can contract out provision of services, but you do not 
contract out your responsibility. You are still responsible for 
ensuring services are delivered to the quality that is required to 
deliver the outcomes that are needed. Across health, social 
care, and indeed prisons and other aspect of public services.  
Some participants who managed private prisons dismissed some of the 
abovementioned monitoring concerns. For instance, Participant 84, a director of a 
closed private prison, claimed that the monitoring framework imposed on private 
prisons was, in fact, more stringent compared to public sector prisons. However, this 
scrutiny was predominantly undertaken by internal audit teams at private prisons, 
which raises the question of objectivity and conflict of interest. Echoing this 
sentiment, he stated: 
The governance in a private establishment is huge. We get a lot 
of scrutiny internally, because it is a risky business, and it can 
impact the rest of the business units which we provide 
elsewhere. We have an internal Controller Team. They monitor 
performance. We are set up against a group of KPIs, which is 
internal to the contract, but we are also then marked across the 
national baseline. We are held to account much more than our 
public sector counterparts in terms of scrutiny and delivery. We 
would argue that, actually, the audit process sometimes stifles 
the ability to do things differently […] and the private sector’s 
there to drive innovation in prisons.  
Thus far, participants tended to perceive privatisation of services as providing limited 




contractors scrutinised their own practices, led participants to question the 
transparency and objectivity of accountability measures. 
7.7.5 Burgeoning government appetite for privatisation despite failure of private 
contractors  
Finally, the bankruptcy of Carillion,22 as well as failures of the Community 
Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) in supervising low and medium risk of serious 
harm offenders in the community, triggered angst among most of the policy 
informants. Participant 43, the research lead of a national think tank, stated clear 
appreciation for the risks that emanated with outsourcing services: “Since Carillion’s 
collapse, there has been a clear recognition within government that contracting out is 
risky. We need to be aware of the financial standing of suppliers”. Similarly, 
Participant 55, a prison health lead of a national health organisation and magistrate, 
reflected on his experience in dealing with CRCs failing to deliver service objectives 
and left a service gap following service failure: 
I have absolutely no confidence in the CRCs at all. For instance, 
somebody in prison for two years; we have taken every bit of 
responsibility away from them for those two years. They are not 
allowed to decide when they go to bed, when they shower, when 
they eat, when they go to work, everything. That is all decided for 
them, they have no responsibility. Then we tip them out the door 
and expect them to all of a sudden be responsible members of 
society who can find themselves a GP, get themselves to the 
community drug services, all of those kinds of things—all of those 
things the CRCs should be doing. Getting a roof over their heads, 
getting their benefits sorted out. CRCs have done nothing, 
absolutely nothing. That is my experience from the ones that are 
local to me that I have had to work with. It is also echoed quite a 
lot elsewhere and in the official publications. Now that they have 
gone belly up, we have been left with a massive gaping hole.  
Well, more so at the end of people’s custodial sentences.  
Nevertheless, the appetite of the current government for contracting out services 
was observed by many participants, which indicated that lessons from Carillion’s 
debacle had yet to be learned. In fact, two new private prisons were under 
construction in 2019,23 despite various study participants’ observations of the two 
prisons’ poor track records of running the prison establishments. As reasoned by 
 
22 A private sector provider of prison maintenance that was responsible for 50 prisons across southern 
England in 2018 (House of Commons Library, 2018a). 
23 HMPs Wellingborough and Glen Parva were conceived as private-sector prisons (House of 




Participant 64, a head of a prison officers’ union, such an anomaly was 
counterintuitive: 
Birmingham got privatised in 2011, and we have just taken it 
back in the public sector—we said it would not work; it has not 
worked. It has not been profitable for G4S. They also have had 
Medway removed from them, because of the scandal with the 
juvenile offenders there, as highlighted by the Panorama 
programme.24 So, the Medway Youth Offending Institution 
came back into the public sector, [and] we did a good job there. 
Then they have just announced last week that that is going to 
be a secure school run by a Christian Charity called Oasis, and 
we never heard of them before. So, it seems that these private 
companies can mess up, lose contracts but they are still 
allowed to bid for new contracts. It does not make sense at all. 
It is not value for money for the taxpayers.  
To summarise, participants observed that outsourcing services, healthcare prison 
services included, ran counter to the government’s objectives of greater service 
efficiency and cost savings. Rather, it resulted in fragmented service delivery, inferior 
quality of services, and a requisite higher degree of monitoring than with public-
sector providers—thus adding to the government’s overall costs. Yet, the continuing 
desire for increased privatisation of prison healthcare and prison services signifies 
political irrationality and supported participants’ observation that it was an ideological 
manoeuvre.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated the impacts of austerity on prison health governance 
and delivery of healthcare services across English prisons. According to participants, 
reductions in the size of prison workforces and plateaued prison healthcare funding 
for NHS England had resulted in compromised accessibility to and quality of prison 
healthcare services. Postponement and cancellation of healthcare appointments, 
increased waiting times, and insufficient consultation time with healthcare 
professionals were cited examples of deterioration of healthcare services. The 
paucity of access to purposeful activities had further adversely affected prisoner 
existing debilitation. Consequently, violent episodes and risk-taking behaviour—such 
as self-harm and drug misuse—had dramatically amplified, resulting in a rising 
incidence of medical emergencies. 
Notably, participants’ comments varied regarding how austerity impacted certain 
types of prisons. Participants noted that prolonged austerity measures had led to 
 
24 The Ministry of Justice took over Medway Youth Offender Institution from G4S in 2016 following 




more violence, rising risk-taking behaviours, increases in reoffending, and 
augmented risks to public health. Considering the decline in the level of governance 
and authority, several participants noted the heightened incidence of prison gangs 
and its attendant harm to vulnerable prisoners and staff.  
Participating healthcare policymakers and service providers also reasoned that 
prisoners’ health complexities, alongside the ongoing recruitment and retention 
problems of healthcare staff, intensified the commissioning and delivery of 
healthcare across English prisons. Additionally, they were critical of the 
intensification of privatisation of prison healthcare and prison services (underway 
since 2012). Contradicting the political perception that private sector organisations 
delivered cost savings and improved efficiency of these services, most participants 
objected to the privatisation manoeuvre on the grounds of questionable morality, 
decreased quality, and reduced accountability. Yet, the government’s future plans 
signalled that augmented privatisation activities were on the horizon, signifying 
political irrationality.  
 
The next chapter will examine how prison issues that are running in the backdrop 
have intensified governance and delivery of prison healthcare across English 
prisons. These pertain to the longstanding issues of overcrowding and cleanliness of 
prison establishments, as well as reduction of resources in the community, thus 
relegating prison healthcare to become the safety net for vulnerable individuals, and 
the adverse sentencing policy and high turnover of prison political leadership. These 






Chapter 8: The longstanding prison issues that exacerbate austerity impacts 
on prison health  
Introduction  
This chapter focuses on participants’ comments regarding the long-standing issues 
of English prisons that have exacerbated austerity’s impacts on prison health. This 
chapter explores participants’ accounts of how the living and built environment of 
prisons, as well as the sentencing commitment of the government and the effects of 
reduced welfare provisions in the community—which increasingly have relegated 
prisons to the role of first responders for vulnerable adults—have inimically 
intensified the experience of imprisonment and affected the delivery of services in 
prisons during periods of austerity. It analyses participants’ observations of how the 
high turnover of justice ministers over the last ten years has resulted in the lack of 
policy coherence in prisons. Accordingly, this chapter demonstrates how most of 
these foregoing factors have further reinforced existing prison instability despite pre-
dating and existing independently of austerity.  
8.1 Living and built environment 
This section will illustrate how the living environment of prisons can intensify the 
experience of imprisonment and affect the delivery of services in prisons during 
periods of austerity. In particular, it will detail the issues of overcrowding and 
cleanliness of prison establishments. 
A few participants operating outside the national prison health system articulated 
concerns about the effects of prison overcrowding. To them, although overcrowding 
has been a historical issue pre-dating austerity, periods of austerity exacerbated the 
deterioration of prisoners’ living conditions. They proffered that overcrowding has led 
to ‘warehousing’ individuals and an increasing level of violence among prisoners. 
Both Participant 4, an advisor to a European intergovernmental human rights 
organisation, and Participant 8, a policy lead of a European public-sector trade union 
organisation, made similar points: 
[T]he single, most corrosive element in any prison system is 
overcrowding. We end up warehousing people and cannot 
provide any level of appropriate service when we have 
overcrowding. What the United Kingdom did in the mid-1980s 
was a classic mistake—it built more prisons. If you build more 
prisons, all you are going to do is end up with more prisoners. 
It’s simple.  
Prison overcrowding is not getting any better. It triggers 
violence and aggression, [which contributes to] an aggressive 




situation in prison services was certainly not good before 2008, 
but austerity measures have exacerbated a situation that was 
already very fragile.  
Many participants also argued that prisoner hygiene has become progressively 
worse, as prisoners’ cells were now harmful living environments. Participant 4, an 
advisor to a European intergovernmental human rights organisation, asserted that 
such poor prison conditions were unacceptable in a developed country:  
I was shown [a category B male prison in North West of 
England]. I looked at the level of dirt, the level of non-upkeep of 
material conditions, never mind the provision of services. It was 
really distressing to see. I expect to see conditions like that in 
some of the Balkan countries I am working in. I do not expect to 
see conditions like that in England. It is sending a much bigger 
message than austerity. It is sending the message that we just 
do not care. That we do not care about prisons; we do not care 
that they are not viewed as individuals. Then we wonder why 
they do not respond to our interventions to make them better 
citizens when we are actually demonstrating to them that 
society does not care.  
Collectively, participants argued that these adverse experiences added to feelings 
of hopelessness for both staff and prisoners, which compromised the safety of the 
working and living environment. Comments from Participant 75, a prison governor 
of a closed prison with an urgent notification status, and Participant 57, a head of a 
prison governor’s union, illustrated this view: 
There is a lack of hope there for both the prisoner and the member 
of staff. They do not want to work in a dingy, violent place.  
We have got two people in a cell made for one person. We are 
overcrowded in many of our prisons, so this all adds to the kind of 
hopelessness that people in prison feel: “They do not care about 
me. I am locked up most of the day because there is no staff to 
unlock me, and when the staff unlock me, they are so busy, they 
have not got time to talk to me. They put me in this filthy rat-
infested cell; they do not help me; they do not do anything for me”. 
This can really impact stability. They become disaffected people or 
give up, feeling that the whole of society has let them down, so 
that anger builds and then spills over.  
Although it is a historical issue, participants asserted that prison overcrowding had 




could snowball, heightening the feeling of hopelessness among prisoners and staff 
and leading to violence among prisoners. 
8.2  Loss of resources in the community 
Although less prevalent in the transcript analysis, some national and local 
participants shared in-depth discussions about the loss of community resources 
contributing to high imprisonment rates. According to the participants’ accounts, 
austerity had resulted in a loss of community, social, and welfare services, especially 
when “the deterioration in the community will eventually catch up with prisons, and 
vice versa” (Participant 56, a regional head of health and justice commissioning for 
the National Health Service).  
Some participants who developed prison health policies believed that prisons were 
increasingly becoming first responders when community provisions were no longer 
available to vulnerable individuals. Although this trend pre-dated austerity, 
participants perceived that austerity exaggerated it since community services were 
also affected by adverse fiscal measures. Participant 32, a regional health and 
justice lead of a health organisation, painted the following picture:  
You think about the criminal justice system, the number of 
people who have mental health problems, and who live in 
poverty and their childhood experiences. Austerity is going to 
affect all the services that they would have gone to for support. 
People who slipped through the net will end up going to prison 
now, whereas before, there might have been a bit more support 
around to help them. Once that gets cut back or taken away, it 
leads to more problems. You just have to look at the homeless 
people in the street to realise there is an issue, and a lot of 
those homeless people would have been in and out of custody.  
Participants working across English prisons talked about the visibility of austerity’s 
impacts on the community in their daily operations. Participant 58, a prison governor 
of a closed prison with an urgent notification status, reported: 
A lot is going on, which means that we are throwing more and 
more people into prison, and it was always the case that 
austerity affected services on the outside. Probation officers are 
stretched. Social workers are stretched. Health visitors are 
stretched. We all know that when those services are stretched, 
the default position becomes prison. When people end up in 
prison, it is because all of those areas outside have failed. And 
the reason that they are failing more is that those services are 
stretched and un-resourced and all that kind of stuff. It is easier 




more and more complicated and challenging people. The 
vulnerability from outside is simply imported inside, making our 
jobs really, really tough.  
Similarly, albeit in a non-prison position, Participant 15, an academic and former 
Cabinet Office advisor, made comments linking economic downturns to increased 
crime rates and incarcerations. In particular, former ex-servicemen who had no 
employment following their deployment overseas, due in part to the closure of 
manufacturing industries following government austerity measures, had led to a 
scarcity of employment opportunities: 
In Cambridgeshire and Essex, we have a lot of ex-military 
servicemen. They lost all sense of purpose in life coming back 
from the wars. They do not go straight from military service to 
prison; their life unravels over a year or two. Drinking heavily, 
battering their wives and children, becoming homeless, and 
eventually ending up in prisons. They were overwhelming in 
prison for violent offences while drunk. When you are a fit, 
young twenty-four-year-old who has had army training and you 
get drunk outside a pub and hit somebody, you are likely to do 
actual bodily harm, so you are going to get a custodial 
sentence. Similarly, we saw [the closure] of many traditional 
industries, like the steel industry in South Wales and North 
Lincolnshire. Around 11,000 young men were laid off by Ford in 
one year. Guess what? Problems of domestic violence, alcohol, 
and drug use in the same year went through the roof. This is 
how austerity at a national level can contribute to offending.  
Participants particularly noted that these institutions are not appropriately equipped 
to deal with social issues: “The government is committed to this kind of notion that 
we can imprison our way out of our social problems” (Participant 52, a head of policy 
of a national penal reform organisation). Similarly, due to declining community 
provisions, Participant 65, an NHS Trust service manager for mental health, 
illustrated how institutions could not divert these vulnerable individuals from prisons, 
despite opportunities to do so. As he declaimed: 
We are seeing an increase in the number of people that need to 
be sectioned, for example, into the Mental Health Act, coming into 
prison. [They] potentially would have been diverted out of the 
criminal justice system at the police custody stage. Now, that is 
muddied because only those who are eligible for Psychiatric 
Intensive Care Unit (PICU) beds—charged with lower-end 
offences—would be eligible for that. But you will get some that are 
clearly mentally unwell and are charged with quite serious 




Overall, participants reiterated that the paucity of community health and welfare 
services—owing to austerity—has indirectly contributed to the current high 
imprisonment rate. Several of them observed how prisons increasingly became 
health and welfare institutions for vulnerable individuals. Thus, they felt that prisons 
were not adequately equipped to deal with social issues. They further noted that 
attempts to divert prisoners with mental health issues from prisons had been 
thwarted because of declining community resources.  
8.3  Lengthier and more punitive sentencing policies 
Many participants articulated how sentencing policies had impaired prison healthcare 
governance and delivery in three distinct ways: 1) statutory obligations—both pre-
2010 and post-2010 austerity implementation—that ensured longer and harsher 
sentencing practices; 2) successful prosecutions for sexual offences; and 3) financial 
incentives for the CRCs in recalling individuals failing to comply with their release 
terms back into prisons. 
Several participants suggested that historical statutory obligations, particularly those 
pre-2010, maintained the high imprisonment rate. Citing the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 and the Indeterminate Sentences for Public Protections, prison sentence 
lengths for several serious crimes had dramatically increased despite a diminishing 
crime level and police resources. As Participant 40, a penal reformist, explained: 
We performed an analysis of what the prison population would 
be if you did not have the mandatory minimum and increased 
maximum sentences in the 2003 Criminal Justice Act, including 
tariffs for indeterminate sentences. The prison population would 
now be 16,000 fewer than it currently is if the 2003 Act had not 
been passed. The courts did what they were told. That is why 
we have got the prison population we have got. The number of 
people getting short prison sentences has fallen dramatically. 
Crime overall has been falling for most of the last three 
decades. Police resources in the last few years have dropped. 
Courts have closed. All of these are substantial brakes on the 
increase of the prison population, but the foot on the accelerator 
is sentencing.   
Several participants also cited successful prosecutions of sexual offences under 
Operation Yewtree as a contributing factor toward longer incarceration terms. To 
them, this was part of the reason for failure to reduce the prison population despite 
the sizeable cut to prison funding. Participant 30, a senior commissioning lead of a 
justice ministry, noted: 
We are bringing in a new wave of longer-term prisoners with 




serious crimes are taking place [and that is] why people are 
getting much longer sentences. It is also worthy to note that 
historical child sex offences and paedophile rings, who have 
been brought to justice, quite rightly, have spiked our prison 
population, as there are an awful lot of people coming into 
custody. I think all of those things contribute to why the prison 
population is not reducing dramatically despite lesser budgets.  
Participant 36, the assistant head of health and justice for a national health 
organisation, stated that the CRCs had had a financial incentive to recall individuals 
who did not comply with their release terms to prison. She argued that this incentive 
contributed towards maintaining the high incarceration rate: 
The CRC contracts and managing people in the community are 
really problematic. You give your contracts the financial 
incentive to send people back to prison, and you wonder why 
your prison numbers shoot through the roof. It is because you 
have given CRCs a financial incentive to simply go back on a 
28-day recall, so people are in and out for 28 days. Somebody 
was supervising them in the community previously, whereas 
now that is not the case. So that is why we see a growth in 
people being recalled for not complying with the licence as well. 
Go figure.  
When the participants were asked why imprisonment trends did not demonstrate 
signs of abating despite austerity, some insinuated that the expense of punitive 
politics had not yet translated into a political realisation. For instance, Participant 50, 
the head of legal for a penal advocacy organisation, articulated that, while sending 
people to prisons aligned with the political promises of being tough on crime, doing 
so came with a hefty price tag: 
Quite a lot of [Ministry of Justice] policies cost money. Locking 
up so many people is very, very expensive. All research shows 
that community punishments actually work much better to 
prevent re-offending and keeping down crime. Governments are 
spending much more money than they need because of this 
punitive agenda; they want to be seen as very tough.  
Perhaps tellingly, when participants functioning outside the civil service questioned 
prison officials on the actual costs of imprisonment that they believed necessitated 
cost-saving measures, that metric was not forthcoming. Participant 13, former chief 
inspector of prisons, echoed this reality: 
I [asked] the person in charge of the finances in the Home Office, 




Nobody can tell me yet. People do not know how much they 
actually need to do all of the things they should do with all 
prisoners. If they assessed all those with mental health problems 
and how much it costs to deal with them properly, I think that they 
would be horrified. Then, at last, the public would know the gap 
between what is needed and what is provided. I think then that 
people would start to look for other ways of getting around it.  
Though a few participants believed that the magistrates and judges could have 
resisted sending people to prisons, Participant 55, who also worked as a justice of 
the peace, provided a nuanced perspective on sentencing practices. This 
informant’s experience suggested that judges and magistrates were inevitably 
constricted by sentencing guidelines—despite their best intentions to avoid 
awarding custodial sentences. He further explained how the sentencers were 
obligated to follow the will of the government: 
Some of it comes down to the understanding and attitude of 
sentencers. Some sentencers will have been in a prison once in 
their entire life, as a part of their recruitment to the magistracy, 
when they will have been required to carry out a prison visit. I 
am fortunate as a magistrate in that, as a commissioner, I am in 
prisons two or three times a week, so I get to see a lot of 
different prisons. I bring that perspective to the bench as a 
sentencer. Additionally, magistrates always work from the 
starting point of what the sentencing guidelines say; if the 
sentencing guidelines say this would normally be a custodial 
sentence, you have got to have a really good reason not to 
follow that through. Often, there is no good reason why people 
still tend to get sent to prison, even for short sentences.  
Overall, participants observed how the historical and recent legislation, which had 
mandated increasingly lengthier and more punitive sentences—as well as the 
subsequent Yewtree Operation for historical sexual crimes in 2012—ensured a high 
incarceration rate in England and Wales. A few participants also blamed the CRCs’ 
incentivised sentencing policy for England’s high incarceration rate.  
 
8.4  Constant ministerial turnover that intensified prison instability  
This section analyses participants’ accounts of the ministerial turnover, which has 
coincided with austerity, that has further contributed towards existing prison 
unpredictability. Additionally, the section explores how some participants—especially 
those working across English prisons—blamed their senior managers for not 
providing correct advice to these ministers, thus reinforcing operational instability 




National policymaking participants have often linked prison service reorganisation to 
the rapid turnover of politicians overseeing the justice portfolio. The majority of 
participants compared the high turnover of Justice Ministers—seven Ministers since 
2010—to other ministerial portfolios—such as the health department, which only 
had three Ministers during the same period (HM Government, 2020a; HM 
Government, 2020b). At the time of the interview, Participant 16, the head of a 
European education association, said: “We have had five justice secretaries in six 
years, and the sense of no one really wanting to take this on”.  
Because the criminal justice reform programmes have dovetailed with the 
ministerial revolving door, several participating policymakers expressed dismay 
towards prison officials’ reactivity engendered by the reactive reforms. Participant 
32, the regional health and justice lead of a health organisation, had this opinion: 
The constant policy changes and the lack of stability have 
meant that everybody has been caught up in this process of 
nothing staying still. You can never get good at something if the 
goalposts are always moving, and things are always changing. 
You do not have a stable workforce. People do not become 
competent at what they are doing. You are always trying to 
cover the gaps in the delivery of services.  
In addition, these policies were often viewed as being short-term. At the time of the 
interviews, several participants praised the erstwhile Justice Minister, David Gauke 
(2018-2019), for having proposed a more liberal prison reform. However, they also 
questioned the continuity of his proposals, given the short-term nature of prison 
leadership. Participant 33, a regional health and justice lead of a health organisation, 
echoed this idea: 
David Gauke [Secretary of State for Justice] said short 
sentences are a nightmare. It sounds fantastic. But is he going 
to be here in 12 months? Two years? Ten years? What is his 
legacy? You have got to think about his legacy as well. 
Governments change. We have got Brexit. There is so much 
going on. If he is still in, I am sure he will see it through. If he 
decides to go in a different direction from his current job or 
things change dramatically with Brexit, who takes forward that 
legacy, or do we still sit treading water?  
As a result, many participants functioning in English prisons, predominantly prison 
governors, raised concerns about this disconnection’s impact on their daily 
operations. Participant 75, a prison governor of a closed prison with an urgent 
notification status, recalled personal frustrations over having the ‘digitalisation’ 
programme in his establishment blocked by a new minister who believed that prison 




principle of less eligibility, suggesting that conditions of life in prison must be set 
lower than conditions for the poor in the community (Sim, 2002). As Participant 75 
opined: 
There was a rollout of digitalisation where each prisoner was 
going to get in-cell computer access. The prisoners could use it 
to interact with the prison systems, whether that was booking a 
visit or an appointment to see a doctor, et cetera. One of the 
ministers, I will not name which one, came in, and he just pulled 
the plug on that. He argued that not everybody in the 
community had a computer. Not everybody in the community 
could book an appointment online […] It would have made 
things much more efficient in the establishment. We have now 
got a halfway house where they have not got a computer, but 
there are kiosks on the landing. So, that is where the 
government can impact an establishment’s running, an 
institution depending on what we might call it.  
Furthermore, these participants questioned the ability of senior prison management 
to advise ministers adequately. Such managers were portrayed as being complicit 
with ministers by legitimising their agenda rather than representing the workforce’s 
views. Indeed, their criticisms suggested that senior management would rather 
support ministerial intentions than exhibit independence from the politicians (e.g., “a 
sycophant” [Participant 64, a head of prison officers’ union), “a kiss-ass” (Participant 
82, a senior prison officer of a high-security prison), and “a yes, sir attitude” 
(Participant 79, a deputy governor of a closed prison with urgent notification status). 
In an accusatory tone, Participant 67, the prison governor of an open prison, noted: 
The Chief Executive and her senior management team are always 
looking up, trying to appease ministers and work with ministers, 
rather than looking at and trying to take the organisation forward. 
We are supposed to be an executive agency, and we should not 
have that level of interference from ministers. But we do, and that 
is hugely frustrating.  
In summary, the study’s national and local participants perceived that the rapid 
turnover of justice ministers and their prison reforms, as well as their perceptions of 
prison rehabilitation, tended to lead to a disconnection between strategic policies and 
local operations. This phenomenon was further intensified during austere periods. 
Several participants, especially those working on the ground, also believed that 
senior managers’ failure in advising ministers appropriately and pandering to them 





This chapter described longstanding prison issues that have intensified prison 
instability during austere times, including overcrowding and the increasingly poor 
living conditions in English prisons. Participants also linked austerity to a rise in 
violent crime among former ex-service members and manufacturing industry 
closures, combined with diminishing community welfare and social services. As 
such, certain social services have been implicitly relegated to prisons, even though 
they are punishment institutions. They also reasoned how a lengthier and harsher 
sentencing policy and the rapid turnover of politicians have cumulatively exposed the 
prison service’s lack of resilience, impacting the governance and delivery of prison 
health in England.  
The next chapter will illustrate participants’ perspectives on recent government 
policies putatively intended to ameliorate austerity’s impacts. In particular, the 






Chapter 9: Government responses to the increasing prison instability and the 
effectiveness of prison monitoring mechanisms 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses participants’ perspectives on recent government policies 
intended to ameliorate the impact of austerity. The narrative predominantly pivots on 
the nationwide recruitment campaign for new prison officers since 2016, highlighting 
the evident dichotomy between national and local participants’ responses regarding 
the quantity and quality of these new officers. It also illuminates the broader effects 
on prison healthcare governance and delivery—both highly dependent upon the 
prison regime’s stability. 
The next section explores participants’ opinions of the effectiveness of the key 
scrutinising mechanisms for prison healthcare and prison regime—particularly 
internal forums, trade unions, the HMIP, and parliamentary inquiries—in mitigating 
the impacts of austerity on prisons. Then, participants’ beliefs about how well third 
sector organisations advocate on behalf of prisoners are described. 
The final section details most national and local participants’ tentative acceptance of 
the political announcements that austerity was coming to an end. The discussion 
concludes with an analysis of participants’ perceptions about the extent to which 
Brexit may prolong austerity, at least in its immediate aftermath, following the 
predicted decline in economic growth.  
9.1 Recruitment of new prison officers since 2016 
This section will highlight participant perceptions of recruitment of new prison 
officers—since the effort’s beginning in 2016—as part of the government’s response 
to mitigating the increasing prison instability across England. It will explore 
participant beliefs on the extent to which the recruitment campaign had successfully 
improved delivery of prison regime and prison healthcare delivery.  
In response to the increasing magnitude of violence in prisons across England and 
Wales, the government launched its nationwide recruitment campaign in 2016 to 
recruit 2,500 new prison officers, a move that was part of the Prison Safety and 
Reform White Paper 2016 (Ministry of Justice, 2016). Participants were asked 
whether these new prison officers improved prison safety and whether they 
facilitated prison healthcare governance and delivery. Many directly involved in 
delivery of the campaign viewed the recruitment campaign as a success. Per 
Participant 30, a senior commissioning lead at a justice ministry: 
We have successfully recruited 2,500 prison officers. The 




benefits of them coming online. It is heart-warming to see the 
number of new officers on the landings.  
Some participants who were on the frontline—particularly new prison staff 
members—believed the new prison staff had brought complementary skills to the 
existing workforce (e.g., IT skills) and values (e.g., concerns for diversity, regard for 
rehabilitation) that were reflective of the outside world. In voicing this perception, 
Participant 72, a prison officer of a resettlement prison, expostulated: 
We bring in new skills that we need. We are quite savvy about 
using computers. We have got a different way of thinking. We 
have open minds. Our mindsets are open to divisive issues, for 
example, the issues of equality and prisoner rehabilitation. We 
have been exposed to a lot of things outside prisons, so it does 
help.  
However, most participants operating at all prison levels challenged these positive 
narratives. Participant 64, a head of a prison officers’ union, for instance, declaimed 
that the recruitment campaign had not reinstated the number of prison officers 
present during pre-austerity measures: 
We do not have the investment we would like. When austerity first 
came in, we lost over 7,000 front line prison officer posts. They 
were all experienced staff. Since that time, we have saved over 
£900 million for the taxpayers, but cuts have dire consequences 
because we have never been in such a poor state. So, we want 
that reinvestment. We want those pre-austerity staffing levels 
reinstated. We want that £900 million reinvested because, so far, 
despite the bold announcements from the government on the 
prison officers’ recruitment, we have only had about £300 million 
put back in. It is simply not enough. You cannot run justice on the 
cheap.  
Beyond the paucity of a sufficient number of prison officers, most prison governors 
and officers agreed that the new prison officers lacked the physical and emotional 
agility or soft skills—such as communication and befriending—needed to perform 
their duties effectively for prisoner rehabilitation and the broader prison regime. As 
Participant 63, a prison officer at an open prison, explained: 
Some of the new officers have not got the physical ability [yet], 
and they are being passed through the training. We have to do 
some remedial training with them, which we are not meant to 
do, because we do not have the extra training resources. When 
you ask them the sports they have done at school and college, 




they are a lot less confident in doing physical interventions. So, 
having somebody my size come up threatening them might 
seem intimidating […] They only get 37 hours of Control and 
Restraint Training. They do not have the physical and mental 
confidence to challenge prisoners, and they will not challenge 
the prisoners […] [Furthermore,] a lot of the newer staff also do 
not know how to have a talk with the prisoners. There is a joke 
that they need emoji cards to talk to some prisoners! They 
prefer to work behind the screen, behind their phone and do not 
like to do much one-to-one engagement with individuals. We do 
not have many screens in the prison; it is all personal face-to-
face contact.  
Additionally, many participants working in operational capacities commented on the 
perpetual cycle of recruitment and retention. They believed this cycle stemmed from 
dangerous working environments (as discussed in chapter 7) and a dearth of 
employment benefits. Participant 78 (from above) explained: “It is just a constant 
cycle of getting new [officers]. Some will just resign in the first week; some will just 
do the training then resign. It never ends”. Further doubting a prison as a place for 
employment owing to safety concerns, Participant 36, an assistant head of health 
and justice of a national health organisation, stated: 
When Michael Spurr (the then Chief Executive Officer of 
HMPPS) said to me before he left [in March 2019], “Well, now we 
have recruited 2,000 people”. What he failed spectacularly to tell 
me was that 45% of those people had left after the first week. 
You do not think you will get knifed with a sharpened toothbrush 
every time you go to work. Let’s face it. We are not talking about 
pink, fluffy bunnies here. There are some nasty bastards in our 
prisons. What you do need to be is risk-aware and not be a 
puppy, thinking you are going to save the world. And you have 
had just six weeks of training, which amounts to nothing because 
actually, you have not got the life skills to manage somebody.  
A small number of participating prison governors believed that linking the new 
officers to the necessary cultural change and values connected to prisoner 
rehabilitation was more important than merely having a sufficient number of officers 
working on the grounds. This point is illustrated from the following remark from 
Participant 58, a prison governor of a closed prison with an urgent notification 
status: 
Recruitment on its own is just not sufficient. It should be linked to 
some purpose, visions, and values […] You can have a lot of 
officers swarming around, but if they are not interacting with our 




around in huddles, it changes nothing. It makes them feel better, 
but it does not necessarily improve things. Recruitment has been 
massively pivotal […] but the fundamental message has to be that 
“You are not just there to turn and un-turn, lock and unlock those 
people. You are there because you have got a purpose”. That is 
really important. 
Nevertheless, according to participants, the existing recruitment-retention-
recruitment cycle has created ongoing operational uncertainty amid institutional 
crises. Consequently, following a low level of retention among prison officers, 
several participants observed that the rate of registered overtime across institutions 
remained high. This has affected delivery of the prison regime and supporting 
services, including healthcare. As Participant 78, a senior prison officer of a closed 
prison asserted: “In every prison, there is a ridiculous amount of overtime. Even 
though the numbers have gone up, there is still not enough staff to cover the work. 
This has adversely impacted other services, including healthcare”.  
In summary, although several national participants felt that the initial recruitment 
campaign for new prison officers (beginning in 2016) was a success, most 
participants thought that it had not ameliorated prison instability. Many of them 
questioned the calibre of new prison officers, perceived the retention rate among 
new prison officers to be low, and attributed that low rate to insufficient training. 
Consequently, dangerous working environments in prisons have been amplified, 
which could potentially affect the prison workforce’s long-term sustainability. 
9.2   Limits of scrutiny mechanisms 
Despite the existence of internal and external inquiry mechanisms in England to hold 
the government accountable, participants across all levels uniformly felt that these 
mechanisms did not appear to have had impact in mitigating the effects of austerity 
on prison health governance and healthcare delivery. This section will explore these 
views in detail, especially failure of them to exercise scrutiny. It will conclude by 
analysing opinions on the third sector organisations’ advocacy activities that were 
involved in prison healthcare governance and delivery.  
9.2.1 Internal scrutiny 
 
When national participants were asked about the existence of oversight mechanisms 
to hold the government accountable in implementing the austerity policy, those in the 
civil service mentioned scrutiny structure of the prison health governance spanning 
internal and external measures. According to them, these measures were specific to 
prison healthcare and crosscut among partners in the health and justice sector. The 




The NHS England Clinical Reference Group has been used to 
take on specific areas and challenges in delivering healthcare 
services across prisons. Discussion at that level can obviously 
fuel strategic thinking for policymakers, who have that line of 
sight into the ministers and can create compelling cases to 
unlock funding and resources. There is a route through there to 
get some agenda service. We have also had some interesting 
dialogue through round tables with HMPPS. There is something 
about those cross-cutting areas, involving the Home Office, 
Ministry of Justice, and NHS England via the National 
Partnership Board (Participant 34, the head of a national prison 
health charity) 
Similarly, as civil service employees, those working as prison governors and officers 
typically raised issues concerning the unsustainable reduction in resources to their 
line managers, usually in their monthly supervision meeting. Refrains, such as “I can 
escalate it to my manager, which means that I have covered myself if it all goes 
horribly wrong” (Participant 67, a prison governor of an open prison) and “I could 
raise it to my line manager and governor, and then it is up to them to take it forward” 
(Participant 74, a senior prison officer of a resettlement prison), broadly mirrored the 
prevailing command-and-control nature of the prison service. 
Similar to the attitude of several policymakers in this study who avoided using the 
word “austerity” in their interview responses (see section 6.3), most participants 
operating at the operational level across English prisons also did not employ the 
word “austerity” when discussing delivery issues with their line management. They 
recognised that the term had political undertones. Instead, they self-censured 
themselves by retailing how reductions in resources had adversely impacted their 
daily governance and the prison regime’s delivery. Accordingly, services such as 
healthcare were negatively affected. This was because they felt it was more 
appropriate for the discussion with their senior managers as it was framed in a 
neutral tone. Example from Participant 71, a prison governor at a resettlement prison 
expatiated on this point: 
I cannot start making career-defining arguments with my boss, so I 
have to be very diplomatic in talking about austerity. I do not make 
any argument that says I am making excuses for poor 
performance. We all have a sense of duty to do the best we can, 
so austerity is never discussed directly. But we have always 
discussed its impact, using examples of staffing issues, for 
instance […] I pick my battles to appear as though I am never 
unreasonable.  
Participants’ narratives also frequently mentioned the expectation of maintaining 




“Our conditions of service restrict us from getting drawn into government policy […] 
Our role in public services is to deliver government policy, and not to challenge it in 
that regard”. Similarly, Participant 86, a prison governor of a women’s prison, 
opined: “We are civil servants, so we become the agent of austerity because we 
deliver the austerity programme of the government”.  
A few participants compared prison to other public services, such as the police, 
whose voice was perceived to be more independent and transparent in publicising 
the fiscal cuts. Participant 67, a prison governor of an open prison, exposited that 
the opacity afforded imposing austerity measures without proper scrutiny. He 
stated: 
Unlike the police, we are a greatly hidden department. We are an 
easy target for the government in terms of austerity. The risk is 
that the damage caused by that [austerity] was predominantly 
behind closed doors and was not seen by the public. Only in the 
last year or so did the public start to wake up to the fact that the 
staff are subject to increasing levels of violence and issues within 
prison, such as drugs and mobile phone smuggling. Health, safety, 
and employment problems are all wrapped up into one.  
Moreover, participants were questioned about whether they could raise issues 
about austerity and how that ability had affected the prison regime via the PGA and 
the POA. Several participants felt that being part of these unions afforded them 
more opportunity to question austerity compared to those who operated at the 
national level—and thus had to remain visibly neutral.25 Participant 78, a senior 
prison officer in a closed prison, further articulated: 
[The POA] does a lot of publicity in the media. We also have good 
relationships with a lot of the Labour politicians and some of the 
Tory ones as well. We have done parliamentary drop-ins. A few 
weeks back, we invited all the staff who have been assaulted to 
tell politicians their story, and there were some really, really 
powerful stories. A younger female prison officer from [a Category 
B prison in Lincolnshire] stood up in a room full of people and told 
everyone about her assault when she had urine and faeces thrown 
at her because she dared to say no to a prisoner. Another male 
prison officer, in tears, said how he was assaulted really badly, 
ending up in the hospital, with his children visiting him and asking 
whether he was going to die.  
 
25 For instance, in 2018, national prison officers called for a strike because of unsafe working 




Other than those few contrarians, scepticism about trade unions’ having any 
effective influence on overturning the austerity measures that have been harmful to 
governance was at the forefront of most participants’ narratives. As an example, 
Participant 86, a prison governor of a women’s prison, questioned: 
Have they made any difference? Not really! [laughs] They are not 
effective. They will appear on the media occasionally, but I am not 
sure what impact that actually has. I am not sure whether their 
voice is heard or taken any notice of in the right places.  
Some other participants believed that unions were campaigning for austerity issues 
situated in broader political discussions. The effects of such efforts were felt across 
the public sector rather than solely affecting the prison service. To these participants, 
austerity issues affected public services. Thus, it rendered the unions’ activism futile: 
“Austerity issues are political decisions, and there isn’t much that the management 
can do about them” (Participant 72, a prison officer of a resettlement prison). 
9.2.2 External scrutiny by the HMIP and parliamentary inquiries 
 
Participants were also queried about the effectiveness of prisons’ external scrutiny 
mechanisms in addressing the impacts of austerity on the prison regime. Those 
mechanisms are designed to support prison healthcare governance and delivery. 
The majority recognised the HMIP and the IMBs at their prisons as key scrutiny 
mechanisms for prisons. As Participant 81, a governor of an open prison, averred: 
Nationally, we have the HMIP, which would come and inspect our 
prisons, either announced or unannounced. On a local level, there 
is an independent body called the IMB. The IMB members write 
directly to the Secretary of State and produce a report annually. 
Matters such as poor infrastructure or resource difficulties affecting 
delivery could be in there. So, matters could naturally escalate that 
way.   
A minority of prison governor participants, for instance, recognised the value of HMIP 
as an important sounding board for accountability: “They have got a critically 
important role to do, and they are responsible for driving up standards” (Participant 
83, a governor of a high-security prison).  
Nevertheless, the majority of prison governor and officer participants did not share 
these enthusiastic responses about HMIP. The perceived effectiveness HMIP was 
deeply polarised in local participants’ narratives. In fact, many of them felt frustrated 
that the HMIP—despite having the independence to do so—failed to utilise its 
authority to highlight how austerity impacted prison operations. Responses from 
several participating prison governors indicated that they believed that they were 




With a few notable exceptions, these anecdotes were extrapolated to make a wider 
point about independent scrutiny mechanisms, as participants did not directly 
mention government resource allocation issues—as they were perceived as 
political. Participant 58, a prison governor of a closed prison with an urgent 
notification status, asserted: 
Independent bodies like the HMIP are not concerned enough 
about austerity, although they know it is there in the background. 
On the other hand, their standards and CPT standards have not 
changed. So, I am still being judged, measured, and inspected on 
a set of standards that do not change. In contrast, my ability to 
influence those standards is severely limited […] There is not 
necessarily a shared understanding between people to say, “Well, 
yeah, we can see why this jail is not performing well, and that part 
of it is down to austerity”, because the people who then mark your 
work are still thinking, “Well, that is not my problem”.   
Such a sense of detachment from political issues like austerity then led to the 
analysis of several participants’ perceptions of how HMIP criticisms of the 
governors’ leadership had been unfairly judged. Participant 57, the head of a prison 
governor’s union, exposited that blaming the governors’ leadership was fruitless. 
These leaders were essentially affected by financial constraints over which they had 
no control. He emphasised:  
What has irritated me is an agenda to shift the blame onto the 
quality of institutional leadership. But these are the same leaders 
we had when we performed the best we ever have. The majority 
are still the same people. They have not suddenly all had some 
catastrophic failure in their ability to lead. The fact is that they have 
had so much money taken away from them. Our prisons’ 
demographics have changed: they are more violent, they are 
younger, and they are disrespectful. The government knows they 
have spent no money on improving our prisons. It is very easy for 
HMIP to blame governors’ leadership. They do not blame the fact 
that the HMPPS has taken 25% of the budget out of the prisons 
but not reduced the population by one prisoner.  
Comments made by participants at the delivery end of the prison health agenda 
echoed Participant 57’s catalogue of frustrations. Participant 65, a service manager 
of an NHS Trust in a closed prison, stated: 
There has been a really irritating improvement plan for me at [a 
Category C prison in Gloucestershire], where they want me to 
provide sexual abuse counselling. We are not a specialist in 




with the inspector this time because she put that on my list. I said, 
“I have tried, I have been out and looked for people who can do 
this, and I cannot find anyone and, actually, when I look at my 
service specification, I do not think that this is something I am 
required to provide”.  
Apart from HMIP scrutiny, participants cited parliamentary inquiries as another 
external scrutiny mechanism for prisons, although comments about these inquiries 
were less prevalent in participants’ answers. Nevertheless, many international and 
national participants suggested that they agreed that continual inquiries did not seem 
to have had any substantive effects on the issue of austerity in prisons. Revealing a 
telling comparative perspective in English domestic politics, Participant 12, an 
advisor to a European intergovernmental human rights organisation, framed how the 
lack of the exercise of power was detrimental to disadvantaged populations: 
In 2017, the UK Human Rights Select Committee focused on 
the prisons’ operation […] [T]hen there was the Public Accounts 
Committee, which considered prisons and their problems. There 
were also National Audit Reports [highlighting issues] in 
prisons. But the question is, do they make a difference to the 
Treasury? And the answer seems to be no. So, the question I 
have would be, why not? [T]here is an ideological reason why 
the government has decided not to spend more money on 
prisons. It has the money; it can spend it. It is just that it 
chooses to spend it in other areas. They chose to spend it 
propping up the banks rather than on marshalling up 
disadvantaged populations. 
Arguing for extending the lack of exercise of power further was Participant 52, a 
head of policy of a national penal reform organisation. He stated that there had yet 
to be an organisation responsible for ensuring whether implementation of the prison 
oversight mechanisms had been adequately implemented and enforced: 
We see recommendations being made all the time, from the 
Chief Inspector, from the PPO, from IMBs. Recommendations 
are made, and then they are not implemented. There is no 
national oversight mechanism. There is no independent 
organisation that is (a) tracking what the recommendations are 
and (b) tracking whether they have been implemented properly 
or enforcing them or holding anyone to account.  
Overall, although external scrutiny mechanisms—such as the HMIP and local 
IMBs—exist as an external oversight for prisons, the majority of the participants 
argued that they had not done enough to challenge the pervasiveness of austerity on 




actively highlighted the ongoing prison issues, their recommendations had yet to be 
fully implemented, given the lack of monitoring and enforcement to do so. 
9.2.3 Advocacy by third sector organisations 
 
Finally, several participants who operated in the advocacy sphere—particularly at the 
national and operational levels of prisons—expostulated about their campaigns for 
improvement in prison conditions. Recognising the current political inaction on the 
impact of austerity on prison healthcare delivery and the broader prison rehabilitation 
agenda, some offered a passionate case for making a difference on a collective and 
grassroots level: “We should speak up a little bit more; we need to advocate more for 
prisoners’ health and well-being. It is about how we use our voice and having the 
confidence to use it”. (Participant 85, a healthcare manager of a women’s prison).  
According to these participants, lobbying with politicians and providing evidence to 
parliamentary committees are the primary routes for raising political awareness of 
the impact of austerity on prisons and beyond. As Participant 39, a policy lead for a 
penal reform organisation, reasoned: 
We have got good relations with members of Parliament and 
some parliamentarians. We respond to consultations. We have 
got an All-Party Parliamentary Group for Women in the Penal 
System. Even without austerity, we are always trying to talk 
about improving prison conditions.  
Analysis of the participants’ comments revealed that some prison healthcare 
providers often embraced advocacy as part of their activities. They did so despite the 
existence of gagging clauses in their contractual documents. Such clauses were 
designed to prevent them from speaking against government policies, including 
austerity. According to these participants, the nomenclatures of the gagging clauses 
ranged from the need to observe ‘confidentiality’ and ‘secrecy’ to more specific 
instructions, such as ‘use of appropriate channels of communication’ and 
‘consequences for breaching the terms of the contract’, including service termination. 
Nevertheless, these participants’ awareness of the current prison conditions 
overrode their hewing to these restrictive clauses, although they remained careful 
not to offend those who funded their services. As Participant 66, the head of a 
substance misuse service operating in various closed prisons, said: 
We are not an organisation that keeps quiet about austerity. There 
are organisations in the third sector with a campaigning culture 
that decides to be quiet about it because of the contractual 
gagging clause. They do not want to offend the people who control 
their income. We are not one of those organisations. Of course, 
we have to be careful what we say, but we do not keep quiet about 




basically a political decision for a commissioner to challenge what 
I am saying. Of course, they have the legal power to force me to 
stop saying certain things that could bring their organisations into 
disrepute […] they can also take my contract away, but they would 
only do that if they had the moral high ground, and they do not.   
Likewise, Participant 76, a head of a social services charity covering various closed 
prisons, spoke at length about how the size, status, and reputation of the 
organisation might work in their organisations’ favour when raising negative issues 
without fear of legal repercussions:  
[Our organisation] is a campaigning organisation as well as a 
service provider. We have a universal credit campaign, and one of 
our mantras is that our enemy is social injustice. And austerity 
helps create social injustice […] There is a gagging clause in our 
contract, but it has not stopped us. Many of our contracts now 
have this gagging clause, so we just ignore it […] If we feel that we 
need to challenge anything, then we will challenge it. We are big 
enough to do that, so that is one of the benefits of being a big, 
longstanding, respected charity.  
However, a few participants from smaller, regional charitable organisations merely 
saw themselves as service providers, with some expressing concern about 
contractual repercussions. For example, some cited operational boundaries in which 
this conformity could be interpreted as individualistic: “We are not set up to advocate 
for prisoners. We are more of a self-management programme […] We have to have 
really strong boundaries in this sort of work”. (Participant 77, a manager of a mental 
health charity covering various closed prisons). To maintain their legitimacy as a 
service provider, these participants resorted to internal channels of communications, 
as outlined in their contractual obligations, which they perceived to be more 
appropriate: “I will escalate to my commissioner if I am really concerned about 
issues, such as treatment delays. The commissioner then has to go and have an 
arm-wrestle with the other bit of NHS England”. (Participant 65, a service manager of 
an NHS Trust in a closed prison).  
In sum, when commenting on indifference towards the recent episode of prison 
instability, many participants from various governance levels openly contested the 
effectiveness of internal and external scrutiny mechanisms. They perceived internal 
scrutiny as ineffective—considering that civil servants were expected to remain 
apolitical. They considered external oversight mechanisms—such as the HMIP and 
the IMBs—despite being independent of the government—as lacking the willpower 
to exercise scrutiny. Beyond this formal monitoring structure, third sector 
organisations, particularly those with large scale operations, exercised their 




smaller organisations from this sector resisted advocacy work to ensure survival of 
their organisations. 
9.3 The rhetoric of austerity is ending 
At the time of this study’s fieldwork, the government announced the end of the era of 
austerity (HM Treasury, 2019b; 2019c). Nearly all national and local participants 
were either unconvinced or sceptical about the Treasury’s announcements that 
austerity was ending. Terms such as “soundbites” (Participant 35, a regional health 
and justice lead of a national health organisation), “rhetoric” (Participant 80, a 
governor of an open prison), and “political sell” (Participant 44, a criminal justice lead 
of a nursing trade union) were captured in their excerpts. 
Through exhaustive analyses of HMPPS spending, Participant 42, the chief 
economist of a national think tank organisation, deduced that HMPPS was still 
experiencing a cycle of financial cuts. Considering that the funding that had been 
allocated for capital spending had now been used for operational purposes, she 
maintained that such manoeuvres merely demonstrated declining financial support 
from the central government: 
One thing that eventually emerged in the last two years is that 
the Ministry of Justice has started transferring some money 
from its capital investment budget into seed level to day-to-day 
spending. In 2018/2019, it moved around and was only roughly 
recorded. The point being that one strategy the Ministry seemed 
to have employed involved transferring some money that was 
going to be used for investment into running day-to-day 
services. This is the same as dealing with austerity. It is 
shelving some problems for later if you are investing in things 
that you thought were important to begin with.  
Many participants proffered similar narratives. For example, Participant 56, a 
regional head of health and justice commissioning for a national health organisation, 
asked: “If austerity is truly coming to an end, why have we not seen more prison 
officers and new prison buildings so that we can deliver modern prison healthcare in 
a truly 21st century way?” Similarly, several participants also noted an increase in the 
government’s level of borrowing compared to pre-2010. For instance, Participant 64, 
the head of a prison officers’ union, explained that “I am all for living within our 
means, but this government actually borrowed more than the previous government 
ever did”. Participant 35, a regional health and justice lead of a national health 
organisation, stated how NHS England funding for prison healthcare remained below 
the level of demand: 
NHS funding is still below the level of demand. To me, that is still 




the services that people want. That is the paradox we have got 
in this country, isn’t it? People have expectations for high-quality 
services but also expectations of low taxes. Politicians should 
tackle this issue by saying, “Either you want to pay less, you are 
getting less, or if you want a really high-quality world-class 
service, you need to pay more”.  
Several participants also talked about claims made in political speeches that implied 
austerity was ingrained in their day-to-day operations across English prisons. This 
entrenchment of austerity solidified their belief that the level of spending on prison 
health would not improve. Even if spending was increasing, time would be needed to 
improve the impacts of austerity on prisons. Participant 66, a head of a substance 
misuse service operating in various closed prisons, argued: 
What does that mean “austerity coming to an end”? The level of 
expenditure is not returning to its pre-austerity levels, so only in 
that circumstance could we say austerity is coming to an end. Of 
course, it can come to an end, but the damage is done. You 
cannot reverse all those years of austerity.  
At prisons’ operational level, participants made comments that could be subsumed 
into three categories, all challenging the idea that the era of austerity was ending. 
First, participants perceived that the single funding injection by the former Prisons 
Minister, Rory Stewart (2018-2019), toward ten underperforming prisons (Ministry of 
Justice, 2018a) was withdrawn from other prison establishments’ budgets by stealth. 
Participant 67, a prison governor of an open prison, alleged: 
The “ten prisons project”26 has taken all of the money. I am sure I 
am not the only one who feels a little bit hard done by because of 
that […] I understand why they were the most problematic and 
worst prisons. But it does feel like the rest of us are not getting 
access to some of the resources that would be massively helpful. I 
do not think there is enough investment in re-staffing. I do not 
know whether prisons will be high on the agenda for getting 
money, even if there is money available.  
Second, many prison officers expressed cynicism about the announcement by the 
erstwhile Prime Minister, Theresa May, that civil servants would receive a 2% pay 
increase in 2019 (Ministry of Justice, 2019e). For the prison workforce, the raise 
depended on prison governors’ finding 1% from their internal budget, to be matched 
by the government for another 1% (ibid.). Participants’ accounts featured metaphors 
 
26 Following an announcement by the former Prison Minister, Rory Stewart (2018-2019), ten prisons 
were selected to benefit from additional £10 million of funding to improve security, address drug 





such as “peanuts” (Participant 82, a senior prison officer of a high-security prison), 
“pittance” (Participant 63, a prison officer of an open prison), and “tokenistic” 
(Participant 74, a senior prison officer of a resettlement prison). Furthermore, 
Participant 82, a senior prison officer of a high-security prison, viewed the pay rise 
as austerity in disguise:  
Theresa May announced that civil servants are going to get a 2% 
pay rise before she departed. She also said that the Treasury 
could only fund 1%, and the rest will have to be found from within 
existing prison budgets. This means each prison governor, up and 
down the country, will have to cut budgets by 1% to give the staff a 
pay rise. So, the budget cuts are still there. They just come in a 
different disguise. 
Third, according to the analysis of the participants’ comments, many did not believe 
that austerity was ceasing in the community, as exemplified by shrinking community 
resources. Several participants observed an increased number of homeless and a 
visible dependency on food banks. A provocative account by Participant 64, a head 
of a prison officers’ union, illustrated that austerity remained in existence based on 
the increasing reliance of individuals on foodbanks, alongside rising homelessness 
and unemployment. As he asserted: 
If the politicians are telling us austerity is coming to an end, why 
have we got an increased number of food banks and an increased 
level of people accessing them? The two do not marry up. If 
austerity is coming to an end, food bank usage would be 
diminishing, but it is not. In fact, it is increasing. You only have to 
walk through any city centre and see the number of people 
begging and living on the streets. So, if austerity is coming to an 
end, why are these people still living on the streets? Why aren’t 
there more jobs for the youngsters? Why aren’t there more 
apprenticeships? It is just a myth, where we are getting sold a lie 
by the government.  
For prison healthcare, a planned cash injection of £20.5 billion for the NHS was 
announced in 2018, to be phased in by 2023/2024 and funded through a 
combination of tax increases and a Brexit dividend (Prime Minister’s Office, 2018). 
However, below the surface of this announcement, several participants working in 
policymaking mentioned that the increase in NHS funding was for all parts of the 
organisation. For instance, Participant 37 reasoned that prison health was viewed 
as a Cinderella service. There was a possibility that prison health would be 
jettisoned in deference to more politically popular measures. Participant 37, a health 




The NHS has received more money year-on-year, but it has 
never received as much money as we actually need year-on-
year. They have always played with the numbers and the 
arguments and the way they presented them. They have 
basically passed the problem back down to NHS England: “You 
have got to manage this”. There are important things, the high-
profile political things that you have got to deliver, such as 
responding to people in Accident and Emergency and making 
sure people are not detained in hospitals longer than they need 
to be. Because prison healthcare is a bit of a Cinderella aspect 
of what we do, it has not got the attention that it should have 
had because other things have been of a much higher physical 
profile. [They are] not going to invest in prison healthcare; they 
will just pass the problem down, and it will be quietly ignored.  
Finally, forecasting the long-term financing of the prison service, several participants 
felt that the threat of Brexit might have exacerbated austerity further, at least in its 
immediate aftermath. Brexit was perceived to be a political force that would throw the 
future of prison and prison healthcare services into further uncertainty: “On top of not 
seeing new money coming into our health sector in the foreseeable future, we have 
got a lot of political disruption from Brexit coming up” (Participant 66, the head of a 
substance misuse service operating in various closed prisons). Participant 40, a 
head of a national penal reform organisation, further explained this viewpoint, by 
considering the increasing demand for healthcare and the shrinking number of 
taxpayers: 
[Austerity] is about to get a whole lot worse. We are still wildly 
over-borrowed as a nation, and demand is growing in all sorts 
of areas, especially health. You have got an ageing population. 
The number of people who pay taxes is diminishing. The 
number of people who consume services paid for by taxes is 
increasing. The circle has not gotten any more square.  
In summary, facing evidence of reorganisation of funding to accommodate ten 
underperforming prisons and a modest pay increase for prison officers, most 
participants did not believe political announcements concerning austerity’s imminent 
end. Their scepticism was further fuelled by feeling that the increase in NHS funding 
might not benefit prison health in comparison to other more pressing and politically 
popular measures. Moreover, they held major concerns about impact Brexit would 
have on economic uncertainty.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated participants’ qualms about the government’s 




prisons. Although the government attempted to manage prison instability by 
mobilising nationwide recruitment for new prison officers in 2016, many participants 
questioned the calibre of new prison officers recruited via this scheme. Additionally, 
poor retention rates among new prison officers were argued to have been linked to 
insufficient training, low salaries, and dangerous working environments. This milieu 
continued to impact the stability of the overall prison regime and the delivery of 
services, including healthcare.  
Many participants also contested the efficacy of internal and external scrutiny 
mechanisms. They noted that the internal scrutiny structure was ineffectual because 
prison staff was expected to abide by the prevailing command-and-control structure 
of the prison service. At the same time, external oversights—from the HMIP to 
parliamentary inquiries—were believed to have been reluctant to exercise their 
power in holding the government accountable with regard to the measures of 
austerity that affected prisons. As such, external oversight recommendations were 
continually ignored, in light of the absence of effective monitoring. Typically, third 
sector organisations filled advocacy gaps by challenging austerity policies toward 
prisoners. Nonetheless, participants observed that several of those organisations 
were reluctant to advocate so as to maintain the longevity of their government 
funding. 
Finally, the homogeneity of participants’ responses contesting the end of the 
austerity era were noteworthy. Their scepticism was based on the lack of 
improvement in the operation of English prisons. Despite the promised cash injection 
for the NHS, participants from prison healthcare services felt that the prison health 
agenda was a low priority compared to other popular metrics, such as improving 
access to Accident and Emergency departments, which were generally receiving 
better political and public buy-in. Last, whether the implications of Brexit will further 
heighten economic uncertainty, at least in the short term, remains unknown. 
The next chapter will explore participants’ views of the options to improve prison 






Chapter 10: Alternatives to Austerity 
 
Introduction 
This final Findings chapter discusses four alternatives to austerity participants 
proposed. The chapter begins by exploring a proposal on how a reduction in the size 
of the current prison population in England should mirror the reduction in prison 
funding, as well as ensure that recurrent funding for prisons is maintained.  
 
Next, participants’ ideas for ensuring improved transparency in penal policies—
especially those pertaining to political accountability and ameliorated data collection 
and utilisation—are considered. Finally, to reinforce prisoners’ right to health as 
embedded in numerous international concordats, participants’ views on how the 
English government could be held accountable for their austerity measures over the 
last decade are explored. 
 
10.1 Reducing the size of the current prison population  
 
Despite variations in participants’ professional backgrounds, they all argued for a 
reduction in the size of the current prison population, albeit in different ways. 
Participating international policymakers reasoned that reducing the prison population 
would prompt the decreasing the prison estate in line with the reduction of prison 
staff. As Participant 17, an advisor to a European intergovernmental human rights 
organisation, reiterated, imprisonment is expensive: 
There is pressure to have fewer prisoners. Look at what has 
happened in America, where suddenly even the Republicans 
realised, “Oh gosh, we have been doing mass incarceration all 
this time, we cannot pay for it”. People do not like having their 
taxes going up. So, if they spend money properly, things can be 
done differently.  
In a similar vein, Participant 2, a consultant for an international health organisation, 
and Participant 39, a policy lead for a penal reform organisation, respectively, used 
hospitals and motorways as similes for prisons in calling for a reduction in the 
current prison population in England: 
Prisons, like hospitals, are expensive. Prison health is best 
served when the general principle of avoiding sending people to 
prisons is applied. In England and several other Western 
European countries, many people are sent to prison who should 
not be sent to prison, which could be looked after much better 




You cannot build your way out of a prison crisis. You cannot 
build another prison because you are overcrowded. It is like a 
motorway; it just fills up with cars.  
Although there was a consensus among these participants that reducing the 
incarceration rate is a way forward for dealing with austerity, there was an array of 
suggestions on how this aspiration could be realised in practice. Overall, 
participants offered three starting points. First, there was a consensus among 
international and national policymaking participants to abolish short sentences; 
doing so would reduce the current prison population. Several participants cited the 
examples of Scotland, France, and Norway, which had reviewed their sentencing 
policies and decided prisons would only be utilised for those posing a threat to 
security and public protection. Participants noted these strategies could be 
replicated in England. As Participant 5, a member of a European anti-torture 
committee, explained: 
In Scotland, there is a presumption against any sentence less 
than three months. In fact, the Scottish and French Parliament 
considered a presumption against any sentence of less than 
one year because prisons should be reserved for those people 
who are imprisoned for reasons of public protection. That is why 
we send them to prison, because they are a risk to society on 
account of their crime.  
Second, some participants suggested alternative community sanctions for prisoners 
not posing a public threat. Participants suggested that amnesties for petty crimes, 
like those applied in Balkan countries, and more financial fines and electronic 
tagging, as applied in Finland, could be adopted. Participants 4, an advisor to a 
European intergovernmental human rights organisation, remarked that “many 
countries now, including the Balkans, are doing amnesty for lower crimes to handle 
growing numbers of prisoners”. Similarly, Participant 2, a consultant for an 
international health organisation, questioned: “Why is it possible that in Finland, so 
few people are landing in prisons, and in England, so many people are coming into 
prison? [The Finnish] have undertaken many measures, from financial fines to the 
electronic tagging”. 
Many participants from policymaking domains also subscribed to the idea of 
community-based interventions. Instead of confinement, they cited distinct examples, 
such as extended fostering, early intervention, diversion from the courts for those 
with mental health issues, and mentoring of at-risk youth. For instance, Participant 
13, a former head of a prison inspectorate, illustrated an example of community 
fostering in Germany that could be embraced in England: 
In Germany, they have always identified community services as 




could be put with a family on release, so there is extended 
staffing outside the prison wall.  
Similarly, Participant 11, an advisor to a European intergovernmental human rights 
organisation, drew upon his professional experiences in New Zealand dealing with 
prisoners who mentored young people on the verge of becoming in contact with the 
criminal justice system: 
In New Zealand, there are many old prisoners in there that 
could be mentors for young men. They get those prisoners out 
into the community, working with the schools, working with the 
local community to say to these young men who are very 
vulnerable and about to go to prison: “This is not something you 
want to do”. It uses prisoners’ experience, giving them some 
meaning, some agency in their rehabilitation, and asking them 
to help us rebuild our community.  
In considering alternatives to imprisonment, these participants frequently mentioned 
the need to influence judges and magistrates. For example, Participant 38, a policy 
lead at a health and social care department, asserted: “We have got to tell 
[sentencers] what the alternatives to imprisonment are. We have got to give them 
confidence in these alternatives. Then, they may not use short-term sentences as 
much as they are doing now”.  
However, Participant 47, a project lead of a national penal reform organisation, 
offered the caveat that supporting infrastructures to deliver these community 
sentences should first be made available to inspire the sentencers’ confidence, 
subject to the permitting sentencing guidance. He further stated that “even though 
the magistrates could, in theory, sentence people to community services, like 
women’s centres, but they can only do that if community services exist”. Some 
participants noted a closure of these services because of receding funding during 
austerity and urged that funding should be provided to improve sentencing practices 
that prevent imprisonment.  
Finally, participants noted that a more immediate solution to reduce imprisonment 
could be to encourage sentencers to make greater use of suspended sentences. As 
such, imprisonment could become a deterrence tool for potential repeat offenders. 
As Participant 55, who worked as a magistrate, opined: 
Sentencers often feel more comfortable providing a community 
order instead of a custodial order, perhaps by looking at things 
like suspended sentences. They will give somebody, in theory, 
a custodial sentence of six months, but they will suspend it for 
two years. That person has that hanging over them for the next 




people do. You have got to have a really good reason not to 
activate the suspended sentence and send that person away 
for six months. There often are good reasons in reality because 
they often tend to be suffering from addictions or mental health 
problems. Sentencers could say that that is a mitigating 
circumstance, and the best that they could do is extend the 
individual’s community order or make it more onerous.   
In summary, all of the study’s participants proposed that downsizing prison 
populations—via abolishing short sentences—would reserve prisons only for those 
who present genuine security and public protection threats. In addition, they 
suggested that using more community sentences with adequately funded 
infrastructures and utilising more suspended sentences could further decrease 
dependencies on the prison system. 
10.2 More provision of resources for prisons and community services 
 
Unanimously, 87 participants across all three levels of prison health governance and 
delivery urged the government to provide more resources to prisons and community 
services to prevent individuals from being sent to the institutions. Their arguments 
are detailed below. 
 
10.2.1 Increasing resources for prisons 
 
First, the participants reported that the cost-saving measures in the name of lean 
and efficient operations should be halted. As Participant 17, an advisor to a 
European intergovernmental human rights organisation, exposited: “We are now at a 
level where we cannot even think of saving money because there really is no money 
to save”. 
 
All participants also emphasised that more resources should be provided to the 
English prison system to assuage the current institutional instability and, in turn, 
improve healthcare delivery. As Participant 12, an advisor to a European 
intergovernmental human rights organisation and leader of a national medical 
organisation, suggested: 
All we need to do is switch on the tap of expenditure again, and 
things will improve. It is literally as simple as that. The 
government just needs to choose it, and it can be different.  
Several participants working across English prisons discussed how investments 
could improve existing prison buildings to create more rehabilitative environments. 
Notably, some participants were careful in their arguments about obtaining additional 




improve prisons’ living conditions rather than to build more prisons. For example, a 
Participant 41, a regional director for the National Prison Services, declaimed: 
If we can invest in our prisons to make them safer and more 
stable, then they would also become more rehabilitative, and we 
could then release people who are less likely to commit a crime. If 
they still get involved with prisons, it would be at a less serious 
level. We do need investment to do that. 
Beyond the arguments for increasing prison resources, many participants argued 
for augmenting resources for community services. They posited that doing so would 
help keep individuals from entering the criminal justice system in the first place.  
10.2.2 Increasing resources for community services 
Beyond providing additional resources to prisons, many participants also stressed 
the importance of ensuring recurrent spending across the community to address 
social issues there rather than in the carceral setting. As Participants 30, a senior 
commissioning lead of a justice ministry, articulated:  
Stop austerity measures in prison altogether. Stop it in the 
community, too, so there will be better mental health services, 
better early interventions in the community, people being able 
to get GP appointments, people being able to get medication, 
and people not having to live on the street. If they are going to 
live on the street, give them the ability to access clinical care 
and provide better access to primary care in the community so 
people can get help. Certainly, there should be a huge 
investment in mental health services and investment in our local 
authorities to provide wraparound care for individuals to keep 
people safe.  
Likewise, additional resources for community services would ensure early support 
for individuals and prevent their entering the criminal justice system. As Participant 
7, an advisor to a European intergovernmental human rights organisation, 
suggested: 
Apart from diverting people out of the justice system, fund 
preventative programmes properly, such as early years 
interventions. Ensure more social support at early stages, 
parenting skills for new parents and identify the people with 
behavioural problems through schools. Prevent them from 





Finally, to improve the government’s fiscal position, some policymaking participants 
suggested imposing a tax increase among profitable corporations and wealthy 
individuals to pay for heightened prison health investment. Participant 35, a 
regional health and justice lead of a national health organisation, said that the 
public’s expectation of high-quality public services should be justified by explaining 
the need for a higher tax rate: 
People have expectations for high-quality services but also 
expectations of low taxes. Politicians should tackle this issue by 
saying either if you want to pay less, you are getting less, or if 
you want a really high-quality world-class service, you need to 
pay more.  
Similarly, Participant 29, an academic and a consultant for an international health 
organisation, argued for the need to tackle tax avoidance among individuals and 
corporations. Predicting that a higher tax payment might be considered politically 
unpalatable by the public, she articulated that the need for this measure should be 
accompanied by narratives evincing how additional funding could be invested into 
critical services, including prisons. As she asserted: 
We need a big social conversation about taxation. We view 
taxation in the same way as the United States views taxation—
as a dreadful imposition by the government. Actually, it is a 
resource. We are buying into a fairer society. We are buying 
lots and lots of services. Taxation is effectively good. People 
should be paying their taxes. Corporations should be paying 
their taxes. We should not be encouraging people to avoid them 
in any way. To me, it is fundamentally about what is the 
purpose of taxation and kind of reframing it, not as an 
imposition on individual freedom, but actually a resource for the 
whole of society and something we all benefit from.  
In summary, along with halting cost-saving measures throughout prisons and 
community services, all participants across all levels recommended enhanced 
investment in these two settings. They argued that the available funding could be 
used to improve the built environment of prisons, as well as improve workforce 
development, with services in the community acting as preventative measures for 
imprisonment. In so doing, various participants posited tackling tax avoidance 
issues prevalent in the UK, and also emphasised the need for the public to 
understand that high-quality public services inevitably require increased taxation.  
10.3 Greater transparency in penal policies 
 
To embrace improved transparency in penal policy in England, some national 




They argued that ensuring more transparent data would allow the public to be 
informed about how their money is spent on prisons:  
The more we involve communities in how prisons are run or even 
just having them know about how prisons are run, the better. I 
think that it has to be a good thing to get people to understand 
what is being done in their name, what is being done in the name 
of the public. (Participant 18, an academic and advisor to a 
European administration organisation) 
Participants also recognised that enhanced prison funding might not be accepted 
well by the populist politicians and the public. As Participant 25, European law and 
human rights specialist, stated: “Prisoners’ human rights tend to have a lesser 
positive reaction”. To dispel this stereotypical perception, participants proposed that 
ameliorated framing of messages on how spending can reduce reoffending and 
lessen the demands on health and law enforcement services. As Participant 21, a 
regional lead of an international health organisation, said: 
This country spends £15 billion a year on the criminal justice 
system. A significant proportion of that budget goes to support 
the prison system. But the people that go through the prison 
system generate spending across law enforcement services, 
health services, social services, etc. […] Not just because it is a 
benefit to those individuals, but also because it may have a 
community dividend. We all have a stake in driving down rates 
of offending and reoffending, getting the best value for our tax 
money, and reducing the demands on health and law 
enforcement services to make our community safer. We can 
build a better future for the country.  
A small number of policymaking participants proposed that spending data should 
include not just the spending figures but also the effectiveness of their spending on 
prison healthcare and the outcomes of prison health. Participant 42, a chief 
economist of a national think tank organisation, demonstrated this point: 
Suppose the government is interested in improving its 
effectiveness. In that case, part of that is encouraging the 
government to think more carefully about how it translates the 
money that goes into services into outputs and outcomes for 
people. The government was focusing too much on the 
spending going into the service without much thought about the 
outcomes at the end of the process. It is about trying to make 
this a bit more visible. The electorate ultimately cares about the 




Several policymaking participants emphasised the importance of government 
departments’ collecting robust data on the costs of ill-health in prisons to help 
influence political discourse in a more informed and transparent manner: 
One of the biggest problems, not only in the UK but also in other 
countries, is a lack of collected data. I think the political discussion 
could benefit from hard data that illustrate what both of us said 
before—prisoners do not stay in prison. They come back to 
society. Therefore, they need data that show that mental health 
care in prisons is deficient. After-care of mentally ill patients is 
deficient, which causes problems in society and increases costs. If 
you have this data, then it becomes more understandable that 
prisoners are not exotic, far away on another planet, but a part of 
society. This dynamic process that happens with these people 
after release could have a strong political influence on the 
discussion on realising that these people are not outside of the 
society, but a part of us. (Participant 23, an advisor to a European 
intergovernmental human rights organisation and an international 
drug and crime organisation) 
Moreover, several policymaking participants called for better modelling of data on the 
poor health provisions in prisons. After all, they believed that ultimately the health of 
English prisoners could affect the health of the public. In fact, a few participants 
quoted a tuberculosis epidemic in Russia between 1997 and 1999 to illustrate this 
point: “An example of how poor treatment in prison affects the community is certainly 
Russia, where multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis caused 20,000 deaths” (Participant 
24, a member of a European anti-torture committee). As further substantiated by 
Participant 23, an advisor to a European intergovernmental human rights 
organisation and an international drug and crime organisation: “Prison healthcare is 
not only for the sake of prisoners; it is for the sake of the whole community”. 
As part of ensuring transparency, several policymaker participants urged enhanced 
accountability of politician spending on governmental programmes, which has yet to 
happen: 
We are civil servants. We are a political vehicle, and our purpose 
is to deliver the sort of the political wheel of our ministers, which is 
what we have been doing. So when things have got messed up 
and broken as a result of it, accountability has to go to the ultimate 
decision maker, namely the responsible ministers and politicians, 
and that has not happened enough in my view. (Participant 58, a 
prison governor of a closed prison with an urgent notification 
status) 




Secretary of State for Transport Chris Grayling (2017-2019) led to further financial 
drains. For example, as Participant 55, a magistrate and prison health lead of a 
national health organisation, averred: 
I think that the wider impact of those austerity measures on 
society needs to be better thought through. Especially when 
you see massive amounts of waste, like the awful Brexit things 
that Chris Grayling did, where the ferry contracts signed to 
ensure critical imports could reach the UK in the event of a no-
deal Brexit were cancelled. The government had to pay £33 
million to Eurotunnel. It had to cancel all the contracts with P&O 
Ferries, which cost £50 million. This money would have paid for 
a significant number of police officers or nurses. Not thinking 
things through and not thinking about the impact of things 
means that some areas are left without resources, and, in other 
areas, resources are wasted.  
Finally, in reinforcing better penal policy transparency, there was consentience 
among policymaking participants that the media would need to be more proactively 
used upon to highlight the current prison instability. As Participant 41, a regional 
prison director of a justice ministry, asserted: 
Prisons appear less safe and more violent, which has come out 
a lot stronger in the media. The media has got it to hit home that 
perhaps we have got a problem in prisons, and perhaps the 
amount of staffing that is gone out of prisons impacts it. Then 
we have seen the political desire to bring back the stability to 
prisons and take up more prison officers, and that got quite a lot 
of profiles, as we started to have a bit more investment backing. 
So, I think it needs to be out there and quite visible.  
In sum, to attain greater transparency in penal policies, participants suggested 
integrating spending data and projected returns of investments into public 
discussions. Furthermore, participants proposed improving accountability of 
spending via performing funding impact assessments and future modelling of data 
on how policy decisions that impact prisons could also affect communities. Finally, 
participants at all levels of governance posited that linking politicians’ spending to 
proposed programmes and better media exposure on penal policies could further 





10.4 Using the right to health as a moral and legal compass 
The majority of participants, particularly those operating at the international and 
national policy levels, advocated using international concordats as minimum 
standards to protect prisoners’ right to health. As the UK government has numerous 
legal principles enshrining prisoners’ right to health, participants argued that these 
principles should insulate prisoners from arbitrary and unjustified restrictions on their 
enjoyment of this right. Participant 21, a regional lead of an international health 
organisation observed: 
[The international obligations on health] are not a nice-to-do. 
They are a must-do. Certainly, the courts uphold with rigour any 
apparent breach of human rights, whether at the European 
Court of Justice level or English court system. I have been an 
expert witness in some court cases where prisoners have 
brought challenges to their detention circumstances. The fact 
that that happens is testimony to the right that prisoners have to 
safe and decent care that the obligation is on the state to 
ensure their well-being.  
Some participants believed that the non-governmental and European oversight 
organisations could be part of setting the prison reform agenda by holding the 
English government responsible for its austerity measures on prison health. As 
Participant 18, an academic and an advisor to a European administration 
organisation, explained: 
It is very important that you have civil society organisations like 
Amnesty International and the CPT involved […] in seeing what 
is happening in prison, writing reports, and telling the rest of the 
public what is actually happening within them.  
Finally, recognising the limitations of the soft enforcement of human rights principles, 
a small number of participants from both international and national levels suggested 
encouraging prisoners and their concerned others to initiate legal action against the 
government’s austerity measures that interfered with their rights during 
imprisonment. In particular, as Participant 5, a member of a European anti-torture 
committee, noted:  
[T]here are very few prisoners in the United Kingdom who 
would make a challenge before the European Court of Human 
Rights. In Northern Ireland, there are far more petitions from 
judicial review by prisoners than there are in Great Britain […] 
[T]here are so few challenges by prisoners in England regarding 
the conditions of detention that they are required to maintain. 




custody and the investigations made by the UK Prisons & 
Probation Ombudsman.  
Moreover, Participant 21, a regional lead of an international health organisation, 
argued that “we keep overlooking the most expert resource on prison life and prison 
health services, which are the people who use them and live there”. Participant 29, 
an academic and a consultant for an international health organisation, exposited 
further: “We need something in case law that this was definitely being contravened 
and taken, and then it becomes case law”. In the absence of these legal challenges, 
the policymaking participants argued that such inertia highlighted a tacit acceptance 
towards austerity measures on prisons.  
Beyond civil actions, Participant 52, the head of policy of a national penal reform 
organisation, argued for criminal prosecution to be brought against the government 
to reinforce its accountability towards violent incidents that affected prisoners in 
England: 
We need to push for accountability for institutional failings by 
looking at how prosecutions could be made through the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act for self-inflicted deaths, 
self-harm, and violent episodes in prisons that imperil prisoners.  
Overall, participants argued for the need to use international agreements as 
minimum standards to protect prisoners’ right to health. Accordingly, they stated that 
insufficient financial resources should not hinder prisoners’ access to healthcare and 
rehabilitative prison environments. They also recommended that non-government 
and oversight organisations should advocate for such rights—with further actions 
taken by the prisoners themselves—and asserted that prisoners and their concerned 
others should initiate civil and criminal litigations against the government to prompt 
remedial action towards the longstanding austerity measures in English prisons. 
Conclusion 
This chapter reported on participants’ practical solutions to reverse the impacts of 
austerity and improve the stability of English prisons. These solutions are outside the 
boundaries of prisons.  
First, every participant proposed reducing the size of the prison population to reflect 
declining prison resources. Analysis of their comments suggested that they believed 
that abolishing short sentences, considering alternative community sentences in lieu 
of imprisonment, and encouraging increased use of suspended sentences would 
reduce the size of the prison population.  
Second, all participants commented that the government needs to make recurrent 
investment in public services, covering both prisons and community services. 




from ensuring that these provisions would be adequately funded across all settings, 
they further proposed that improved funding would ameliorate the built environment 
of prisons and investment in the prison workforce.  
Third, to ensure augmented transparency in penal policies, several participants 
suggested publicising prison spending data and including projected returns on 
investments and funding impact assessments in public discussions. Similarly, linking 
politicians more explicitly with their political activities would ensure greater political 
accountability to prevent financial waste. 
Finally, many participants proposed that international concordats could be used as 
minimum standards to protect prisoners’ right to health and prevent arbitrary damage 
to their rehabilitation experience. These participants also recommended that relevant 
international sectional groups and pressure groups, as well as prisoners and their 
concerned others, should take an increasingly proactive stance in holding the 
government accountable for the impact of its austerity measures on prisoners’ 
health.  
The next chapter will present an in-depth discussion of the findings. The chapter will 
articulate how these findings relate to the investigation’s literature review and 
theoretical framework, specifically focusing on how the results address gaps in the 







Chapter 11: Discussion of Findings 
Introduction 
The previous chapters presented a synthesis of key themes that emerged from the 
interviews with prisons and prison health experts in England. This chapter links those 
themes and discusses how austerity and its backdrop of neoliberalism have 
impacted prison health governance and delivery of prison healthcare in England. It 
does so by juxtaposing key issues arising from the Findings chapters with theoretical 
and conceptual perspectives introduced in the Literature Review chapters. It also 
discusses the applied implications for prison health policy. 
11.1 Central arguments 
This research is the first in-depth, qualitative study exploring the impact of 
macroeconomic austerity on prison health governance and delivery. The sample 
included 87 prison health experts in England, international (N=29) and national 
policymakers (N=27), prison governors and officers, as well as representatives from 
prison health services (N=31). Using interdisciplinary lenses from public health, 
criminology, social policy, law, politics, economics, and sociology generated a 
theoretical framework utilised to derive central arguments of this thesis. 
Austerity unravels a series of six political paradoxes that have shaped and 
constrained prison health governance and delivery of prison healthcare in England. 
These paradoxes point to discrepancies between intentions of austerity and the 
actual implementation of the austerity measures post-execution. The false political 
narratives revealed are not only untrue but also damage English prison health 
governance and delivery.  
First, the chapter discusses the paradox of austerity that politicians have claimed to 
be inevitable and necessary. Their justifications for making fiscal cuts that were 
portrayed as requisite to prevent economic profligacy, the argument for rejecting 
excessive government expenditures and debt, and increasing use of privatisation to 
reduce costs will be confuted. Second, it will expose the peculiarity of prison health 
governance and delivery, especially the extent to which it operates within a 
prevailing structure that prioritises top-down hierarchies and punishment over 
collaboration and rehabilitation. Third, concurrent with the implementation of 
austerity, is deterioration in prison leadership as revealed via transient political 
leadership of prison service, as well as the rampant growth of prison gangs and 
serious organised crime groups across English prisons. Cumulatively, these 
phenomena pose a challenge to English prisons’ command-and-control governance 
and thus impact the governance and delivery of adequate healthcare in prisons.  
Fourth, in contrast to the claim that ‘we are all in this together’ (Cameron, 2010a), 




Using the market as a political compass, participants commented on the withdrawal 
of welfare services from the community, as well as a deindustrialisation process that 
forced penal institutions to become first responders. Fifth, the paradox of the 
government’s existing responses towards prison instability—manifested as the by-
product of austerity implementation on prison service—will be revealed. The praxis 
of building additional prisons, recruiting new prison officers, and blaming 
psychoactive substances masks the root-cause of system instability—which is the 
withdrawal of resources from prison service—and merely coheres with its neoliberal 
vision. Sixth, the paradox of establishing scrutiny mechanisms to monitor prison 
operations continually is that these scrutiny mechanisms remain unable to hold the 
government accountable for deterioration in governance and delivery of healthcare 
across English prisons.  
Overall, this study demonstrates that austerity has failed to reduce the burgeoning 
national debt, control governance and delivery of healthcare services in an effective 
and efficient fashion, and improve prisoner health in England. Yet, after over a 
decade of producing the same results, the government remains reluctant to dispense 
with this failed agenda. The foregoing are the central arguments that this chapter 
revisits. 
11.2 The paradox of austerity and cost-saving 
The findings of this study point to the paradox of austerity as an imperative economic 
measure. Participants identified two fallacies that politicians used to support 
austerity: 1) the need to balance the economy and 2) the government approaching a 
hard limit on its ability to borrow. Participants also reflected on the impacts of the 
implementation of austerity on both prisons and prison health. They further 
declaimed the paradox of cost-savings via increasing preference for privatisation. 
 
11.2.1 The paradox of austerity as imperative 
 
Most participants agreed that austerity meant government funding cuts directed at 
public services. Their understanding of austerity ran parallel to the early definitions of 
austerity as strict financial discipline (Anderson and Minneman, 2014; Bramall, 2013; 
Fontana and Sawyer, 2011; Ortiz et al., 2011; Schui, 2015). These early definitions 
of austerity also intersect with the UK government’s argument that a decrease in 
state spending will stimulate economic growth (Gamble, 2014). On the surface, such 
reasoning appears definitive, pragmatic, and free from ideology, while at the same 
time creating the opportunity to raise doubts about the financial sustainability of the 
welfare state (Farnsworth and Irving, 2018). 
Following the execution of the 2012 Benchmarking Programme that sought to reduce 
workforce size without reducing prison population (House of Commons Justice 
Committee, 2012), several participants close to the delivery line witnessed 




austerity era. They questioned the political rhetoric of ‘the need to balance the 
economy’. Their cynicism runs parallel to the extant political economy literature. That 
work points to the voluntary, pre-emptive deflation efforts by the UK government, 
which is similar to what the Troika inflicted on Greece, Ireland, and Portugal as part 
of their bailout conditions (Gamble, 2014; Schrecker, 2016). There was no 
requirement for implementation of austerity in the UK (ibid.). Yet, despite the 
absence of any economic evidence, the politicians executed their own version of 
austerity, signalling British exceptionalism. Based on participants’ understanding, 
misleading political narratives focused for the need to balance the economy by 
affording the financial market to dictate a decrease in public sector spending and 
avoiding an increase in taxes to ensure that the government could continue to 
borrow at reasonable interest rates (Gamble, 2014; Midgley, 2014).  
Some participants also ridiculed the validity of the “maxing out the national credit 
card” rhetoric. Yet, austerity does not reduce debt. In fact, participants argued that 
national debts increased despite austerity. Thus, this finding builds on Blyth’s (2013) 
argument that austerity measures in Romania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, and 
Lithuania coincided with increasing debt. Despite a decade of austerity, the UK debt 
ballooned rather than dissipated. The debt-to-GDP ratio was 74.7% in 2010 before 
the economy felt the impact of austerity (Office for National Statistics, 2021b). By 
2019, the ratio had increased to 84.6% (ibid.). Debt was a vehicle for imposing 
austerity measures (Blyth, 2013; Klein, 2007). Yet, a decade of austerity has 
engendered an annual financial gap in state finances of £180bn per year for the UK 
government following several high-profile bank bailouts suggestive of corporative 
welfare (Farnsworth, 2018), including the Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB and 
HBOS. Such a contradiction also exposes the distinctive nature of neo-austerity 
following the 2008 financial crisis: despite the effort to restrict public spending to 
prevent burgeoning national deficits, austerity has enabled the implementation of 
measures to support and promote private actor interests (Davies, 2016; Farnsworth 
and Irving, 2018; McBride and Mitrea, 2017). 
Some research participants argued that the absence of feasibility assessments prior 
to austerity made the fiscal cuts possible to be executed without safeguards. This 
assertion builds upon arguments that assessing the robustness of the distributional 
impact of spending cuts on public services was impossible (HM Treasury, 2018; 
O'Dea and Preston, 2010). Despite the political narrative attempting to justify 
austerity as economically unavoidable, several participants noted that the scale and 
timing of these state expenditure rollbacks were opportunistic. To participants, 
predicting with precision the impact of the target to achieve £900 million savings by 
the end of 2015 was unfeasible without any prior analysis or evidence (European 
Public Service Union, 2016; NOMS, 2015). Despite the imposition of the mandatory 
savings, the rate of incarceration remained constant. Several participants operating 
within a commissioning mandate were adamant in their commitment to financial 




justice lead of a national health organisation), that they had “no alternative but to 
simply go ahead with the austerity plan of the government”. Without credible 
evidence to engage in cost-saving measures, participants sensed that they had to 
execute unprecedent cost-cutting measures without a viability assessment. 
Several participants also recalled how the government tended to blame previous 
Labour governments (which had held office between 1997 and 2010) for leaving the 
country in a severe state of debt, thereby making austerity seem unavoidable 
(Gamble, 2014). The government aligned itself with many right-wing economists who 
argued that the state should suffer the consequences of its financial mismanagement 
in preceding decades (Bennhold, 2009; Konings, 2009; Panitch and Konings, 2009; 
Thompson, 2013). This alignment gave the government credibility and signalled that 
it—unlike its predecessors—was capable of managing finances (Buller and James, 
2012; Gamble, 2014; Hayton, 2014; Jabko, 2013). Moreover, this was also 
considered a public relations exercise in placating the general public by highlighting 
the necessity of austerity. The irony is that, after a decade of austerity, austerity 
measures have remained in place, albeit in a more draconian fashion with an 
increased level of debt compared to a decade earlier. 
11.2.2 The paradox of cost savings via increased privatisation 
The increased prison and prison healthcare privatisation is a trait of neoliberalism 
that intersects with austerity programmes that demand cost savings. Yet, study 
participants exposed misconceptions of cost savings using private sector providers. 
They also railed against the moral legitimacy of their delivering punishment on behalf 
of the state, as well as service efficiency and quality. 
From a moral standpoint, many participants from different levels of prison health 
governance and delivery agreed that the state, rather than a private organisation, 
should manage punishment. Consistent with Corcoran (2014), they argued that the 
state is morally responsible for prisoners’ health and welfare when administering 
punishment and that such a responsibility should not be outsourced to private 
contractors. However, this sentiment is not shared by the government, as it is keen 
to outsource public services per its neoliberal perspective. Thus, those participants in 
a commissioning position often argued that they had no alternative but to appoint the 
best provider for delivering penal services, irrespective of providers’ organisational 
arrangement. Section 9(4) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 requires 
commissioners to employ competitive bidding in the procurement process for 
services costing at least €134,000 (or ~£117,552). Moreover, the Health and Social 
Care Act 2012 allows “any qualified provider” to manage public services. These two 
statutory instruments mandate that procurement processes must provide equal 
access to all potential bidders and remove bureaucratic obstacles. Doing so invokes 
public procurement as part of the competitive and deregulatory processes to permit 
the government to relinquish its oversight power to the private sector (McGregor, 




expenditures on private contractors (HMPPS, 2019a; Ministry of Justice, 2009) and a 
29% rise of £9.2 billion on private health providers in 2018/2019 (Department of 
Health, 2015; Department of Health and Social Care, 2019). The cost savings 
agenda during austerity seems to have played a role in this explosion of private 
contractor involvement in the penal system. 
A few participants from the advocacy and monitoring fields observed that 
privatisation offers reduced scope for accountability. According to these participants, 
private contractors typically hide behind the veil of commercial confidentiality to avoid 
data sharing and scrutiny that could enable monitoring of their services. Absence of 
accountability and ownership by both the HMPPS and their private contractors is 
consistent with Harvey’s (2010) contention that neoliberalism leads to a 
consolidation and centralisation of power in the hands of a few institutions that 
escape public control. As such, it illustrates a democratic deficit (Chomsky, 1999) 
representing a fault line in governance structure. The self-scrutiny of private sector 
providers has raised the question of objectivity and conflict of interest. For instance, 
Participant 84, a director of a closed private prison, claimed that the monitoring 
framework imposed on private prisons was more stringent compared to public sector 
prisons. However, this scrutiny was predominantly undertaken by their own internal 
audit teams, which raises the question of objectivity and conflict of interest. This 
study found parallels with Australian studies that have demonstrated that the 
absence of oversight frameworks and little to no quality control of private security 
operators can undermine the image of the penal sector among the public (Andrew 
and Cahill, 2007; Baldino, et al, 2010).  
Because markets are not self-correcting and cannot provide appropriate quality 
control (Fitzgibbon and Lea, 2018), many participants operating in a commissioning 
capacity felt that they had to safeguard meeting health needs of prisoners from 
private organisations’ desire to deliver services commercially. Acting as gatekeepers 
(Lipsky, 1980), they imposed close monitoring on private contractors, although they 
were conscious that doing so would inevitably increase transaction costs. This 
behaviour illustrates that, notwithstanding previous research, there are no significant 
differences in cost savings between public and private prisons (Le Vay, 2015).  
Indeed, this study’s findings provide evidence that is counter to austerity's putative 
cost-saving rationale and the government’s desire “[…] to secure new services to 
improve existing service delivery, encourage innovation and drive value for money" 
(Ministry of Justice, 2011, p.4). Some participants from private sector organisations 
admitted to removing prison employees’ sick pay and pensions to benefit 
immediately government’s expenditures. Nonetheless, this research provides a 
caveat that privatisation of prisons in England could potentially increase government 





Also, participants questioned in two ways the stability of prison health governance 
and delivery within the structure of penal commercialisation. First, they had serious 
doubts about de-prioritisation of some services over others vis-à-vis the interests of 
the private companies. Second, they argued that private organisations were more 
innovative than the public sector, those from private healthcare organisations readily 
queried the relationship between profit margin and access to prison healthcare 
delivery. Participants claimed that penal commercialism and rehabilitation of 
prisoners were antipodal to each other: one based on financial opportunities, and the 
other on needs. Although prison contractors in England have been shown to project 
efficiency through reduction of employment costs (Hermann and Flecker, 2012; 
Sachdev, 2004), this study found that it did not lead to superior quality. Participants 
contended that health is a common good, but privatisation and austerity put this 
ethical argument in jeopardy; indeed, they regard it as being incompatible with 
market-based strategies for its distribution. The transactional nature of this approach 
prioritises profit over a social agenda; businesses have reduced impetus to 
rehabilitate prisoners entrusted to them (Andrew and Cahill, 2007; Feeley and 
Simon, 1992). This finding builds on Saldivar and Price’s transatlantic study (2015) 
that found that privatisation financially benefits private prisons at the expense of 
prisoners. However, this phenomenon is antithetical to the prison rehabilitation 
agenda. The finding also adds to recent evidence that there are a small number of 
private prisons where the HMPPS rather than NHS England directly commissioned 
healthcare (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2019b). Several governors have 
raised concerns about worsening standards of healthcare in these prisons, as they 
were not subjected to the NHS England delivery framework (ibid.). Overall, 
privatisation seemingly serves to depoliticise the use of imprisonment through 
economic logic, desensitises the state from its welfare obligation, and camouflages 
health governance and delivery in a commercialised structure. 
In discussing privatisation, some participants expressed concerns regarding a series 
of events that demonstrated the failure of private contractors in delivering their 
promises. These included the following: 1) the transfer of HMP Birmingham from 
G4S to public sector prisons due to excessive violence and poor standards (Ministry 
of Justice, 2019a); 2) the recent enquiry highlighting the poor performance of private 
contractors in reducing reoffending post-release; and 3) the bankruptcy of Carillion, 
which managed facilities in prisons across the southern England. Taxpayers paid an 
estimated £72 million for these services (Sasse et al., 2019). Participants’ 
perspective denotes the continued corporate welfare approach in which private 
businesses continue to be heavily state-subsidised (Farnsworth, 2012; 2013). These 
foregoing three events provide an early warning that privatisation might cost more in 
the long run, as the government continues to subsidise those firms’ failures. The 
debacles of G4S, community rehabilitation companies, and Carillion have diverted 
public expenditures from entities in need (Dawkins, 2002; Farnsworth, 2012; Nader, 
2000). Yet, despite its poor track record across the English criminal justice system, 




the penal landscape following an outsourcing plan for two new prisons, HMPs Glen 
Parva and Wellingborough (House of Commons Library, 2018b; Ministry of Justice, 
2019f). Participants felt given the results to date, continued privatisation is evidence 
of political irrationality.  
11.3 The paradox of prison health, within a punishment structure during a time 
of austerity 
Continuing our discussion of paradoxes, how prison health is managed during a time 
of austerity reflects three strands: 1) the impact of austerity on prison healthcare 
delivery despite prison health funding remaining stagnant; 2) the stability of 
equivalence in delivery of prison healthcare services; and 3) the focus on 
punishment’s jettisoning the prison health agenda. These phenomena will be 
examined vis-à-vis deterioration in stagnant funding and workforce, as well as 
decreased prisoner access to healthcare and their living environment and safety. 
11.3.1  Stagnant prison health funding  
Although NHS England’s funding appears to fall under the category of non-
discretionary funding, in that it has not been subjected to a direct financial cut (NAO, 
2017; Streeck and Mertens, 2013), many participants observed how the 
maintenance of this level of funding throughout the period of austerity increased the 
strain on services as the volume and complexities of prisoner health soared. 
Participants responsible for delivering healthcare services paid less for staff and 
opted for volunteers, thus reducing service levels. These conditions provide 
contextual intelligence that supplements official reports of a real-term decrease in 
health funding, which simultaneously affects prison health funding (Marmot, 2017; 
New Economics Foundation, 2018; The Health Foundation, 2019). This situation is 
occurring even when epidemiological evidence attests to the augmented burden of 
the presence of diseases among prisoners compared to the general public (Dolan et 
al., 2016; Fazel et al., 2016; Forrester et al., 2013; Herbert et al., 2012; Ritter et al., 
2011; Stürup-Toft et al, 2018).  
As several participants argued, the constant cycle of commissioning and 
procurement, as well as poor and unsafe working conditions (such as healthcare 
staff being subjected to assaults and poor pay), impaired the prison healthcare 
workforce and eliminated the focus on prison healthcare workforce planning. This 
finding corroborates official statistics that demonstrated a shortfall of 39,520 nurses 
(NHS Improvement, 2019), with 45% of prison nurses indicating that staff shortages 
compromised the care that they could provide (House of Commons Select 
Committee, 2018). Also, the most recent CPT inspections of English prisons 





The majority of the healthcare staff taking part in this study attested to acclimatising 
to their poor working conditions. Maintaining safe staffing levels within English 
prisons requires considerably more systematic attention to workplace recruitment 
than has occurred in recent years. According to several participants, they had no 
choice but to use more expensive agency staff to deliver existing services. Given the 
government's desire to implement austerity as a cost saving measure, this situation 
is ironic. These observations point to serious inadequacies in prison healthcare—a 
trend that is likely to worsen, given the lack of a coherent government approach to 
recruitment, migration policies, and the uncertainties of Brexit (The Health 
Foundation, 2019).  
11.3.2 The unstable notion of prison healthcare equivalency 
The paradox of rehabilitation is further evidenced by prisoners’ deteriorating access 
to healthcare. Almost unanimously—and irrespective of the level on which they 
operated—informants argued that the reduction of prison officers (i.e., a 30% 
reduction in prison staff between 2009 and 2017 (CPT, 2017; NAO, 2017)) was a 
barrier to prisoners’ accessing prison healthcare services. These issues include 
prisoner inability to attend healthcare appointments, frequent postponement or 
cancellation of appointments, rising waiting times for treatment, and insufficient 
consultation time with medical professionals. The situation transcends the official 
reports that detailed excessive delays prisoners faced in receiving medical treatment 
(CPT, 2017; HMIP, 2017; HMIP, 2019; HMIP, 2020). Apart from providing the much-
needed intelligence of how financial cuts impact prison healthcare delivery across 
English prisons, this study demonstrates that prison healthcare cannot absorb the 
effects of austerity that have been imposed on the prevailing prison structure. It also 
illuminates a close meshing between prison health and community health, both 
which have been witnessing deterioration in services (Nuffield Trust, 2020). Also, 
several participants described how the prolonged lack of access to acute and urgent 
healthcare services, such as operations and cancer treatment, caused in their 
opinion prisoner death and disability.  
Given the longstanding issues concerning prisoner health, imprisonment can be an 
indirect form of double punishment: imprisonment plus insensitivity towards the 
incarcerated population’s needs, owing to government-imposed austerity. This 
study’s findings extend Sykes’s (1958) theory on deprivation by illustrating how the 
deterioration of prison conditions and the environment under austerity exceed 
deprivation of physical liberty, goods and services, sexual relations, autonomy, and 
security through obstructed access to healthcare. The declension in prison 
conditions and its environment run counter to human rights obligations. These 
responsibilities were proposed by Kudla v Poland [2000] ECHR 512: the state 
ensures that imprisonment does not subject prisoners to distress or hardship 




outcomes highlight the seeming acceptance of punishment and the impact of placing 
retribution above measures of health and well-being.  
Additionally, several healthcare participants articulated the impacts of austerity on 
the broader NHS system. They descanted on the loss of clinical time and a ripple 
effect on the wider NHS performance. This situation complemented the Nuffield 
Trust (2020) study finding that over 75% of missed appointments were partly blamed 
for the lack of prison staff and engendered a cost to the NHS of £2m (Nuffield Trust, 
2020). Extant research evidently idealises prison health in England: the NHS took 
over prison healthcare in 2006 in which the organisation underwent strategic and 
operational overhaul (Gatherer and Fraser, 2009; Gatherer et al., 2005; Leaman et 
al., 2017). However, this study finds that austerity and the wider neoliberal 
preference of punishment challenge the stability of equivalence. Though there has 
been improvement and equivalency of prison healthcare following the transition of 
services to NHS England, austerity impedes such possible achievements. In fact, it 
worsens healthcare services for prisoners. The impacts of austerity compromise 
governance and delivery of prison health, because well-being within a prison regime 
demands regime stability and consistency. These observations underscore that 
prison healthcare services are highly dependent on stability of prison governance; 
participants often reported that stability to be deteriorating.  
This study attempted to provide an enhanced nuanced view of the impact of austerity 
by assessing the heterogeneity of the effect of austerity on the different types of 
prison establishments. Findings revealed that an inconsistency existed in how 
different interviewees viewed the consequences of austerity on a particular group of 
prison establishments. Several argued that austerity affected the middle-ranking 
closed prisons disproportionately, as the Benchmarking Exercise in 2012 left them 
with a fragile workforce base. A consensus emerged that financial cuts to high-
security prisons could have been less impactful compared to other establishments. 
Several participants argued that, although most prisons experience a similar level of 
violence, some private prisons were newer and had better environments conducive 
to prison rehabilitation, with more freedom to deal with establishment-related issues 
compared to the public-sector-led prisons. Though austerity impacts all prison 
establishments, some were more resilient in absorbing the government’s fiscal cuts.  
11.3.3 Prioritisation of punishment over health 
Most participants, irrespective of their governance level, stated that the shortage of 
prison officers had contributed to a decline in access to purposeful activities and 
rehabilitative environments. They observed that prisoners spend long hours in their 
cells without opportunity to socialise with fellow prisoners and engage in activities 
that were critical to their health and well-being. These observations support a 
catalogue of failures officials have reported regarding deterioration in the 
rehabilitation and living environment in English prisons over the last decade (CPT, 




The lack of access to purposeful activities is not only an inhumane condition, but it 
reinforces punishment in a rather disproportionate way that it also imperils prisoners’ 
health—especially when seven in ten prisoners suffer from two or more mental 
disorders (Singleton et al., 1998). Participants espoused that purposeful activities 
might help prisoners deal with the boredom and stress of imprisonment in productive 
ways. Previous studies found that lack of access to such activities, segregation, and 
confinement place prisoners at particular risk (Guenther, 2011). This present study 
further connects the dots between such conditions and the reduction in prison 
resources. Following a decrease in purposeful activities, the rise of self-inflicted 
deaths rose by 37% between March 2010 and March 2020 (House of Commons 
Library, 2017)—although even this metric is likely to be underreported. Without 
acknowledging the role of purposeful activities in imprisonment, surprisingly the 
latest average reoffending rate is 45% for all those released from custody and 61% 
of those serving a sentence of fewer than twelve months (Ministry of Justice, 2020d). 
Participants stated that, despite the claim from the Ministry of Justice that 
imprisonment reduces reoffending via rehabilitation programmes (ibid.), lack of 
access to opportunities for education, employment, training, and volunteering infers 
that the government has minimal interest in using rehabilitation as a core driver for 
reducing incarceration rates. 
Further evidence of prioritisation of punishment over health is seen via participants’ 
accounts of how overcrowding imposes degrading prison conditions and that 
confinement within poorly maintained cells can accelerate the progression of 
diseases. Although prison overcrowding has been an issue in England since 1990—
and predated austerity (CPT, 2020a)—warehousing people due to austerity 
emphasises punishment over rehabilitation. The global COVID-19 pandemic has 
magnified the poor living conditions within prisons by exposing these institutions’ 
vulnerabilities to infectious disease outbreaks (Burki, 2020; Kinner et al., 2020). 
Cases and deaths linked to COVID-19 are emerging in English prisons (HMPPS, 
2021c). Indeed, prisoners remain at considerable risk (Ismail and Forrester, 2020b), 
with the latest statistics revealing a total of 6,007 new cases at the end of December 
2020 (HMPPS, 2021c). This is a 39% increase from November 2020 (ibid.). 
Overcrowding issues juxtaposed with poor resources and rigid security processes 
can delay the pandemic’s diagnosis and treatment (Burki, 2020; Ismail and 
Forrester, 2020b; Kinner et al., 2020). 
According to many participants, longer in-cell time is related to a rise in the number 
of riots, assaults, acts of self-harm, and suicides. This narrative is consistent with 
official statistics showing a 53% increase in assault and a 61% growth in self-harm 
incidents between 2010 and 2020 (CPT, 2020a, Ministry of Justice, 2020f), as well 
as coordinated riots that took place at least once a day in 2015 (House of Commons 
Justice Committee, 2016). Given the poor recording practice across prisons, the 
foregoing metrics are likely underestimated. Beyond the direct impact of such 




prisoners, thus fomenting a negative psychological impact (HMIP, 2017). Because 
these marked reductions in safety show no sign of abating, interviewees predicted 
higher rates of such incidents, as well as a rise in reoffending and radicalisation. The 
denouement will be a heightened risk of inflicting torturous, inhumane, and 
degrading treatment on both prisoners and prison staff. 
Furthermore, participating prison officers stated that staff reductions impeded 
stanching the flow of psychoactive substances. There is an insufficient number of 
prison officers to curb the drug supply (e.g., conducting drug searches and 
intelligence gathering) and an increased demand among prisoners for drugs to cope 
with their poor living environment. Prison officials seized psychoactive substances in 
6,699 instances in 2019, a dramatic increase from the 15 recorded seizures in 2010 
(Ministry of Justice, 2019b). This study provides augmented nuance to the official 
reports concerning psychoactive substances. It does so by detailing a catalogue of 
issues arising from the use of these substances by prisoners: a surge in medical 
emergencies, an anticipation of more frequent acts of violence—thus fostering fear 
and intimidation among prisoners and staff—hindrance of healthcare staff’s delivery 
of planned activities, heightened attention to medical emergencies, use of external 
healthcare resources (e.g., ambulances), and the undermining of key working and 
healthcare interventions on prisoners. This study’s finding that deterioration in 
prisoners' access to healthcare, purposeful activities, a rehabilitative living 
environment, and safety comports with Wacquant’s (2002) contention that the 
structure of prisons influences determinants of prisoner health diurnally.  
11.4 The paradox of top-down stable and structured governance  
This study highlights the paradox of the top-down governance. In so doing, the 
participants revealed a discrepancy in 1) legal accountability between ministers and 
governors and 2) level of independence of civil servants. Additionally, they revealed 
how top-down governance shapes and constricts English prison health governance 
healthcare delivery. Despite the governance, participant accounts attested to the 
growth of informal governance in the forms of prison gangs and serious organised 
crime across English prisons. Collectively, these unfolding events impacted the 
prison health governance and delivery of healthcare in English prisons in both direct 
and indirect fashion. 
11.4.1 Accountability and independence of civil servants 
Many participants spoke about the power of justice ministers in dictating the policy 
and delivery of English prisons, although legal responsibilities rest on the prison 
governors. Section 11 of the 1952 Prison Act holds prison governors as the 
guarantors for all activities taking place in the establishments they managed. 
According to the informants, civil servants are expected to obey politicians’ 
objectives. This practice aligns with Gramsci’s (1971) hegemony theory of 




autonomy and later Boin’s (2001). Critical realists such as Scharpf (1997), Hay 
(2002), Marsh (2003), and McAnulla (2005) have noted that the polity context of the 
British political system is significantly affected by structured inequality—specifically, 
the continued concentration of power in the hands of central government. This 
concentration is especially true among those with ministerial controls and thus 
directly relevant to prisons. Participants averred that policymakers, prison governors, 
and prison officers cannot be viewed as independent from the state, which plays a 
key role in running England’s prisons. 
Participant narratives highlight the tension within the literature on the independence 
and constriction of civil servants. Social policy scholars (e.g., Gash et al. 2010), 
theorised that public bodies depoliticise political decision making, improve 
independence of civil service to make decisions, and allow the government to access 
bureaucrats’ skills and expertise. However, several participating governors described 
examples of thraldom to their superiors by selecting their battles carefully and 
treading cautiously between conformity and resistance to the prevailing political 
power, which might go against their aims as leaders. Austerity distorts the perceived 
power of prison governors, thus revealing an incorrect perception that prison 
governors enjoy a degree of discretion in running their establishments (Cheliotis, 
2006; Liebling and Arnold 2004; Twining and Miers, 1982). As early as 1984, 
Chapman argued that prison leadership should be reserved for ministers, as 
ministers expect civil servants to execute the ministerial visions. Per the Learmont 
Report in 1995, ministerial involvement will typically be relatively high compared to 
other public sector areas—a situation that continues today—which contradicts Gash 
and colleagues’ (2010) theory on the autonomy of the civil servants. 
The temporal nature of ministerial tenure adds to the problematic nature of the 
command-and-control governance of prisons in England. Many policymaker 
participants observed that the country had seven Justice Ministers between 2010 
and 2019 (HM Government, 2020a), who created what they called ‘butterfly’ 
policies— moving from one policy reform to another. These butterfly policies, 
especially when new policies were introduced in an ad hoc way prior to completion of 
previous reform agendas, contributed to systemic reactivity and further instability. 
Other portfolios, such as Health and Housing, had less than one-half the level of 
turnover in the same period (HM Government, 2020b). Ministers are typically 
transient, regularly moved for strategic political reasons, thus making coordination of 
governance and delivery challenging (Flinders, 2002). This study builds on Flinders’ 
(2002) contention by showing the impact of these temporary ministers. Specifically, it 
perpetuates reactivity of reforms in which their execution rests on transitory figures 
who often have not had prison leadership experience. This situation clearly allows 
ministers to detach themselves from responsibility in the event of a crisis. It also 
perpetuates the irony that prison governors are legally responsible for prison 





The findings of this study also challenge the idealistic perception that civil servants 
are independent from political interference. Several local-level participants accused 
their senior management of being complicit with ministers. They criticised the 
pervasive deference of these officials to the ministers, describing senior 
management of HMPPS assuaging the ministerial plan rather than honestly 
describing how austerity affected the ground-level operations. The findings of this 
study oppose Sparks and Bottoms’ (1996) theory of a representational dimension: 
behaviour of officials typically represents the bureaucrats’ view of the prison system 
as a whole. Participants described ‘sycophant’, ‘kiss-ass’, and ‘yes sir attitudes’ 
affecting senior management who colluded with the politicians. The failure of the 
HMPPS upper echelons to manage ministerial expectation aligns with Gramsci's 
(1971) theory of how elites control state apparatuses to disseminate the values that 
reinforce their ruling position and the hegemonic project of neoliberalism. In 
revealing this phenomenon, the epistemological basis of the study allows for 
exploration of multiple truths and varying perspectives, even by those operating 
within one government department. 
11.4.2 The paradox of top-down governance’s shaping and constriction of prison 
health governance and healthcare delivery 
The findings of this study also demonstrate that the prison health system depends on 
the political compass of incumbent politicians. Conforming to a Weberian theory of 
bureaucracy as an iron cage that denies staff autonomy (Weber, 1930), participants 
articulated that the whims and fancies of these politicians dictated the delivery of 
healthcare in prisons. Specifically, ministers’ policies on sentencing, streamlining of 
the running of prisons, increasing size of prison estates, and lack of scrutiny of the 
relationships of the UK with the European Court of Human Rights were predicated 
on their capriciousness. Informants also described Gauke and Gove—who served as 
justice ministers in 2015 to 2016 and 2018 to 2019, respectively—to be on a liberal 
spectrum, but they saw Grayling (2012 to 2015) as authoritarian—based on their 
observations of the reforms executed for prisons over the last decade. As a result, 
the study shows that, given the high throughput of ministerial figures, prison service 
continues to be ill-equipped to translate vague and conflicting goals into integrated 
actions.  
This research further demonstrates how the prevailing political determinants for 
prisons will trump the dispersal mode of governance of health services. Similar to the 
top-down imposition of the economics of austerity, governance of prisons possesses 
a command-and control structure. It often collides with the execution of prison 
healthcare delivery, which is based on a more dispersed governance model than 
prisons. Participants mentioned navigating this tension. Social policy literature 
dismisses the hierarchical nature of governance and instead embraces self-
organisation, interorganisational cooperation, fluid interaction with stakeholders, and 




Rhodes, 1996). Bevir (2009), however, qualifies this assessment as there is a 
possibility of an exception to this generalisation—a discussion that is relevant to the 
prison system. Although Marks (2014) claims that command-and-control 
management techniques are not best suited to complex systems (e.g., healthcare), 
this research registers an exception to the existing literature. In particular, the 
prevailing political determinants are external to the NHS England remit (e.g., prisons) 
and will thus trump the dispersal mode of governance of health services. 
Participants’ observation of how the command-and-control prison structure trumps 
prison health governance and delivery is dramatised through the lack of coherent 
aims of imprisonment. The generalist nature of Rule 3 of the Prison Rules of 1999, 
which state that the purpose of prison service is to encourage and assist prisoners to 
lead a good and useful life, has been criticised as providing unfettered discretion for 
the Justice Ministers to dictate the purpose of imprisonment (Livingstone et al., 
2008). Policy documents have further highlighted the purposes of imprisonment. 
HMPPS (2021a) states that the functions of imprisonment are to execute court 
sentences, prevent further victimisation, and reduce reoffending via rehabilitation 
programmes (e.g., education, employment). However, the need to provide 
healthcare and well-being provisions has not been explicitly acknowledged within 
these official intentions. Furthermore, HMPPS priorities around security and public 
protection, as well as the managerial emphasis on cost-savings and efficiency to 
appease taxpayers (Liebling and Crewe, 2012; Loader and Sparks, 2002), often 
takes precedence over the prison health agenda of NHS England. Such political 
interference provides evidence of a classical theory on favourable agency myth: 
politicians can appear to be supportive of altruistic goals and yet those goals are 
impossible to achieve given political preferences and resource constraints (Lipsky, 
1980).  This study finds a mismatch between politicians’ will and resource constraints 
of public service, with the official goals and practices of the prison health agenda 
usually being portrayed as altruistic and civilised. A misalignment between the policy 
that recognises rehabilitation as a penal driver and extant resource constraints 
reinforce the conflict between ‘policy-in-form’ and ‘policy-in-use’ enacted on the 
‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ of policy formulation and implementation. Similar to 
Diamond et al. (2016) and Pierre and Peters (2020), authoritative and hierarchical 
governing remains relevant, which has shaped and constricted England’s prison 
health governance and delivery.  
Participants’ responses reflected the extent to which the state dictates the minutiae 
of prison health delivery. Albeit indirectly, it frustrates the notion of equivalence—by 
which prison health service provisions should be equivalent to community health 
services (WHO, 2014). The problem of equivalency is underscored by a participant’s 
observation of how a minister dismissed evidence on offending, mental health, and 
drug misuse issues among prisoners that would have been useful in supporting 
cases for healthcare equivalency. Another participant noted that a minister who, 




because there were individuals in the community who did not have access to 
computers. This observation runs parallel to the ‘less eligibility principle’: conditions 
in prisons should not be as good as conditions in the community’s labouring poor 
(Sim, 2002). In fact, underlying the structure of prison health governance and 
delivery is the state’s choice whether to exercise its power over health governance 
and the extent to which the state sees fit to align prison health governance and 
delivery with the prevailing political ideology (Holden, 2011; Peck and Tickell, 1994; 
Vayrynen, 1999).  
This study finding confirmed the academic observation that the rehabilitation ideal 
has been politically attacked for being insignificant, soft on crime, and ineffective in 
reducing the extent of reoffending (Cullen and Gendreau, 2001; Hollin and Bilby, 
2007). This development, then, reinvigorates punitive practices that stressed 
punishment, incapacitation, and deterrence (Garland, 2001; Pratt, 2007) via a top-
down structure that trumps prison health. Though the concepts of government 
without governance were in fashion in the 1990s (Rhodes, 1996), they tend to leave 
limited space for domination of one government agency over another. This study 
highlights an urgent need for a new definition of governance that seeks to mesh the 
theoretical representation of the prison health system and structure with the 
empirical manifestation of adaptation towards political activities or pressures.  
11.4.3 The growth of informal governance: prison gangs and serious organised 
crime groups in English prisons 
Despite the hierarchical nature of prisons, the top-down structure that has dominated 
is being replaced by another governance structure: prison gangs and organised 
crime groups. The growth of these informal governance structures has coincided 
with escalation in drug use within prisons, a domino effect created via a reduction in 
the number of prison officers—which has weakened the structure of institutional 
governance.  
Building on previous research (Gooch and Treadwell, 2020; Maitra, 2010; Skarbek, 
2011), this study demonstrates the sophistication of the microeconomic structure of 
organised crime. The findings show how gangs thrive in English prisons and reveals 
how criminal groups sustain a monopolistic market through coercion and violence. 
This study also highlights an important new finding: these groups prey on vulnerable 
staff and traffic drugs via former prisoners. Habermas’s (1973) crisis of legitimacy 
theory explains and conceptualises the lack of detection and enforcement that has 
resulted from having fewer prison custodians. A broader crisis of legitimacy of prison 
governance, resulting in a loss of control of the prison institution, undermines 
leadership and coordinated action for health delivery.  
Furthermore, several participants feared the total loss of order and governance in 
English prisons. They suggested that a situation similar to the Strangeways riot 




several participants as a consequence of prolonged austerity measures. The present 
findings provide a wake-up call regarding the cumulative effect of disruptions to 
prison authority—upending that contradicts the stable governance that is putatively a 
natural outgrowth of the top-down nature of England’s prison governance. 
11.5 The paradox of political rhetoric on tough on crime and ‘we are all in this 
together’ 
This section describes the paradox of the policy of ‘tough on crime’ from participants’ 
perspectives. Over the past few decades, this policy has been perpetuated by 
politicians. Additionally, this section will detail participants’ disbelief of the political 
slogan that ‘we are all in this together’ (Cameron, 2010a) that was orchestrated 
during the austerity period. 
11.5.1 The paradox of tough on crime 
Participants traced the provenance of the tough on crime movement to the 1990s, 
which marked an increased use of prison as a sentencing option—a policy that has 
continued to fuel political debate since. The UK’s major political parties have made 
an unwavering commitment to being tough on crime (Reiner, 2011), and politicians 
have repeated the message (Hough and Roberts, 2012; Lacey, 2008; Roberts et al., 
2011). As participants observed, penal politics are increasingly responsive to 
punitive and retributive public opinion (Bottoms, 1995; Loader, 2010; Pratt, 2000).  
Several participants suggested that historical statutory obligations, particularly those 
pre-2010, seemed to have maintained the high imprisonment rate. Citing the 
Criminal Justice Act of 2003 and the Indeterminate Sentences for Public Protections, 
they averred that prison sentence lengths for several serious crimes had dramatically 
increased despite diminishing crime levels and police resources. In addition, the rise 
in the prison population stems from the successful prosecutions of historical sex 
offences and use of indeterminate sentences—both continue despite being 
abolished legally in 2012 (Prison Reform Trust, 2020). The high rate of imprisonment 
in England has also been maintained by the incentivised recall policy of the now-
defunct Community Rehabilitation Companies. It was invoked for released prisoners 
not complying with their terms of releases and because of a decrease in the use of 
community sentences (Ministry of Justice, 2013). Statutory commitments run counter 
to austerity’s intentions: austerity demands reductions in public sector spending, yet 
the unabated imprisonment rate serves to do the opposite.  
This study tracks the drift in imprisonment, although existence of short sentences, 
criminal cases, and declining police resources are not yet systematically understood. 
The imprisonment rate stands at 174 prisoners per 100,000 people in England and 
Wales, far higher than the European average of 132 per 100,000 (House of 
Commons Library, 2019a). Although remaining high, the rate of imprisonment has 




at 45,500 cases—has prevented a surge (Crest Advisory, 2020). Several participants 
blamed the expansion of the prison population on the eagerness of judges and 
magistrates to impose carceral sentences. This majority view parallels the Ministry of 
Justice’s (2013) finding that those who committed violence against a person, drug 
offences, or sex crimes–the groups contributing most to the increase in the prison 
population–rarely received home detention curfew or a release on licence. A 
participant working as both a justice of the peace and a prison healthcare 
commissioner, explained that judges typically wanted to avoid custodial sentences, 
but sentencing guidelines constricted them. Given the current UK Prime Minister’s 
announcement in 2019 that police resourcing would increase by 2022, that police 
would extend stop and search, and officials would review sentencing for serious 
offenders (Ministry of Justice, 2019f), conceivably the imprisonment rate will continue 
to grow.  
Despite the political orchestration that ‘prison works’ (Parliament UK, 1993) and that 
crime is falling because of the incapacitating effects of prisons (Green et al., 2003), 
this study provides further evidence that being tough on crime does not reduce crime 
nor reoffending. A mere 17% of respondents considered crime to be an important 
issue in the UK today, compared to 25% in 2010 (Ipsos Mori, 2015; Ipsos Mori, 
2019). Attention during that epoch focused on issues related to immigration and 
Brexit (ibid.). Nearly seven in ten respondents in the nationwide Crime Survey for 
England and Wales believed that prison was ineffective in punishing those guilty of 
crimes (Ministry of Justice, 2015), thus refuting the politicians’ contention that prison 
works to deter crime. Additionally, reoffending rates continue to be high: 45% for all 
those released from custody and 61% for those serving a sentence of fewer than 12 
months (Ministry of Justice, 2020d). Despite the absence of evidence demonstrating 
that imprisonment reduces crime rates and reoffending, the government continues to 
advance penal drift by stating that ‘there are no plans to end short term prison 
sentences’ and that ‘sentencing must match the severity of the crime’ (CPT, 2020b). 
Additionally, the government responded to condemnation of the CPT after its 
inspection of England’s prison in 2019 by stating that it ‘does not propose to set 
arbitrary targets for reducing the prison population’ (ibid.). Despite evidence that it 
does not work to abate crime rate, this defensive response signals further expansion 
of imprisonment. 
11.5.2 The irony that ‘we are all in this together’ 
Despite then-Prime Minister David Cameron’s claim that ‘we are all in this together’ 
(Cameron, 2010a), this research demonstrates that the burden of austerity is not 
experienced equally. This fact is manifested in two ways: 1) the withdrawal of welfare 
services from the community and 2) deindustrialisation processes during the 
austerity period. Both phenomena signal a state withdrawal from the economy to 
allow the market to dictate the fate of the population—a key feature of 




individuals. It reaffirms the irony that ‘we are all in this together’, especially when 
those who engineered or profited from the asset bubbles do not bear the brunt of the 
resulting austerity; rather, workers and the poor do (Callinicos, 2012). 
A small number of participants argued that the loss of social and welfare services in 
the community forced penal institutions to become first responders. They traced this 
development to removal of funding from local authorities—especially social 
protection spending—upon which communities were dependent. There was a one-
third reduction in local authority budgets between 2010 and 2015 and another 56% 
decrease in central grant funding to local authorities between 2015 and 2020 (HM 
Treasury, 2015). This reveals the established link between poverty and social 
exclusion that compromises health (Davey Smith et al., 2001; Marmot, 2005; 
Whitehead, 2006; WHO, 2014). Social issues associated with relative deprivation, 
including imprisonment, are strongly linked to society’s unequal income distribution. 
The UK’s Gini coefficient, Palma Ratio, Top 1% share, S80/S20 ratio, and P90/P10 
ratio point to an increase in income inequality between 2010 and 2019 (Office for 
National Statistics, 2021a). Homelessness is up 60%, fitful sleeping has risen 134%, 
and use of food banks has increased four-fold between 2010 and 2018 (UN General 
Assembly, 2019). The social gradient in health illustrates that the lower a person’s 
social position, the worse his or her health (Marmot, 2020; Wilkinson and Pickett, 
2009). Participants argued that these individuals arrive at penal institutions 
possessing extraordinary complex health and social needs that have gone unmet 
owing to diminished community services from austerity.  
These participant remarks support the conclusion that poor health of prisoners is 
partly a by-product of their experiences before entering incarceration. Prisoners 
predominantly come from the most deprived sections of society, and they bring their 
poor health into prisons (Marmot, 2005; Spencer, 2001; Whitehead, 2006; Williams, 
1995; WHO, 2014). Many of the entrants in the criminal justice system have little 
education, low incomes, meagre employment opportunities, transient abodes, and 
unstable relationships (Prison Reform Trust, 2019). During a time of austerity, these 
experiences are even more pervasive and have a compounding effect on the 
population’s health and well-being, particularly when community assistance has 
been withdrawn owing to austerity measures of the government. Such consequential 
precursors cause neglect, inequality, and discrimination—all which prisoners 
cumulatively experienced. As Wacquant (2000) argued, neoliberalism doubly 
regulates the poor: by welfare conditions and sanctions and through the criminal 
justice system. When the function of the welfare state withers, the penal state 
flourishes in its place (ibid.). Participants articulated a closer meshing of conditional 
welfare and criminal sanctions over time, where the majority of English prisoners 
come from deprived areas and have experienced unemployment, homelessness, 




A parallel body of work exists that notes that imprisonment is as an opportunity to 
improve prisoner health (Crewe, 2005). This view is consistent with Goffman’s 
(1968) importation theory. It proposes that prisoners bring their life experiences into 
prison and that these experiences must be addressed during imprisonment. In fact, 
Wacquant (2002, p.388) has argued that health in prison or jail facilities cannot be 
described as ‘distortive and wholly negative’ because imprisonment acts as a 
‘stabilising and restorative force’, especially for those with many barriers to 
accessing healthcare in the community. However, the findings of this study 
contradict this argument. Leaving a citizen’s need for healthcare so underserved in 
the community to imprisonment is illogical. Study findings illustrate the raison d’etre 
of prison in its current form is punishment, not rehabilitation. Penal institutions lack 
the moral and financial means to assume the role of welfare provider, especially 
when access to healthcare and decent living provisions are deteriorating across 
English prisons. The fact that they are poor guarantors of crime prevention and 
reduction compromises hope for rehabilitation (Downes, 2001)—especially when 
entrée to healthcare is decreasing.  
The process of deindustrialisation in communities that were highly dependent on 
manufacturing industries further exposes the irony that the burden of austerity is 
experienced uniformly. Several participants observed how deindustrialisation of the 
1980s, the failure of miners’ strikes, and the long decline of working-class agency 
through the trade union movement have left them vulnerable (Milne, 2014). This 
observation supports existing research that suggest the impact of austerity is most 
severe in areas with high levels of deprivation (Beatty and Fothergill, 2017; Clifford et 
al., 2013; Jones et al., 2016; Taylor-Robinson and Gosling, 2011). These 
phenomena typify neoliberalism: allowing the market to dictate outcomes that led to 
deindustrialisation and withdrawing assistance to the point that the government 
becomes insensitive to the diurnal predicament of society’s members. Furthermore, 
one participant who was an academic and former cabinet office advisor, referenced 
a relationship between economic downturns and increased crime rates and 
incarcerations among former military and those who were affected by the steel 
industry closures across England. This finding advances extant, but currently limited, 
work that has examined latent links between the effect of austerity on areas with high 
levels of deprivation and the diminishing social and welfare services in these areas 
across England. There are clearly defined patterns of social deprivation and spatial 
segregation in such areas (Marmot, 2020; Pacione, 1997).  
In the face of inadequate community provisions for vulnerable individuals, the 
foregoing processes have left prisons as first responders. Although American 
criminologists have been quick to note how austerity and deindustrialisation in the 
United States reduce the lifespan of those living in poverty and exacerbate crime—
thus leading to imprisonment (Linkon and Russo, 2002; Nosrati et al., 2018)—these 




11.6 The paradox of the current government responses towards prison 
instability 
The government’s lack of meaningful action amounts to a political paradox when the 
solutions cohere with its neoliberal vision. This section will discuss participants’ 
responses towards three key governmental efforts to address prison instability: 1) 
building additional prisons to ease overcrowding; 2) recruiting new prison officers to 
instil enhanced stability in the English prison regime; and 3) blaming the rise of 
Spice—by instituting a claim that the profile of prisoners is changing—in an attempt 
to individualise explanation of the existing prison instability. It will also describe 
participants’ reactions to recent political announcements asserting that the era of 
austerity is finally ending. 
11.6.1 The paradox of the government’s solution towards prison instability 
As many interviewees suggested, building an additional prison space–20,000 cells 
anticipated by 2025 (CPT, 2020a)–disguises the longstanding issues of 
overcrowding and degrading living conditions in England’s prisons. In fact, they 
argued that it would increase the incarceration rate rather than improve prisoners’ 
safety (Garland, 2001). 
Participants commented on both the volume and skill level of the newly recruited 
prison officers hired to restore regime stability. Following several political 
announcements and the subsequent publication of the Prison Safety and Reform 
White Paper 2016, the government allocated £291 million to recruit 2,500 extra 
prison officers (Ministry of Justice, 2016). Participants involved in this programme 
initially perceived the recruitment campaign as successful. The government 
managed to recruit 4,500 new prison officers between 2016 and 2019 (Parliament 
UK, 2020). Nevertheless, based on the testimony of the majority of participants, the 
recruited number did not reinstate the original number of officers from the pre-
austerity era; plus, retention issues remained prevalent among this cohort.  
Participants portrayed the high rate of attrition for new recruits as symptomatic of the 
adverse working conditions; this milieu continues to destabilise prison health 
governance and delivery. This portrayal supports the observation that short terms of 
service have increased: 38% of departures in 2019 were officers who had served 
less than one year, up from 31% the previous year (HMPPS, 2019b). Their 
descriptions also corroborated the official report that in March 2019, one-half of 
prison officers in England had less than five years of experience, a large decline 
from 22% in March 2010 (ibid.). Forty-six percent had at least ten years of 
experience or more, down from 56% (HMPPS, 2019b), thus reflecting the culling 
associated with the Benchmarking Exercise in 2012. 
Beyond recruitment and retention, most interviewed prison governors and officers 




nearly at the same level as they were seven years ago, but the workforce is now 
much less experienced. Most participants, however, said that new prison officers 
were bereft of the physical and emotional agility or soft skills needed to perform their 
duties effectively (e.g., communicating with and befriending prisoners). Staff lacked 
the training to act as prisoners’ mentors, counsellors, and social workers, despite 
their being required by the government to provide such support (HMPPS, 2021b). 
This study thus adds evidence to the phenomenon of deskilling (Royal Society of 
Arts, 2016). Participants also highlighted that new and inexperienced staff 
sometimes struggled with challenging disobedient prisoner behaviour, leading them 
to question the legitimacy of prison governance.  
Several participants also mentioned how politicians opportunistically blamed 
increasing prison instability on the augmented use of Spice. To them, imputing 
prison instability to drugs alone did not address the core of the problem and masked 
how the reduction in the number of prison officers had exacerbated the less 
rehabilitative environment in prisons. Apart from being framed as an attempt to 
individualise the discourse on the existing prison instability, attributing problems to 
Spice rather than austerity resembles interpretive denial (Cohen, 2001): prison 
instability was being inputted and framed onto the use of drugs rather than onto the 
austerity that hindered purposeful activities and reduced workforce capacity to 
conduct drug searches. Extending Cohen’s sociology of denial theory, Copes (2003) 
suggested that deniers often use denial techniques to justify their actions and 
simultaneously cleanse their consciences. Such denial is similar to the government’s 
dispensing £10 million to reduce violence and restrict drugs in ten underperforming 
prisons (Ministry of Justice, 2018a).  
In a noteworthy response, a prison policymaker participant argued that austerity did 
not exacerbate prison instability. Indeed, he claimed that there was no evidence 
confirming an association between financial reduction and prison instability. Using 
the lens of literal denial by Cohen (2001), the participant’s proposition suggests that 
there is no validity to assertions that human rights infringements occur in prisons in 
England and Wales. The denial of the linkage between austerity and prison instability 
have manufactured doubt about the validity of the relationship between the two 
(Magnus, 2008). By arguing that there is a lack of evidence, such denialism locates 
itself within agnotology—or the promotion of ignorance and indifference. Denialism is 
a social science theory that illustrates how those in power attempt to gaslight or 
manipulate the public by fragmenting the reality of austerity (Proctor and 
Schiebinger, 2008). Demonstrating with quantitative precision that austerity is 
responsible for worsening prison health in England is beyond the scope of this study. 
Nonetheless, an overwhelming majority of participants explicitly rejected the minority 
claim that additional evidence was needed to prove that austerity has been a 





11.6.2 The rhetoric that austerity is ending 
Nearly all participants expressed scepticism about the Treasury's announcements of 
the imminent end of austerity in 2019. They felt that austerity’s end date would be 
protean as the planned date approaches and that general elections will continually 
motivate politicians to postpone the end date of austerity. This study’s findings 
support existing academic and policy observations (Farnsworth and Irving, 2015; 
The Conservative and Unionist Party, 2017; Vina et al., 2013). Eleven months apart 
in 2018 and 2019, two different chancellors announced that the austerity era was 
ending (HM Treasury, 2019b; 2019c), without any alteration to prison and prisoner 
health resources. Additionally, there is recent evidence that the UK’s economy has 
been growing for years. It had not returned to the low recession point of 2009, plus 
growth had exceeded 2% since 2013 (OECD, 2018). Typifying Klein (2007) and 
Blyth (2013), this denouement signified how politicians created their own crisis and 
resorted to neoliberal adjustments as solutions. 
Additionally, given the absence of resource injections, several policymaking 
participants pointed to HMPPS’s utilisation of capital spending for operational 
purposes. Indeed, official data shows £235 million were transferred from the capital 
to the operational budget between 2017 and 2018 (House of Commons Scrutiny 
Unit, 2018). Capital spending on prisons has focused on ‘improving statutory 
compliance and addressing issues such as fire safety, water hygiene, and asbestos’ 
(NAO, 2020); this is a sign that austerity remains in place. 
A series of reforms that the government executed has only reorganised the existing 
funding allocation. Several participants explained that a new cash injection for ten 
underperforming prisons provided by Rory Stewart, when he was the prison minister 
in 2018 (Ministry of Justice, 2018a), actually was derived from other prison 
establishments' budgets. Many prison officers expressed cynicism about the 
announcement from erstwhile Prime Minister Theresa May that civil servants would 
receive a 2% pay increase in 2019 (Ministry of Justice, 2019e). This plan required 
prison governors to find 1% from their internal budget to be matched by the 
government’s 1%. Participants described this as a token increase in resources. 
Additionally, to portray that the era of austerity had not ended, some participants 
reasoned that the NHS funding remained below the level of demand. The 
government promised a funding increase of £20.5 billion for the entire NHS by 
2023/2024, funded through a combination of tax increases and a Brexit dividend 
(Prime Minister's Office, 2018). To the participants, NHS funding was for all parts of 
the organisation. Given the ‘Cinderella status’ of prison health, some participants 
expressed that responding to people in Accident and Emergency and ensuring that 
hospitals did not detain people longer than they needed to be would assume priority.  
Many participants also did not believe that austerity would cease in the wider 




number of homeless and a visible dependency on food banks—both indicators that 
austerity persists as a policy (UN General Assembly, 2019). This austerity 
phenomenon indicates that the burden of adjustment is not experienced equitably; it 
also confirms that austerity is not abating. 
Finally, informants' optimism regarding the recent promise of a cash injection was 
tentative, at best, because Brexit—which was to fund this injection—was expected to 
reduce trade flows and stall economic growth (Erken et al., 2017; Mion and Ponattu, 
2019; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016). The Bank of England's (2020) prediction that 
Britain would experience its worst recession in 300 years and that its economy would 
likely suffer the most extreme damage of any country in the developed world from 
the COVID-19 crisis (Bank of England, 2020) suggest a dark future. In fact, the UK is 
set to weather another austerity era, as the current Chancellor of Exchequer, Rishi 
Sunak, announced a more than £10 billion per year decrease from departmental 
spending plans next year and for subsequent years (HM Treasury, 2020). In five-
years’ time, departments’ day-to-day budgets will be £13 billion lower than had been 
planned in March (ibid.), which contradicts the political rhetoric that austerity is 
ending. 
11.7 The paradox of scrutiny 
Despite the continual monitoring of prisons and prison health by internal and external 
mechanisms, these mechanisms have had limited impact on effectively holding the 
government to account for implementing austerity programmes that have led to the 
deterioration in prison health and its supportive prison regime. This phenomenon 
calibrates the paradox of scrutiny: the monitoring organisations lack sufficient power 
and independence to instigate reforms with independent organisations—such as 
voluntary ones—because they are increasingly subjected to a gag clause in return 
for continued funding. The establishment of these institutions alone cannot constitute 
an effective remedy for rectifying violation of prisoners’ human rights. 
For internal monitoring, some civil servant participants explained that they would 
escalate issues that emanated from austere measures via their line management. In 
particular, those occupying policymaking strata reported to high-level partnership 
boards across governmental departments, such as the National Partnership Board 
(Ministry of Justice, 2018b). Those functioning across prison establishments would 
typically raise a series of issues with their line managers. Broadly, their activities of 
escalation mirror Goffman’s (1961) traditional portrayal of the carceral state of 
hierarchical, top-down leadership, where operations are highly dependent on the 
prevailing stance of the government.  
Subscribing to the top-down culture of prisons, the majority of civil service 
participants avoided using the word ‘austerity’ in their interviews. They discussed 
austerity indirectly, using phrases such as ‘lack of funding’ and ‘working under 




managerial depoliticises the construct of austerity and embodies the sociological 
theory of implicatory denial (Cohen, 2001)—officials act as ordered, and their duty to 
obey supersedes their moral principles. Routinisation arises (i.e., normalisation of 
catastrophic events), and subjects (in this case, prisoners) are dehumanised when 
they are deemed undeserving members of the community. Participants illustrate how 
they have imbibed the neoliberal hegemony in a flawed narrative that austerity has 
streamlined prison service. Acceptance of this flawed view has depoliticised the 
political construct of austerity, as participants felt that they have no alternative but to 
execute the will of politicians through economic logic. Such thinking has obscured 
the use of austerity as a political apparatus and afforded its being subjected to 
limited political accountability.  
Despite their membership of the PGA and POA, several participants expressed 
scepticism about the effectiveness of these unions. Although a minority mentioned 
the close links between these unions and politicians (irrespective of party politics), 
most participants’ descriptions contained scepticism that these groups could have 
any effective influence on overturning the austerity measures that have been harmful 
to prison governance. In part, some participants felt that austerity was a political 
decision. Therefore, challenging prison service management on this ground would 
be futile. This attitude reflects previous studies that have illustrated the level of 
disinterest in national issues with more concern about the prison in which union 
members work and their immediate environment (Bennett and Wahidin, 2008). 
Similarly, this study’s findings highlight the ineffectiveness of the parliamentary 
inquiries in challenging the government’s measures of austerity on prisons. Despite 
continual parliamentary inquiries, participants argued that their barrage of reports 
and the colossal number of recommendations have yet to engender effective reform 
across English prisons. Although the government has promised many reforms over 
the last decade, it has made no real effort to fulfil them effectively. This finding is in 
line with extant studies and exemplifies the issues of compliance of the government 
with parliamentary committees (Brazier and Fox, 2011; Defty et al., 2014; Rogers 
and Walters, 2006). This study provides initial evidence in assessing the 
effectiveness of these parliamentary committees in the context of prison and prison 
health. 
 
Throughout this study, participants from all layers of governance emphasised the 
lack of effectiveness of prison oversight—such as HMIP, PPO, IMB, and CQC—that 
have allowed the government to continue restructuring the prison service. In turn, 
they noted that prison health governance and delivery have declined. Although a 
minority of participating governors alluded to the value of these organisations as an 
accountability structure for their delivery, many participants identified HMIP’s failure 
to comment on government resource allocation issues and viewed this failure as 
political. A few participants felt that many issues emanated from the lack of 




such decisions. They felt that the HMIP did not fully utilise the power and 
independence guaranteed by the statutory provision of section 5A of the Prison Act 
1952 (as amended) and were directly answerable to the UN OPCAT (NPM, 2021). 
The findings of this study fill the scholarly gap identified by Padfield (2018, p. 57): 
“Little has been written on the effectiveness of prison monitoring, especially in the 
academic literature, and empirical studies are even rarer”. By examining the extent 
of effectiveness of external monitors in impacting those who work and live in prisons, 
this study seeks to address the lacuna that Padfield (2018) noted. It reveals that, like 
the UN OPCAT, the PPO and IMBs have failed to challenge the governance and 
commissioning of prison healthcare to ensure prisoner health and well-being. In 
revealing these failures, the current study contradicts earlier investigations of these 
boards that have presented a more favourable view of these institutions’ role in 
highlighting and preventing institutional abuse and upholding accountability (Bennett, 
2016; Lewis, 1997; Ramsbotham, 2003).  
Recent studies indicate that these agencies have a more managerial than monitoring 
agenda; as such, the failures of the prison service become management summaries 
because the agencies are becoming monitoring bodies with minimal power to 
sanction, compared to when they were initially established (Behan and Kirkham, 
2016; Bennett, 2016; Padfield, 2018). At times, reports have led to negative media 
publicity, yet action and meaningful change have been absent. However, the latest 
HMIP report explains that one-half of the HMIP recommendations for improvement 
have not been achieved in 2019/2020 (HMIP, 2020). This fact suggests that 
inspections of prisons and their healthcare services have failed to ensure prisoner 
health and well-being. This study provides an alternative explanation for why 
organisations have failed to act on evidence of poor performance, despite a 
continual level of monitoring. 
This study also reveals that different monitoring agencies have contradicted each 
other. HMIP, CQC, PPO, and IMBs have expressed serious concerns about prison 
staff’s failure to implement improvements following their reports (House of Commons 
Library, 2019b). Although these organisations have evaluated prison conditions and 
fostered indispensable political, policy, and public conversation about them, their 
conclusions have not necessarily aligned with their findings. For instance, HMIP 
undermined its criticism by stating that the English prison service is not entirely in 
crisis, pointing to the minority of prisons that were relatively safe, calm, and 
professional, and where staff were caring (HMIP, 2019). In contrast, in its annual 
report, the PPO, described the prison system as in crisis (PPO, 2017). Critically 
questioning why these oversight mechanisms were not in unity in challenging the 
government is important.   
Third sector organisations that receive funding for prison health services have 
experienced gag clauses that prevent them from inveighing against austerity. 




gag clauses as ranging from a general description of a need to observe 
‘confidentiality’ and ‘secrecy’ to more specific requirements such as ‘using 
appropriate channels of communication’. Consequences for breaching the terms of 
the contract include service termination. This finding adds evidence from the penal 
sector to the existing consensus among social policy theorists that dependencies on 
a state’s extensive resources and political power can force voluntary organisations to 
conform to a top-down agenda and solidify principal-agent relationships that could 
stymie their advocacy arm (Baggott, 2013; Carmel and Harlock, 2008; House of 
Commons Select Committee on Public Administration, 2011; Kelly, 2007; Lewis, 
2005; Martikke and Moxham, 2010). As such, their ability to gain consensus from 
those within the government structure could be limited and the scope of negotiations 
for ameliorating issues concerning prison and prison health could be constricted.  
Nonetheless, despite existence of gagging clauses in their funding agreements, 
some organisations with national presence have embraced their advocacy roots. 
They tread carefully between contractual obligations and conscience for advocacy 
and between overt and covert forms of resistance. According to participants working 
in these sectors, this position, is often reinforced by the size, status, and reputation 
of the organisation. Larger, more established organisations may be able to raise 
those issues and deviate from prevailing political norms without fear of legal 
repercussions. Smaller organisations might utilise internal channels of 
communication to raise concerns, as described in their contractual terms. This 
behaviour among smaller organisations fits within what Hall (2011) termed 
'disaffected consent'. Such organisations present themselves as a legitimate partner 
in delivering state services, refraining from challenging their funder (Newman, 2012). 
This collusion reflects an abandonment of equality and justice and a mutation of 
these values into consumerist logic. It reproduces neoliberalism in ways that 
challenge the hegemonic process (Clarke, 2008; Hall, 2011; Larner et al., 2007; 
Massey, 2011; Newman, 2012). 
Overall, this thesis sought to fill the gaps of sparse research on how prison health 
organisations respond when expected to incorporate neoliberal changes into their 
work. Reflecting on the gagging of charitable organisations (Disability News Service, 
2019), as well as the statutory obligations under the Lobbying Act 2014, this study 
provides preliminary indications that gag clauses have increasingly crept into the 
work of prison health charities. It identifies a trend that can be generalised to 
charitable sector operations across the UK, whereby the work of members of such 
organisations reflects the viewpoint of their funders.  As a consequence, the voices 




11.8 Undoing austerity: Applied implications of the research  
Social science excels at analysing and theorising political and social activities but not 
at informing policymaking. More than eight decades ago, Keynes (1936) argued that 
the market did not show any signs of correcting a free market economy’s negative 
externalities. Because questions of resource allocation are too important for 
politicians and economists alone to determine, this chapter considers seven 
measures participants suggested to undo the effects of austerity on prison health 
over the last decade.  
11.8.1 Reduce the prison population 
First, all participants exhorted the government to reduce the current prison 
population in England. Considering that the annual average cost per prison is 
£38,042 (Ministry of Justice, 2017a), the state should consider alternatives to 
imprisonment. Consistent with prior work which has argued that prisons should 
house only those whose incarceration protects public safety (Mills and Kendall, 
2018), participants believed that fines, community service, and diversion of prisoners 
with acute mental health problems to a hospital or community-based treatment are 
less costly, more proportionate to criminal harm, more responsive to prisoners’ 
needs (especially for those with mental health issues), and less disruptive to 
prisoners’ families and social networks.  
In providing enhanced insight into the need to reduce the prison population, several 
participants also suggested eliminating short sentences and providing amnesty for 
petty crimes. Apart from being more financially sustainable than extant efforts, they 
are safer options, especially for reducing COVID-19 transmissions (and other 
potential pandemics) among prisoners and staff (Ismail and Forrester, 2020b). This 
reasoning would appeal to the right-wing groups that might object to these measures 
as being soft on crime.  
11.8.2 Making investments in prisons and community services 
Second, participants suggested making investments in prisons and community 
services. Apart from improving prisoners’ living conditions to mitigate current prison 
instability, the recurring spending could address potential risk factors at early 
stages—for instance, via early years’ interventions and mentoring of at-risk youths—
which might well provide further evidential support for existing work (UN General 
Assembly, 2019). Doing so would inspire sentencers’ confidence in awarding non-
carceral sentences subject to the permitting sentencing guidance.  
11.8.3 Tax on corporations and the wealthy 
Third, participants proposed a tax increase on profitable corporations and wealthy 
individuals. Echoing Ruckert and Labonté (2017), reinforcing more progressive 




addressing discrepancies in corporate tax rates would address the actual root of the 
financial crisis and highlight that being tough on crime is not financially sustainable. 
For instance, a negligible recovery rate of 0.05% (five pence per pound sterling) for 
the £5.8 billion tax evasion by multinational companies (Financial Times, 2017) could 
raise £29 million. This runs parallel to the most recent iteration of the British Social 
Attitudes survey, which found that support for ‘tax more, spend more’ is at 60%—the 
highest level in 15 years (National Centre for Social Research, 2018). The additional 
funding could be invested in critical services while ensuring that it fits the pattern of 
discourse established by the UK media and opinion leaders concerning taxation and 
the broader issue of resource allocation. 
11.8.4 Greater transparency  
Fourth, participants emphasised the need for greater transparency in economic data 
to expose the paradox of austerity. Consistent with Chang (2010), improving the 
public’s political literacy will facilitate reclaiming the narrative that austerity is a 
political, rather than economic, imperative, and that living in conditions of economic 
scarcity and extreme inequality is unacceptable. Several participants’ 
recommendations provide new nuances on framing messages regarding how prison 
health spending can reduce reoffending and lessen the demand for health and law 
enforcement services. Participants’ argument of how multidrug-resistant tuberculosis 
bred in prison caused 20,000 deaths in Russia in the late 1990s (WHO, 2006) could 
be used as logic regarding the increased value that taxpayers’ monies could have on 
a safer society if the funds are directed at improving prison conditions. 
Attaching enhanced accountability for programmes to their relevant ministers (e.g., 
attributing the probation service failure to Chris Grayling, the erstwhile Justice 
Minister, who also executed the Benchmarking Exercise contributing to the existing 
prison instability) would improve political accountability and transparency. It would 
also provide a continual thread of evidence that politicians are responsible for 
directing governmental policies (Boin, 2001; Terry, 1995). As prisons are a hidden 
department compared to other public services, opening them up for increased 
accountability and transparency is the way forward. 
11.8.5 Better data collection and publication 
Fifth, participants suggested that ameliorated data collection and dissemination 
would facilitate the governance and delivery of prison health in England. These 
efforts would ensure augmented, transparent reporting of the true costs of 
imprisonment and violent incidents and illuminate the burgeoning prison population’s 
latent needs—including their complex health needs (NAO, 2017).  
Enhanced data monitoring would also highlight the role of private prisons and 
expose their actual costs to the public purse. Alongside the need for future studies 




justice system in England, such research would warn government actors not to 
accept the promises of private companies at face value, but to reduce corporate 
welfare and expedite the demise of private sector operations in prison health and 
prison service as a whole. 
Moreover, conducting a thorough impact assessment to forecast the fiscal impact on 
prisons (and other public sector services) prior to the imposition of future funding 
cuts should become mandatory. Participants suggested that these analyses should 
be publicised to allow for media and public scrutiny. Drawing on and advancing 
previous research (Stuckler and Basu, 2013), when citizens can access and engage 
with the data, politicians can then be truly held accountable for their budget decisions 
and the effects of those decisions on lives and deaths in prisons. Transparency 
would expose the systemic government manipulations of data and political 
misconduct that constitute breaches in public office duties. 
11.8.6. External organisations calls for a reduction in imprisonment and monitoring of 
recommendations for prisons 
Sixth, like austerity, imprisonment is a political choice. To enable effective responses 
to existing prison instability, participants called for advocates and researchers to 
scrutinise the current government’s leadership and hold decision makers 
accountable for their actions or inaction. Building upon existing work (Scott, 2018; 
Green and Ward, 2004), non-governmental organisations—such as Amnesty 
International and the Association for the Prevention of Torture, as well as those in 
the UK, such as the Howard League for Penal Reform, the Prison Reform Trust, and 
INQUEST— should consistently articulate the impact of austerity on prisoners, 
remind the state not to breach health standards, monitor compliance, and, as a last 
resort, name and shame human rights violators. Participants, indeed, went further by 
recommending establishment of an independent oversight authority to ensure proper 
implementation of recommendations resulting from prison monitoring and 
inspections. Holding the government to account through legal power could also close 
the crisis-reform-crisis-reform loop. 
11.8.7 Legal action 
Seventh, based on the successes of prisoners in invoking the European Convention 
on Human Rights to improve their health and well-being (Karamalidou, 2017; van Zyl 
Smit and Snacken, 2009), participants suggested that prisoners and their concerned 
others should be encouraged to initiate legal action against government austerity 
measures via the right to life and violation of the prohibition of torture under Articles 2 
and 3 of the Convention. Courts could then assist in addressing political policies and 
laws and regulations that are unresponsive to legitimate demands for healthcare 
resources (Syrett, 2007). Inspection reports by the HMIP and CPT could be used as 




Some participants also suggested that prisoners take legal action via section 1(2) of 
the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act of 2007. That section 
avers that the impediment of access to healthcare, as well as worsening living 
conditions and increasing violence in prisons, could constitute corporate 
manslaughter. If so, a gross breach of a duty of care would be occurring owing to 
serious management failures. As one participant noted, a test case is needed to 
ensure that legal obligations are cemented and enforced through the law, as the 
2007 Act has thus far garnered minimal successful prosecution and sanction 
(Tombs, 2018). 
Finally, prisoners’ exposure to torture, cruel treatment, or punishment is a human 
rights transgression amounting to state-sponsored crime (Green and Ward, 2004). 
Irrespective of active violations of human rights or passive failures to protect 
individuals against violations of their rights, academics and advocacy organisations 
must demonstrate how prisoners’ micro-experiences connect to the neoliberal state’s 
reorganisation of markets via macroeconomic austerity and the dismantling of social 
security systems. The state crime caused by austerity—imposed on one of the 
marginalised groups within today’s society—is a fertile field for health and 
criminological inquiry and vital for highlighting how austerity has dismantled the 
safety net of marginalised English citizens. 
Summary 
This Discussion chapter has analysed key issues arising from the research findings 
and subsumed them within the broader theoretical and conceptual perspectives of 
the debate concerning austerity, neoliberalism, and prison health governance and 
healthcare delivery. This study argues that austerity has exposed the political 
paradoxes that have shaped and constrained prison health governance and delivery 
of prison healthcare in England. 
Austerity and imprisonment have failed to deliver their stated objectives: to reduce 
the burgeoning national debt rapidly and to accrue cost savings via privatisation of 
services. Yet, after over a decade of failure, England’s government continues to 
pursue these avenues, producing the same results with significant political 
reluctance to dispense with them. Despite the maintenance of the same level of 
prison health funding of NHS England and the healthcare equivalency that 
guarantees the same level of access to healthcare for prisoners as for those in the 
community, deterioration in prison health governance and delivery of healthcare has 
ensued. This is evidenced by the growth in prisoners’ health needs and the reduction 
in the size of the healthcare workforce, as well as by prisoners’ obstructed access to 
healthcare and the declining living environment and safety in prisons.  
This study highlights the discrepancies in the top-down governance of prison service. 
A combination of ministers’ direction of the policies and delivery of prison agenda 




serious organised crime across English prisons, has challenged the stability of this 
mode of governance. Inevitably, the prevailing political structure of the prison service 
constricts the governance of prison health and healthcare delivery. Furthermore, the 
paradox of being tough on crime encourages harsher statutory commitment that 
maintains a high rate of imprisonment; yet the logic that ‘we are all in this together’ 
has been exposed via the visible loss of welfare services and deindustrialisation 
processes that inevitably targeted poor people as the ideal candidates for 
imprisonment. 
Initiating reforms that fail to resolve the scarcity of resources issue merely exposes 
the extent to which solutions permeate the political vision of neoliberalism. 
Additionally, limited actions taken by the oversight mechanisms of prisons signifies 
the paradox of monitoring mechanisms and challenges their very existence. Seven 
recommendations have been proposed, from reducing the prison population and 
increasing spending on the community services to calling for greater transparency in 
political accountability and catalysing legal actions against the government via the 
routes of European Convention on Human Rights, the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007, and state crime. To untangle the political paradoxes 
that have shaped and constricted prison health governance and delivery of 
healthcare in England and to realise its utility, an increasing radical and upstream 
approach needs to be created to effectuate a change through recommendations 
such as those offered here. 
The next chapter will conclude the thesis by exploring the impact of the findings of 
this research, outlining its research strengths and limitations, and discussing its 




Chapter 12: Conclusion 
12.1 Revisiting research questions  
This study’s investigation was guided by the main research question: “How does 
austerity impact prison health governance and healthcare delivery in England?” 
Drawing from the perspectives of 87 prison health experts, this thesis argues that 
austerity exposes six political paradoxes that have shaped and constrained prison 
health in England since 2010. These paradoxes are: i) the need for austerity and 
cost-saving measures; ii) the operationalisation of prison health within a punishment 
structure; iii) the perceived stability of a structured, top-down control of prison service 
that affects the governance and delivery of prison health services; iv) the 
orchestration of political rhetoric on tough on crime and ‘we are all in this together’; v) 
mobilisation of neoliberal responses of the government towards prison instability that 
do not appear to address the root cause of it; and vi) continual scrutiny on prisons 
and prison health that have yet to initiate paradigm-shifting in ensuring a stable 
prison regime that is conducive for the governance and delivery of healthcare 
services in English prisons.  
Overall, the findings demonstrate that austerity has failed to reduce the burgeoning 
national debt, to control the governance and delivery of effective and efficient 
healthcare services, and to improve the utility of health among prisoners in England. 
The subsequent sections describe how this study’s findings answer the research 
questions that have been operationalised for this study.   
12.1.1. In what ways have austerity been mobilised as a vehicle to strengthen 
neoliberal constructs that impact prison health governance and the delivery of prison 
healthcare services in England? 
Study participants opined that austerity had been mobilised as a vehicle to 
strengthen neoliberal constructs via two political fallacies: i) the economy needs to 
be balanced to reduce burgeoning national debt, and ii) the national credit card 
(government borrowing) is reaching its spending limit. Although appearing to be 
common sense, study participants vigorously challenged this reasoning from both 
economic and ideological perspectives. They argued that the UK was not part of the 
Eurozone, and yet it opted for voluntary and pre-emptive deflation (Gamble, 2014; 
Schrecker, 2016). By claiming that the national credit card had reached its limit, 
participants critiqued that this fallacy would lead to economic shrinkage from the lack 
of stimulation via demands for goods and services (Blyth, 2013; Stiglitz, 2014; 
Weeks, 2019).  
More broadly, despite a political claim that austerity was necessary to reduce the 
state debt, participants observed that the debt-to-GDP ratio rose to 84.6% in 2020, 
following the government’s concerted effort to bail out the banks (Farnsworth, 2018; 




Conservative politicians initiated towards the previous Labour government, 
specifically, their claim that their political predecessors had mismanaged the 
economy (Gamble, 2014).  
All of these strategies were opportunistically executed, considering that it was 
impossible to assess the feasibility of how HMPPS could deliver £900 million in 
savings by 2015 without reducing the prison population (European Public Service 
Union, 2016; HM Treasury, 2018; NOMS, 2015; O’Dea and Preston, 2010). Overall, 
presenting austerity as an imperative neuters political criticisms. It also dislodges its 
implementation from the neoliberal framework, in which its impacts were visible to 
prison healthcare and the broader prison regime.  
12.1.2 How is austerity manifested upon prison healthcare governance and 
healthcare delivery, as well as the supportive prison regime?  
The government’s implementation of austerity measures, per participants’ views, 
resulted in the stagnant prison health funding that ignored increased complexities of 
prisoner health, alongside poorer healthcare provisions and purposeful activities for 
prisoners, which served as a form of double punishment. Despite the increased 
complexities in terms of prison population’s health compared to the general public 
(Dolan et al., 2016; Fazel et al., 2016; Forrester et al., 2013; Herbert et al., 2012; 
Ritter et al., 2011; Stürup-Toft et al., 2018), stagnant prison health funding over this 
period effectively has meant fewer resources were available to address prisoners’ ill-
health effectively (NAO, 2017). The study participants articulated how they adjusted 
their healthcare services by resorting to extreme cost-saving measures, such as 
reducing services, paying less for staff, and opting for the use of volunteers for 
services. Given the poor retention of the healthcare workforce, participants also had 
to use agency staff, which were more expensive, lessening the cost-saving 
measures and predicted to worsen given the lack of a coherent government 
approach to recruitment and migration policies and uncertainties of Brexit (The 
Health Foundation, 2019). 
Consequentially, imprisonment can be an indirect form of double punishment where 
the strict imposition of austerity leads to indifference towards the incarcerated 
population’s needs. The participants observed that following a 30% reduction in 
prison staff between 2009 and 2017 (CPT, 2017; NAO, 2017), there was an 
increased inability of prisoners to attend healthcare arrangements, frequent 
postponement or cancellation of appointments, longer waiting times to access 
treatment and insufficient consultation time with medical professionals. In fact, the 
participants described how prisoners’ prolonged and inadequate access to acute and 
urgent healthcare services, such as operations and cancer treatment, caused death 
and disability.  
Additionally, the participants linked the shortage of prison officers and prisoners 




riots, assaults, and self-harm. These findings shine a contextual light onto a 
catalogue of failures reported by official reports (CPT, 2017; CPT, 2020a; House of 
Commons Justice Committee, 2016; House of Commons Library, 2017; Ministry of 
Justice, 2020f). Moreover, staff reduction made it impossible to curb the flow of 
psychoactive substances, which increased by 447 times in 2019 since 2010 (Ministry 
of Justice, 2019b). This study provides further context that these substances 
increased medical emergency cases, created a fearful environment for staff and 
vulnerable prisoners, undermined health interventions, and called upon external 
healthcare resources (e.g., ambulances) that were already stretched. 
 
Located within the broader context of government outsourcing, the research findings 
confront the logic that increasing privatisation of prisons and prison healthcare 
services would save the government in spending. Given the limited scope of 
accountability and quality control on these private contractors, the participants 
imposed closer monitoring on these private contractors. While those who were in the 
commissioning roles attempted to address the potential democratic deficit (Chomsky, 
1999), they were also honest that doing so would inevitably increase transaction 
costs, which is antithetical to the cost-saving driver of the government. Furthermore, 
the 2019 transfer of HMP Birmingham from G4S to the public sector and the 
bankruptcy of Carillion were the highest-profile failures of this strategy during the 
period of the study (Ministry of Justice, 2018a; Sasse et al., 2019). These events 
pointed to the continued subsidisation of private businesses’ failure, in which the 
taxpayers will cover the costs (Farnsworth, 2012; 2013). Not only has privatisation 
failed to achieve systematic innovation and efficiency, but also it costs more in the 
long run. 
12.1.3 How has the top-down control of the prison service affected prison health 
governance and healthcare delivery across English prisons? 
The study participants unpacked how prisons’ top-down governance constricts how 
prison health and healthcare services are governed and delivered in England. 
Similar to the top-down imposition of the economics of austerity, the governance of 
prisons dictates a top-down control of how prison health and healthcare services are 
governed and delivered in England. This research registers an exception to the 
existing literature on dispersal governance (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Fidler, 2007; 
Kooiman and van Vliet, 1993; Rhodes, 1996), whereby the prevailing political 
determinants trump the governance and delivery of health in prisons by NHS 
England. Given the lack of coherent aims of imprisonment under Rule 3 of the Prison 
Rules 1999, as well as competing priorities around security, public protection, cost-
savings, and efficiency (Liebling and Crewe, 2012; Loader and Sparks, 2002), the 
agendas force the prison health system in England to align itself with the prevailing 




This top-down sentiment was further unpacked by the participants’ arguments that 
the justice ministers were omnipotent and ordered how prison policy and services 
should be delivered across English prisons. Although the portrayal of civil servants 
being independent of political interference (Gash et al., 2010) and despite section 11 
of the Prison Act 1952 holds prison governors responsible for their establishments, 
examples from this study illustrate the opposite: the civil servants must navigate 
political mines carefully and conform to the political vision of ministers.  
The political orientation of ministers would dictate the governance, policy, and 
delivery within the prison service. Furthermore, ministers’ temporary nature resulted 
in ‘butterfly’ policies—moving from one policy reform to another—which did not 
provide stability and continuity in policy implementation. These political figures are 
transient (Flinders, 2002), and the perpetual political leadership change allows 
ministers to detach from responsibility in the event of a crisis.  
The growth of informal governance, in the form of prison gangs and serious 
organised crime groups, further challenged the stability of the top-down control of the 
English prison service. This growth parallels the increasing use of psychoactive 
substances, which weaken institutional governance. Building upon previous research 
(Gooch and Treadwell, 2020; Maitra, 2010; Skarbek, 2011), this study illustrates how 
these criminal groups trafficked drugs via former prisoners to supply contraband, 
preyed on vulnerable staff to bring in contrabands, and sustained drug markets via 
coercion and violence. The participants observed that having fewer prison officers 
resulted in a loss of control of the prison institution (similar to the Strangeways Riot 
in 1990) and undermined coordinated action for health delivery. These facts are in 
line with the crisis of legitimacy theory (Habermas, 1973).  
12.1.4 To what extent did longstanding issues of English prisons impact prison 
health governance and delivery of healthcare, as well as the broader prison regime, 
once austerity was put into place in 2010? 
The study participants articulated how the longstanding issues of overcrowding and 
more punitive sentencing policies, as well as how the poor continued to bear the 
brunt of reduced resources in the community, worsened the impacts of austerity on 
prison healthcare and the broader prison regime since 2010. The longstanding issue 
of overcrowding, according to the participants, juxtaposed the worsening problems of 
hygiene and cell maintenance since the implementation of austerity. This 
observation supports how the existing prison conditions exacerbate the poor health 
of prisoners (House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee, 2018; NAO, 
2020), which became an increasing concern given the increase in cases and deaths 
linked to COVID-19 in English prisons (Burki, 2020; HMPPS, 2021c; Ismail and 
Forrester, 2020b; Kinner et al., 2020). 
The perpetuation of the political slogan of ‘tough on crime’ over the past few decades 




imprisonment rate. Alongside the use of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the 
indeterminate sentences for public protection, successful prosecution for historical 
sexual offences, increases in the recall policy for released prisoners not complying 
with their terms of releases, and limited use of community resources have been cited 
as furthering the use of imprisonment (Ministry of Justice, 2013; Prison Reform 
Trust, 2020). Despite the high offending rate (Ministry of Justice, 2020d) that 
illustrates the futility of increased imprisonment, the imprisonment rate seems likely 
to increase, following a political announcement on increasing police resources in 
2022, alongside the extension of the stop and search programme and review 
sentencing for serious offenders (Ministry of Justice, 2019f).  
In contrast to the claim that ‘we are all in this together’ (Cameron, 2010a), this 
research demonstrates that participants believed that the poor continue to bear the 
burden of austerity, especially when the imprisonment rate is set to increase. Using 
the market as a political compass, participants witnessed the withdrawal of welfare 
services from the community, as well as a deindustrialisation process that forced 
penal institutions to become first responders for some individuals. Homelessness 
was up 60%, fitful sleeping 134%, and food banks use increased four-fold between 
2010 and 2018 (UN General Assembly, 2019). The loss of funds contributes to the 
broader unfulfilled aspect of well-being and welfare needs. When individuals arrive at 
penal institutions, they present with extraordinarily complex health and social needs 
and depend on scarce prison healthcare resources that have not increased since 
2006, even as prison populations have grown.  
A small group of participants also connected the dots between deindustrialisation, 
economic downturns, increased crime rates, and the increased incarceration of 
former military and those impacted by the steel industry closures across England. 
These areas of high deprivation depended upon employment in manufacturing 
industries, but the deindustrialisation of the 1980s, the failure of miners’ strikes, and 
the long decline of working-class agency through the trade union movement had left 
them vulnerable (Milne, 2014). This assertion supports existing research that 
suggests the impacts of austerity are most severe in areas with high levels of 
deprivation (Beatty and Fothergill, 2017; Clifford et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2016; 
Taylor-Robinson and Gosling, 2011) while reinforcing the observation that the 
burden of adjustment is not experienced symmetrically. 
12.1.5 What has been the government’s response to the ongoing instability since 
2010? 
The study participants observed how the government responded to the ongoing 
prison instability since 2010 by building an additional 20,000 prison places by 2025 
(CPT, 2020a), recruiting new prison officers, and blaming psychoactive substances 
for prison instability was an effort to instil order in English prisons. They noted that 
these manoeuvres disguise austerity’s contribution towards the current instability and 




As many interviewees argued, building more prison spaces did not address the 
issues of degrading living conditions or overcrowding in English prisons. Similarly, 
despite the nationwide recruitment campaign to recruit new prison officers to restore 
prison stability (Ministry of Justice, 2016), the majority of the participants argued that 
it did not reinstate the number of prison officers pre-austerity. Nor did these new 
officers have the emotional intelligence and skills to discharge their duties effectively. 
The adverse working conditions resulted in nearly four in ten (38%) officers leaving 
the prisons with less than one year’s service (HMPPS, 2019b).  
Participants contended that blaming the increasing use of Spice for prison instability 
seeks to extricate the link between austerity and system instability. Such a claim 
masks how austerity hindered purposeful activities and reduced workforce capacity 
to conduct drug searches. Separately, almost all participants expressed scepticism 
about the Treasury’s announcements of the end of austerity in 2019. Apart from the 
changing dates of the end of austerity (Farnsworth and Irving, 2015; The 
Conservative and Unionist Party, 2017; Vina et al., 2013), they observed the lack of 
real changes in resources for both prisons and the community.  
Furthermore, they alluded that Brexit would stall economic growth, parallel to various 
predictions (Erken et al., 2017; Mion and Ponattu, 2019; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2016). Further forecasts predict that the UK economy will likely suffer the worst 
damage from COVID-19 (Bank of England, 2020). The Treasury recently announced 
that more than £10 billion per year would be cut from departmental spending plans 
next year and in subsequent years (HM Treasury, 2020). Austerity has yet to show a 
sign of abating.  
12.1.6 In what ways do the scrutiny mechanisms of prisons mediate the impact of 
austerity on prison health governance and healthcare delivery in English prisons? 
Monitoring actions on the governing and delivering of prison and prison health have 
yet to secure any fundamental reforms to the system. While internal monitoring 
exists in terms of escalation of issues via line management and across governmental 
departments (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2019b; Ministry of Justice, 
2018b), the participants’ narratives rendered them futile, as the civil servants had no 
alternative but to comply with the prevailing political agenda. Similar scepticism was 
projected onto trade unions such as the PGA and the POA, as well as the scrutiny by 
parliamentary committees despite their continual monitoring (Brazier and Fox, 2011; 
Defty et al., 2014; Rogers and Walters, 2006).   
Likewise, external scrutiny mechanisms, such as HMIP, PPO, and IMBs abstained 
from commenting on how austerity directly impacts prisons and prisoners. Many 
participants blamed the apolitical nature of these organisations. Additionally, the lack 
of consensus among these organisations in portraying the current prison system in 





12.1.7 What are the policy solutions to address the impact of austerity on prison 
healthcare and prison healthcare delivery in England?  
Considering how austerity has increased the state debt, weakened the governance 
and delivery of healthcare services, and worsened the health among prisoners in 
England, participants suggested the following seven solutions to address the 
adverse impacts of austerity on prison healthcare and the broader prison system:  
i. Reducing the rate of incarceration in England via alternative routes to 
imprisonment, such as fines and diversion of individuals from prisons to health 
institutions. Such efforts would be more financially sustainable, proportionate 
to individuals’ criminal harm, and more responsive to their mental health 
needs (Mills and Kendall, 2018); 
 
ii. Increasing resources for prisons to improve prisoners’ access to healthcare 
and an improved living environment, while concurrently ensuring recurring 
spending for preventive services in the community to address potential risk 
factors of offending (UN General Assembly, 2019);  
 
iii. Imposing higher taxes on profitable corporations and wealthy individuals to 
increase resources across all public sector organisations (Ruckert and 
Labonté, 2017); 
 
iv. Ensuring better transparency via increasing political literacy of the public 
(Chang, 2010), framing messages on how prison health spending can reduce 
the dependencies on health and law enforcement services, and underscoring 
political accountability towards the relevant ministers (Boin, 2001; Terry, 
1995); 
 
v. Improving data collection and publication of the true cost of imprisonment and 
private prisons, as well as ameliorating forecasts on future proposed cuts on 
public sector services (NAO, 2017; Stuckler and Basu, 2013); 
 
vi. Encouraging non-governmental organisations to challenge democratic 
deficiencies in prison and prison health governance and delivery (Scott, 2018; 
Green and Ward, 2004), alongside forming an independent oversight authority 
to ensure proper implementation of recommendations resulting from prison 
monitoring and inspections; and 
 
vii. Initiating legal challenges under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 
Act of 2007 for arbitrarily interfering with prisoners’ entitlement and serious 




framing austerity as a state crime owing to exposure of prisoners to torture, 
cruel treatment, or punishment (Green and Ward, 2004). 
 
Although these proposed solutions are not a panacea to remedy the impacts of 
austerity over the last decade, if implemented correctly and robustly, they may have 
the opportunity to facilitate fundamental reform on prison and prison health in 
England.  
12.2 Thesis contribution 
This thesis makes empirical, theoretical, methodological and policy contributions to 
interdisciplinary prison health studies. These contributions are explicated below.  
12.2.1 Empirical contribution 
The novel analytical narrative presented here strengthens the realisation that 
austerity is a political choice and, after a decade, is clearly a failed political ideology. 
As affirmed by participants, politicians claimed that austerity was imperative to 
reduce the state debt and recover from the global recession that emanated from the 
US and European countries (Gamble, 2014). However, the UK debt-to-GDP reached 
an apogee in 2019 compared to the pre-austerity era in 2010, following the bank 
bailout programme of the government (Office for National Statistics, 2021b). 
Austerity has failed to fulfil its objectives in reducing deficits. It also illustrates the 
British exceptionalism in opting for voluntary deflation despite not being a member of 
the Eurozone when there is no economic imperative for doing so (Gamble, 2014; 
Schrecker, 2016). Its fiscal adjustment programme was comparable to what the 
Troika imposed on Greece, Ireland, and Portugal as part of their bailout conditions 
(ibid.). If recession provided the pretext, it is startling that growth did not provide a 
reason for relief, as the United Kingdom's economy, the fifth largest in the world, is 
continually growing, exceeding 2% between 2013 and 2018 (OECD, 2018). This 
thesis highlights one of the central political economy characteristics of austerity: it is 
a mere political choice with an active interplay of discrediting evidence and 
downplaying state adaptability, rendering it a failed political agenda after a decade. 
This study also underscores how imprisonment during the time of austerity becomes 
a form of double punishment. Building on Sykes’s (1958) theory of deprivation, this 
study reports how austerity obstructs access to healthcare and purposeful activities 
for prisoners, creates precarious living conditions and increases levels of violence 
that subject prisoners to excessive distress or hardship. The fact that prisons 
continue to hold these citizens not only belies the notion of healthcare equivalence in 
prisons, but also actually constitutes a human rights abuse. These findings contest 
the efficacy of previous studies showing that imprisonment is an opportunity to 
improve prisoners' health (Crewe, 2005; Goffman, 1968; Wacquant, 2002). Current 
resources and conditions make such improvement difficult. It also reveals the 




gangs and organised crime within English prisons and materialised the crisis of 
legitimacy (Habermas, 1973), which undermines leadership and coordinated action 
for health delivery.  
The thesis builds upon existing scholarly and governmental work that argues that 
austerity deteriorates safety nets for the communities and primes vulnerable 
individuals from these communities for prisons. The fact that approximately 14 
million people in the UK live in poverty, experiencing record levels of hunger and 
homelessness (UN General Assembly, 2019), evidences deterioration in the 
population’s health and supports the conclusions that the poor health of prisoners is 
partly a by-product of their experiences before entering incarceration (Marmot, 2005; 
Spencer, 2001; Whitehead, 2006; Williams, 1995; WHO, 2014). Eventually, these 
individuals arrive at penal institutions demonstrating extraordinarily complex health 
and social needs that have gone unmet due to diminished community services under 
austerity. 
Based on the participants’ narratives, this thesis provides preliminary evidence of 
how austerity affects populations in deprived communities and those who 
experienced the process of de-industrialisation. Building on extant studies that the 
impacts of austerity are most severe in areas with high levels of deprivation (Beatty 
and Fothergill, 2017; Clifford et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2016; Taylor-Robinson and 
Gosling, 2011), this study illuminates the links between social issues and relative 
deprivation, including imprisonment. This link is further demonstrated by the indices 
of income inequalities, such as Gini Coefficient, Palma Ratio, Top 1% share, 
S80/S20 ratio, and P90/P10 ratio, all of which point to a widening income inequality 
between 2010 and 2019 (Office for National Statistics, 2021a). This study finding 
also builds upon the evidence of a 49% real-term reduction in Government funding 
from 2010 to 2018 alongside a rise in demand for key social services (House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2018) that has further reinforced 
inequalities, especially in deprived communities. 
In previous generations, several areas across England depended upon employment 
in mines, steelworks, and shipbuilding, but the deindustrialisation of the 1980s, 
befitted the neoliberal construct of rolling back the state intervention from the 
economy. The results left the working class vulnerable (Milne, 2014; Pacione, 1997). 
This present study not only builds upon the assertion that the poor bear the brunt of 
austerity (Harvey, 2010), but also underscores the notion of double regulation of the 
poor by Wacquant (2000). Participants witnessed a close meshing between the 
rolling back of the welfare state and rolling out of penal institutions. It also reinforces 
the strengthening of the coercive arm of the state as well (Cavadino and Dignan, 
2006). Various US literature has examined the role between austerity and 
deindustrialisation, which finds a reduction in lifespan of those living in poverty and 
an increase in the seriousness of criminality that leads to imprisonment (Linkon and 




quantitative studies that might explore the association between the government’s 
decisions to withdraw funding from a welfare-based approach and the increase in 
criminality in areas that experienced deindustrialisation during the austere era in the 
UK.  
In addition, this study builds upon privatisation lessons from other countries, 
particularly Australia and the United States, on the lack of oversight and quality 
control monitoring of private prison providers, and nuances supporting arguments 
against the privatisation of prisons and prison healthcare services in England. Rather 
than reducing inefficiency and improving cost-saving and competition, this study 
illustrates that it achieved the opposite with immense consequences. Participants’ 
observations shed new light on how privatisation increases monitoring costs for the 
government, which contradicts the cost savings agenda. Meanwhile, using profit as a 
moral compass, as illustrated by study participants, could limit the efficacy of health 
utility on prisoners. Furthermore, the transfer of HMP Birmingham from G4S to a 
public sector prison, the bankruptcy of Carillion, and the poor performance of private 
contractors who delivered the Transforming Rehabilitation programme post-
imprisonment signified the arguments against privatisation (Ministry of Justice, 
2019a; House of Commons Justice Committee, 2019b). It provides an early warning 
that privatisation might cost more in the long run as the government continues to 
subsidise their failure.  
Yet, despite its poor track record across the English criminal justice system, 
forecasts indicate private contractors will occupy an increasingly significant role in 
the penal landscape following an outsourcing plan for two new prisons, HMPs Glen 
Parva and Wellingborough (House of Commons Library, 2018b; Ministry of Justice, 
2019f). Several participants signalled this move as politically irrational. This anomaly 
is ripe for an academic investigation into estimation of the actual costs of 
privatisation in prisons and the broader criminal justice system. These future studies 
should expose the contradiction of continuing to trust these private contractors when 
they continually fail to deliver in terms of costs, service efficiency, and quality, as well 
as the broader moral legitimacy for the state to maintain the administration of 
punishment rather than the private contractors. 
Finally, this thesis illustrates how the impotence of oversight mechanisms of English 
prisons continues to inflict the peril of austerity on prisoners and the prison 
workforce. This study seeks to address the lacuna that Padfield (2018) identified by 
examining the effectiveness of external monitors in impacting those who work and 
live in prisons. This study finds that civil servants, from policymakers to prison 
officers, had to maintain their impartiality by aligning themselves to the vision of 
justice ministers. Concurrently, this study provides the first evidence needed to 
assess parliamentary committees’ effectiveness in monitoring prison and prison 
health and establishes a foundation upon which future studies should build. Negative 




reforms. This fact corroborates the finding that one-half of the HMIP 
recommendations for improvement have not been achieved in 2019/2020 (HMIP, 
2020). All monitoring bodies have expressed serious concerns about prison staff’s 
failure to implement improvements following their reports (House of Commons 
Library, 2019b). 
The participants also criticised the ineffective oversight mechanisms of English 
prisons, which reflects the unwillingness of HMIP, PPO, and IMBs to challenge 
austerity on the grounds of its deterioration of prison regime and prison healthcare 
services. Ironically, they impose liability on civil servants who had no choice but to 
execute political mandates. These findings contradict earlier studies of these boards, 
which present a more favourable view of their role in highlighting and preventing 
institutional abuse and upholding accountability (Bennett, 2016; Lewis, 1997; 
Ramsbotham, 2003). This study also articulates a new phenomenon: the Lobbying 
Act of 2014 increasingly prevented third sector organisations from speaking up 
against austerity based on their contractual clauses and statutory requirements. It 
identifies a trend that can be generalised across charitable sector operations across 
the UK whereby the work of members of charitable organisations must reflect the 
viewpoint of their funders, consequently muting, concealing and obscuring the voices 
of these voluntary organisations. Silence and lack of meaningful actions helped 
create the space and conditions for the deep-seated crisis that austerity continually 
inflicts on prisoners and the prison workforce. 
12.2.2 Theoretical contribution 
The second contribution of this thesis is theoretical clarity in analysing the complexity 
of the impact of austerity on public sector services. This thesis argues that, based on 
the perspectives of prison and prison health experts, austerity exposes six political 
paradoxes that have shaped and constrained prison health in England since 2010. 
This framework reflects the impact of neoliberalism: mutable and tentative 'rolling 
back' and 'rolling out' policies, hegemonic programmes, and governmentality (Ward 
and England, 2007). Overall, austerity has failed not only to reduce the burgeoning 
national debt, but also to control the governance and delivery of healthcare services 
in a way that is effective and efficient, and to improve the utility of health among 
prisoners in England. While maintaining a sensitivity to the uniqueness of other 
contexts, this framework could potentially be adapted to other public service sectors 
to examine the impacts of austerity on different settings of health. 
Furthermore, this thesis advances further understanding of the limited autonomy and 
independence of civil servants. The participants found that civil servants were unable 
to challenge the impact of austerity on prisons and prison health effectively. 
Irrespective of the organisational strata, all of them avoided using the word ‘austerity’ 
in their day-to-day discussions within their departments and with stakeholders, 
demonstrating their passive and pervasive acquiescence as civil servants. While 




exist to depoliticise decision-making processes and that civil servants are 
independent decision-makers, this thesis suggests that this conclusion is somewhat 
problematic and rather overstated, at least within the prison service context. Instead, 
the top-down control mimics the critical realist theory of governance (Marsh, 2011), 
reflecting how the government maintains a firm grip on hierarchical coordination, 
inherited from the Westminster model of strong ministerial steering.  
Ministerial involvement in prison services is a tradition that continues to the present 
day. This study does not align neatly with the theory of representational dimension 
(Sparks and Bottoms, 1996), which posits that officials’ behaviour is a homogenous 
reflection of the system as a whole. Tensions exist within the narrative of those who 
worked across English prisons themselves, where they spoke against ministerial 
involvement in the prison service. Nevertheless, on the whole, this study 
demonstrates how civil servants have drifted into the margins of decision-making, 
doing their best to execute the ideas the central government had foisted upon them. 
Inevitably, study participants from all organisational levels aligned with the objectives 
of politicians and their ideological hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). This has depoliticised 
austerity through economic logic, disguised the use of austerity as a political 
apparatus, and disconnected political accountability to emasculate criticisms.  
Additionally, this study highlights the constriction of prison health governance within 
a top-down control structure of prison service. In fact, it is a new form of governance 
that has yet to be theorised by academics, which seeks to mesh the theoretical 
representation of prison health system and structure with the empirical manifestation 
of adaptation towards top-down structure. While the concepts of government without 
governance were in fashion in the 1990s-providing an alternative to the traditional 
top-down, command-and-control approach of hierarchical steering by the central 
government (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Fidler, 2007; Kooiman and van Vliet, 1993; 
Rhodes, 1996)—they tend to leave limited space for the domination of one 
government agency over another. This new form of governance highlights the zero-
sum approach that demonstrates a collision between a top-down and a dispersed 
system, prioritising short-term security and control in the criminal justice system. It is 
a form of governance that is completing riddled with ideology, power and political 
interests and can thwart social pursuits, such as rehabilitation. Underlying the 
structure of prison health governance and delivery is the state’s choice to align 
prison health governance and delivery with the prevailing political ideology (Holden, 
2011; Peck and Tickell, 1994; Vayrynen, 1999). 
This thesis provides further impetus for the emerging scholarly turn towards informal 
governance within prisons that flourished because of weak formal governance. 
Advancing previous research (Gooch and Treadwell, 2020; Maitra, 2010; Skarbek, 
2011), this study demonstrates how the microeconomic structure of organised crime 
thrived. Previous studies (ibid.) were based on ethnographic accounts from 2014 and 




As an update to existing scholarship, and moving beyond Habermas’s (1973) crisis 
of legitimacy theory, this study explains and conceptualises the lack of detection and 
enforcement resulting from fewer prison custodians and a broader crisis of legitimacy 
of prison governance, which has resulted in a loss of control of the prison institution, 
an undermining of leadership, and coordinated action for health delivery. 
The thesis also seeks to build on the theory of agnotology, which remains under-
theorised in social sciences (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008). The narratives of a 
minority of civil service participants who denied the relationship between austerity 
and prison instability, claiming hard evidence of causation, has emerged from this 
analysis. Most participants rejected such logic, concluding that the violent 
catastrophe following the Benchmarking Programme 2012 did not merely happen by 
chance. These denials nevertheless resemble a process of manufacturing doubt and 
promoting ignorance and indifference via the continual process of gaslighting (ibid.). 
Those in power manipulate the public by fragmenting the reality of austerity. Blaming 
prison instability on the increasing level of psychoactive substances is an act of 
agnotology, enabling theorisation of denialism. The politics of austerity cannot be 
fully appreciated without looking at the political response that frames the prison 
crisis. 
This thesis highlights the long-standing degradation of the prison rehabilitation 
construct over the last few decades. A mismatch between the policy that recognises 
rehabilitation as one of the penal drivers and the resource constraints reinforces the 
conflict between ‘policy-in-form’ and ‘policy-in-use’ enacted on the ‘frontstage’ and 
‘backstage’ of policy formulation and policy implementation. Furthermore, the 
stability of the governance and delivery of prison health is highly dependent upon the 
ministerial view that rehabilitation initiatives are soft on crime. This view is further 
juxtaposed by a vague purpose of imprisonment under Rule 3 of the Prison Rules 
1999, which is written to encourage and assist prisoners in leading a good and 
useful life, and reinforces the notion of punishment at the expense of rehabilitation. 
When unpacking the pro-punishment sentimentality, the complex meaning of prison 
rehabilitation continues to occupy the backseat of prison discourse. This view 
amplifies the theory of bureaucracy (Weber, 1930): that prison service continues to 
be ill-equipped to translate vague and conflicting goals into integrated actions. This 
inability creates ripple effects on prison management, the delivery of healthcare 
equivalence, and eventually impedes prisoners' access to health services. The 
concept of prisons as potentially rehabilitative merely obfuscates the dominant reality 
of punishment in English prisons.  
Finally, this thesis paves the way for international research to determine the ways in 
which the exposure of prisoners to torture, cruel treatment or punishment via 
austerity could amount to state crimes. Implicit in the human rights-based definition 
of state crime is the inclusion not only of active violations of human rights but also of 




individuals or corporations (Green and Ward, 2004). In light of recent ministerial 
admissions, including those of Boris Johnson, austerity programmes were more 
wide-ranging, severe, and damaging than initially intended (Al-Jazeera, 2019), and 
the UN’s special rapporteur investigation found the UK government in breach of its 
human rights obligations in a ‘systematic’ and ‘tragic’ way (UN General Assembly, 
2019). Demonstrating the framing of state crime caused by austerity, imposed on 
one of the marginalised groups within today's society, is a fertile field for health and 
criminological inquiry.  
12.2.3 Methodological contribution 
The third thesis contribution is methodological. This research is the first in-depth, 
large scale qualitative study exploring the impact of macroeconomic austerity on 
prison health governance and delivery. The sample (N=87) included prison health 
professionals in England, international and national policymakers, prison governors 
and officers, as well as representatives from prison health services in England. 
Interdisciplinary lenses from public health, criminology, social policy, law, politics, 
economics, and sociology formed a sophisticated theoretical framework. As Szostak 
(2013; 2015) and, more recently, Pye (2018) have noted, interdisciplinary research is 
a means of generating coherent debates and delivering richer outcomes to resolve 
today’s complex research problems, something which is beyond the capability of a 
mono-disciplinary approach. This study utilises this framework in theorising the 
impacts of austerity on prison health governance and delivery from different 
disciplinary dimensions. 
This study further builds upon the paucity of ‘studying up’ research in the prison 
health field. Building upon previous methodological studies on elite participants 
(Lilleker, 2003; Littig, 2009; Mikecz, 2012; Richards, 1996), the methodological 
contribution is demonstrated via interviews with 56 international and national experts, 
who occupied authoritative positions and engaged with policymaking activities in the 
prison health field, and who were capable of influencing political outcomes on prison 
health. The sparsity of research with political and policy elites is not unique to the 
prison health field, considering their position in an asymmetrical distribution of 
knowledge and their insularity from the public, which can be attributed to their power 
(Hunter, 1995; Ostrander, 1995).  
 
The thesis outlined how invitation strategies were carefully planned and executed, as 
previous studies have illustrated how elites are relatively inaccessible (Laurila, 1997; 
Ostrander, 1995; Sabot, 1999; Thuesen, 2011; Welch et al., 2002). Strategies 
included adapting to their busy schedules, creating a good impression to foster trust 
and openness throughout the process (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007), and going 
beyond media soundbites (Hallin, 1992; Petkov and Kaoullas, 2016). While previous 
literature forewarned the direct implications of the power dynamic, noting that elites 




process (Sabot, 1999; Welch et al., 2002), this thesis proves otherwise in that all of 
these elite participants were open about their experiences and in articulating the 
impacts of austerity on prison health. On a broader level, it challenges the duality of 
an ‘us against them’ position, since the process was amenable and reciprocal, with 
me bearing in mind the need to critically question their viewpoints rather than merely 
accepting their propositions. Overall, this thesis method provided insight into the 
hidden elements of the austerity phenomenon, which fits the aim of the research: to 
understand the impacts of macroeconomic austerity of prison health governance and 
delivery of prison healthcare in England. 
While the large sample size of this study helps with the transferability of the findings 
across the prison health system, condensing the data from 87 interviews and 
devising cross-cutting theories across all interviews proved challenging. Existing 
grounded theory methodology favoured a three-stage analysis coding process: (a) 
open coding, (b) focused coding, and (c) axial coding (Charmaz, 2006). To provide 
further refinement on the emerging theories from the analysis, the researcher 
devised an additional stage, called ‘The Fourth Order’ to consolidate the axial codes 
to form a central research thesis. Here, all the axial categories from the different 
interview phases underwent a further deductive and synthesis process to form a 
central research thesis that austerity exposes six political paradoxes that have 
shaped and constrained the prison health in England since 2010. Amalgamating 
axial codes involved refining their tacit meaning to ensure that the categories 
explicated all the properties and were faithful towards their axial essence, narrowing 
down towards the central thesis. The central thesis was realised when these 
categories covered all the major themes from the interviews.  
Finally, this study addresses academics’ concerns relating to data saturation. It 
addresses the perception that research can never achieve data saturation. Data 
saturation demands turning every stone but offers no precise method of achieving 
this threshold. To entirely bypass methodological elitism, this research employed two 
strategies. First, a five-dimension framework (Aldiabat and Le Navenec, 2018; 
Bonde, 2013; Bowen, 2008; Morse et al., 2009) was drawn upon: 1) examining the 
nature and complexity of the investigation; 2) the interdisciplinary nature of the 
research established the heterogeneity of the sample; 3) theoretical sampling 
prompted further focus on the emerging theories from the initial interviews; 4) 
triangulation process of the sample selection; and 5) the use of subjectivity and 
intuition to determine data saturation. Second, this research devised a new variance 
called ‘participant saturation’, where key stakeholders recommended as participants 
were already interviewees. Upon achieving this kind of saturation, it will be futile to 
interview additional stakeholders for the research. Doing so ensured inspection of 





12.2.4 Policy contribution 
Finally, this study highlights the urgency of policy responses that could strengthen 
political accountability towards the imposition of austerity on prison and prison 
health. Several participants recommended monitoring per capita spending on prisons 
and prison healthcare services, which can be facilitated by international 
organisations such as the WHO and the CPT, given austerity is a global 
phenomenon. Similarly, quantifying the actual costs of imprisonment and ill-health 
within this setting is needed to form the basis of political, policy and social 
discussions, especially on the extent of prison effectiveness in addressing them. 
Rather than focusing the impacts of austerity within the prison setting only, 
connecting the postponement or cancellation of health appointments and longer 
waiting times to access treatment to the broader NHS England performance, for 
instance, would provide a bird’s eye view of the event. 
National research could be focused on tracking the extent of implementation of 
recommendations from the prison oversight bodies to improve prison health and 
regime in England. To address the partial and inconsistent view of the participants 
on the extent to which austerity impacts different prison establishments and 
prisoners, this thesis suggests a closer monitoring of the austerity impacts across 
prison establishments and prisoner groups in England. Independent external 
organisations will be in the best place to monitor this development as part of their 
scrutiny framework. Similarly, tracking mechanisms that connect ministers to their 
reform agenda–irrespective in the events of success or failure–would reinforce the 
omnipresence of their political power in directing civil servants to execute their 
political vision. Such research could potentially highlight the lack of ownership and 
compliance, and how the broader political climate around Brexit, responses towards 
the COVID-19 pandemic, and the discussions on withdrawal from human rights 
commitments often tamper with the implementation of those recommendations. 
Perhaps such a potentially large-scale analysis could prompt the question: ‘What 
would prison health look like in light of these challenges’?  Put another way, ‘Do the 
political shocks involving prisons signal that we are nearing the end of a period of 
prison volatility, or instead are we closer to the beginning of a new period of great 
change’? Overall, these research projects could potentially be significant in 
delivering original, significant, and rigorous scholarship. 
This thesis also presents an opportunity to reflect on the impact of austerity 
measures in other domains where policy choices could compromise health. Future 
international research could focus on determining the extent to which 
macroeconomic conditions and the political economy frameworks that the member 
states adopt are commensurable with a government’s commitment to provide 
sufficient financial resources for prison health. The analysis could be linked to the 
existing obligations, such as the principle of equivalence of healthcare in prisons 




the Sustainable Development Goals 2030 that were estimated to be between 
US$3.3 and US$4.5 trillion a year (Ismail et al., 2021; Tangcharoensathien et al., 
2015). As politicians are faced with competing fiscal demands, it is important to 
address under-resourcing of health and welfare services in the criminal justice 
system and to understand the political archetype that could either nurture or thwart 
prison health commitment. 
12.3 Strengths and limitations of the study 
This research contextualises the impact of austerity on the prison health governance 
and the delivery of prison healthcare services in England. The significance of the 
findings herein pertains to countries beyond England, particularly those where 
austerity shaped prison policy following the 2008 global economic recession. This 
thesis presents an opportunity to reflect on the impact of austerity measures in other 
domains where policy choices could compromise health. Such explorations would 
likely indicate that austerity cannot be justified empirically or ethically, given its 
deleterious health effects on governance, the workforce, and policy end users. 
As with all research, however, there are limitations to the study reported on in this 
thesis. It is beyond the scope of this study to demonstrate with quantitative certainty 
that austerity is responsible for worsening prison health governance and the delivery 
of healthcare in English prisons. Some measures demonstrated the effects of 
austerity over the last decade, particularly the increasing violence that precipitated 
from the post-2012 Benchmarking Exercise in prison, which saw a reduction in 
prison workforce; there is no other plausible alternative explanation for existing 
prison instability. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of participants explicitly 
rejected the claim that more proof is needed. In doing so, participants clearly 
indicated that they saw austerity as inflicting harm on prison health governance and 
healthcare delivery in England.  
Considering the qualitative nature of this study, the findings of the instability of the 
prison health system and the broader regime of prisons cannot be precisely 
attributed solely to austerity. There are longstanding prison issues that are 
connected to government policy decisions and are broader than austerity, notably 
inadequate funding and delivery of prison healthcare services, poor health of 
prisoners, and statutory commitment on sentencing—all of which have been 
discussed in this thesis. Although asserting with quantitative certainty that austerity is 
responsible for worsening prison health governance and delivery in England is 
beyond its remit, interviews from this study can also be used more conventionally as 
a precursor to quantitative research by discovering how austerity impacts the prison 
health and prison regime. Experimental studies could identify potentially counter-
intuitive and important findings regarding fiscal relations, redistribution, and the 
normative order within prisons. These studies would also help ensure that more 
conventional quantitative statistical generalisations replace the potential pitfalls 




While this study attempts to understand the impacts of austerity on prison health 
from 87 prison health experts’ perspective, it discounts the experience of prisoners 
themselves. This gap suggests the need for future studies to understand the micro-
assumptions made by the research participants, particularly on how the distribution 
of resources impinges individual prisoners. As such, future research should address 
the specificity of the impact of austerity on the diverse prison populations, as well as 
unequal distribution of spending cuts along gender, age, ethnicity, and nationality, 
alongside intersectionality among them. As 90% of prisoners will eventually leave 
prison (House of Commons Library, 2019a), future studies could also assess the 
impacts of austerity on prisoners after they return to their communities.  
Moreover, the study utilised a convenience sample (N=17) for the micro-level of the 
governance study phase. It was highly dependent on the availability of prison 
governors and officers to take part in this research. The data also focused solely on 
adult prisons in England and may not reflect conditions in other places of 
confinement, such as youth offender institutions and immigration removal centres. It 
is parsimonious to assume that some of the insights provided here do not apply to 
these environments.  
Those participants who took part in the study may also have been those who had a 
strong motivation to express their viewpoint. Although their realities are important 
through a constructivist lens, these participants may have provided an unreflective 
impression of the setting. However, on balance, the research’s ethical framework 
influenced the participants’ decision to participate or not and share their experience 
in specific establishments. Epistemologically, the principles of constructivism 
grounding the study suggest that meaning has intersubjective underpinning and is 
context-bound. In adopting this perspective, the study did not seek generalisable 
findings or definitive truths but instead intended to capture the shared understanding 
or consensus (within a diverse and varied system) of the prison using the voices of 
experts of the prison health system. Regardless, the study's findings are transferable 
to other health settings and have a role in theory building, especially about prison 
health, governance and delivery of services, and austerity discussions.  
12.4 Final thoughts  
A decade has passed since the introduction of the political rhetoric of austerity in 
England. Austerity and imprisonment have failed to deliver their stated objectives: to 
rapidly reduce the burgeoning national debt and the rate of reoffending, respectively. 
However, after over a decade of failures, the state continues to pursue austerity and 
imprisonment, producing the same result, and political reluctance to dispense with 
them seems as strong as ever. Austerity is an expensive political choice, and the 
actual cost of imprisonment during austere times constitutes an egregious violation 
of human rights. This research offers a starting point, providing a narrative calling for 




England’s international and domestic commitments to the humane treatment of all 
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Justice Ministers and their policy and political focus on prison during term of office 
Minister Brief summary of policy and political focus on prison during term of office 
 
Ken Clarke  
(2010 – 2012) 
 
Signalled that short sentences fewer than 12 months were not effective in rehabilitating 
prisoners. Proposed increased scrutiny on the relationship between the European Court of 
Human Rights and the UK. Planned to reduce sentences, including those convicted for rape, 
who pleaded guilty at the pre-trial stage. Introduced Green Paper on Transforming 
Rehabilitation that sought to change how probation service is delivered via extension of 
statutory rehabilitation to offenders serving custodial sentences of under 12 months, thus 
opening the market to the public and voluntary and private sector organisations, and introduced 
payment by results for providers to reduce reoffending.  
Criticised by his political peers for being soft on crime for proposing a reduction in the prison 
population. Responding to the English riot incidents in 2011, he adopted a tougher stance 







(2012 – 2015) 
 
Pursued a “tough justice” agenda by 1) ending automatic early release for terrorists and child 
rapists; 2) terminating simple cautions for serious offences; and 3) introducing increased 
protections for householders defending themselves against intruders. Executed prison’s 
Benchmarking Exercise to reduce the number of prison officers, thus contributing to prison 
instability. Proposed cuts to legal aid and imposed flat-fee court charges for magistrates’ courts, 
with the lowest fee being £150 for a guilty plea. Proposed the introduction of British Bill of Rights 
to replace the European Convention on Human Rights. Introduced a limit of 12 books for 
prisoners. Created the now defunct Community Rehabilitation Companies to manage those on 
probation for low-level crimes. 
Criticised by the House of Commons Justice Committee in 2015 for a 38% rise in prison deaths 
since 2012 and for the failure of privatising the Probation Service via the Community 
Rehabilitation Companies so that those services would be restored to public ownership and 
control. 
Michael Gove  
(2015 – 2016) 
 
Scrapped the courts fee and the limit of 12 books per prisoner, as instituted by Grayling. 





Liz Truss  
(2016 – 2017) 
 
The first woman to hold the Justice Minister position. Announced a £1.3 billion investment 
programme in prison service and recruitment of 2,500 additional prison officers to address 
violence in prisons, as part of the Prison Safety and Reform White Paper 2016. Introduced the 
Prison Reform Bill, which laid the foundation for collaborative commissioning for prison 




(2017 – 2018) 
 
Served the shortest time period—six months. Conceded to European Court of Human Rights 
ruling on prisoner voting in Hirst v UK (No.2), albeit in a rather tokenistic way, by allowing 






David Gauke  
(2018 – 2019) 
Famously quoted for his remark “prison does not work,” he proposed scrapping short sentences 
of under 12 months and modernising prisons via use of technology in their diurnal regime. 
Favoured rehabilitation over punishment and recommended fewer women in prison. Introduced 
the Urgent Notification process to allow HMIP to notify the Justice Minister of failing prisons, 
with HMPs Nottingham, Exeter, Birmingham, Bedford and Bristol, and the Feltham Young 
Offender Institute given such a notice during his tenure. 
Criticised by the House of Commons Justice Committee for failing to tackle prison instability. 
Forced the former Parole Board Chair, Nick Hardwick, to resign following an assessment to 
release John Worboys, a black cab rapist. 
 
Robert Buckland 
(2019 – Present) 
 
Recommended that sexual and violent offenders be required to serve two-thirds of their 
sentence, as opposed to half. Announced intention to have another prison in Wales as part of 
Boris Johnson’s plan for another 10,000 additional prison cells.  
 
Criticised for suggesting that suspects accused of serious crimes should be granted anonymity 
if the accusations threatened their reputation; the idea was viewed as potentially favouring the 
rich. Condemned by the Prison Reform Trust and Howard League for Penal Reform for the 
delay in releasing non-violent prisoners from prisons during the COVID-19 pandemic. 


























Example of invitation letter 










Example of a two-page summary of the research project  





























The feedback that I received after the circulation of these documents was positive. One 
participant said, “I've read your articles with great interest – and admiration; very well 
done; and I'm happy to know that I've been able to provide some support to your work”. 
 
Most participants asked to be kept in touch and to be informed of all publications 
deriving from this project for reference.  
 
Several participants even forwarded the paperwork to their wider network who operated 
at the United Nations, the European Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the House of Commons Select 












Conference presentations throughout the PhD study 
• Ismail, N. (2019) Impact of austerity on prison health in England: a qualitative 
study involving national policymakers. 12th European Public Health Conference, 




• Ismail, N. (2019) The pervasive impact of austerity on prison health in England: 
the perspective of national policymakers. Oral presentation at The Fifth 
International Conference on Law Enforcement and Public Health (LEPH), 21st – 






• Ismail, N. (2018) Impact of Macroeconomic Austerity on Prisoner Health in 
England: A Qualitative Study Involving International Policymakers. Oral 
presentation at The Fourth International Conference on LEPH, 21st – 24th 
October 2018. Toronto, Canada.  
 
 
• Ismail, N. (2018) The Impact of Macroeconomic Austerity on Prisoner Health and 
Well-being in England: Preliminary Findings from an International Study. Invited 
presentation at the Prison Health Research Symposium, University of Central 







• Ismail, N. (2018) What is Good Prison Research? A PhD/Early Career 
Perspective. Invited presentation at the 2nd International Correctional Research 






Ethical approval by the Faculty Research Ethics Committee at UWE Bristol in 
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HMPPS Research Criteria 
I reviewed my application against the following seven criteria prior to submission that 
ranged from linking the research to one of the HMPPS priorities to anticipating 
demands on resources for each individual establishments (HMPPS, 2017b):  
1. Is the application sufficiently linked to HMPPS priorities? At the time of 
submission, their priorities were:  
 
a. Delivering punishment and orders of the court; 
b. Security, safety and public protection; 
c. Reducing reoffending; 
d. Improving efficiency and reducing costs. 
  
2. What are the anticipated demands on resources? This includes, but is not 
limited to, staff time, office requirements and demands on data providers. 
 
3. Does the research overlap with other current or recent research?  
 
4. How appropriate and robust is the research methodology? 
 
5. Are there any data protection or security issues to consider? 
 
6. Are there any ethical considerations? 
 
7. What is the extent of the applicants’ research skills and experience? 
 
There are seven key sections to be completed in the application form (Ministry of 
Justice, 2019):  
1. Key details about the applicant and information regarding the research 
project, for instance, the proposed topic and the project collaborators; 
 
2. The aims and objectives of the research, which include an outline of the 
primary research questions, the alignment of the research utility to HMPPS 
business priorities, and the potential contributions to academic knowledge; 
 
3. The proposed methodology, together with the resource implications and 
operational risks of using the proposed methodology; 
 
4. The requirement to access the prison frontline, which asks for a rationale on 





5. Data protection, which involves issues around data collection, retention and 
disposal. In addition, compliance with the European General Data Protection 
Regulation 2016/679 is required. This ensures that participants have the right 
to be informed of the research and how their data are handled and stored 
following the interviews, along with the right of access, rectification, erasure, 
portability, and object of data processing; 
 
6. The research ethics approval which it is intended will be sought from other 
institutions, for example the university ethics committee; and 
 
7. The proposed dissemination routes of the research. 
  
  
 
 
 
